



BC

THE

AMERICAN

CATHOLIC QUARTERLY

REVIEW.

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vancat
invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantium sive confitentum.
S. AUG. EPIST. CCXXXVIII. AD. PASCENT.

VOLUME II.

FROM JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1877.

PHILADELPHIA:
HARDY AND MAHONY,
PUBLISHERS AND PROPRIETORS,
505 CHESTNUT STREET.

THE
AMERICAN
CATHOLIC QUARTERLY

COPYRIGHT, 1877,

BY

HARDY & MAHONY.

70735

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Vol. II.—JULY, 1877.—No. 7.

THE ENGLISH IN THEIR CONTINENTAL HOMESTEAD.

1. *The Anglo-Saxon Poem of Beowulf.* By Benjamin Thorpe.
2. *England under Anglo-Saxon Kings.* By Lappenberg. 2 vols.
3. *History of English Literature.* By H. A. Taine. 2 vols.

I.

HYPOLITE ADOLPHE TAINE is a critic; he is at times an agreeable gossip; but he is no historian. He makes reflections and calls them philosophy; he strings a series of them together and designates the result a book. That they ought to be pertinent to their subject-matter never seems to enter his head. A book, a name, a single word, is a sufficient peg on which to hang them, as so much furniture with which to decorate the vacuity of his ideas. It is no exaggeration to say that one-half the matter contained in the two volumes of his *English Literature* might be omitted without the least detriment to the connection of the essential parts. Whole sections are inserted which would bear as much relevancy to the portion treated of one hundred pages before or after. And then he is biassed in his judgments. He has it all prearranged concerning what he will find in an author's works. To establish proofs for his theory, he often takes mere incidental remarks as characteristic of the whole tone of a poem. This is the secret of his inability to do justice to Shakspeare. His opinions are all tinctured with newspaper flippancy. What he says is smartly said; it is all point; it can never be taken as a rounded expression of the author or work on which he delivers judgment. Few of his

decisions can be regarded as final. Add to this the fact that he talks, throughout the book, a most pernicious system of philosophy, which proves him to be a disciple of Auguste Comte, and it may easily be understood why Mgr. Dupanloup so strenuously opposed the crowning of his work by the French Academy. Paying public honor to such a book were giving open approval to atheism. It were even countenancing superficialness, for Taine is superficial. The moment the reader resists the fascination of his style, and weighs his assertions in the light of history and philosophy, he finds him to be a skilful manipulator of surface facts, and nothing more. Nowhere is this more manifest than in the first chapter on the Saxons. A few quotations from Scandinavian mythology, a passage from Tacitus, the mention of Beowulf, and a few items of history, promiscuously thrown together, suffice for him to spin his thread of fiction upon. More things go to make up a history of English literature than are dreamt of in Taine's philosophy.

Literature has value only by reason of the thought it conveys. But thought has various outlets. It is expressed in a people's laws and life, in its arts and architecture, in its philosophy and religion, in its science and industry. Each explains the other. Thus literature is only one out of many forms of thought. To make it the whole embodiment is to destroy the real relation of things. Thought is as subtle as the spirit that gives it existence. It pervades every action of life; it is the suggester of man's plans; it is the motive power of his deeds; it is the regulator of his industries; it moulds his religion and mythology; it explains his views; it sings of his heroes. Man is so called because of his thinking power.¹ But thought is reacted upon by circumstances. It gets its shape from the time and place in which it is expressed; it receives its coloring from the person who speaks it. No thought stands alone. It forms an inseparable link with the past and the future. A sentence, whether spoken or written, would at no other time and in no other place receive the exact shape it receives then and there. Nor could other than the person speaking or writing it give it the same tone as that it takes. This truth applies with equal force to a nation. According to the degree of its civilization will a people express itself. At no two epochs will it retain exactly the same form of utterance. Hence the necessity of taking into account the precise condition of a people in forming an estimate of its literature. We will examine the state of thought among the English people prior to their leaving the Continental homestead. We will then be in better condition to appreciate their real progress under Christian and Norman influences.

¹ The word *man* is pure Sanscrit and means *to think*.

II.

We will begin by giving things their right names. In calling the English Anglo-Saxons, we are calling them what they had never called themselves up to the last century. In early times they spoke of themselves as *Englisc*. The elegant translation of Polydore Virgil's History, made towards the end of the sixteenth century, speaks of "the dominion of the Engleshemmen, as a fresshe burden and ofspringe of nature,"¹ beginning after the overthrow of the Britons. True, England was peopled by three races, the Angles or English, the Jutes, and the Saxons; but they are of the same stock, having the same religion, the same manners and customs, and nearly the same language. They inhabited that part of Europe now known as the Schleswig-Holstein provinces and the Netherlands. This was their second homestead. Many centuries previously they lived in their cradle-land in Asia. They bear kinship with the Persian and Hindu; but their difference of occupation, the nature of their soil, and the influence of climate, so changed their natures, and gave such direction to their thoughts, that it were difficult to imagine them originally one people with the Hindu, did they not retain evidence of the relationship in their language. And that proves them to be of the same stock. In both do we find words identical in sound and in meaning, as the term *naman*, which means "name" both in Sanskrit and old English.² Sometimes, while the word remains, its primitive meaning becomes changed in one or other of the languages. Such is the word *path*, which, as a verb, means to go.³ In this sense is it used by Shakspeare, in a passage over which the critics have been greatly exercised.

"For, if thou path thy native semblance on,
Not Erebus itself were dim enough
To hide thee from prevention."⁴

It is the privilege of genius to strike the original meaning of a word long after it has passed from the common intelligence. Such was Shakspeare's case in this instance. Again, in our irregular verbs, we have forms which can be accounted for only by a comparative study of the Sanskrit. Take, for instance, the verb *to be*. The forms *is* and *am* come from the verb *as*, of the same meaning, and its first person, singular, *asmi*; the form *was* is found in the verb *vas*, to dwell; and the form *be* is one with *bhu*, a word having also the same meaning.⁵ And it is only in a language cognate to

¹ Vol. i., p. 126, Camden Society Publication, 1846. The author of the translation is unknown.

² See Bosworth's Anglo-Saxon and English Dictionary, p. 171, and Max Müller's Sanskrit Grammar, p. 87.

³ Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 508.

⁴ Julius Caesar, Act ii., sc. 1.

⁵ See Max Müller's Sanskrit Grammar for the conjugation of each of these verbs, pp. 277, 260, 245.

the Sanskrit that we find the root-word of our comparative *better*. "In the Persian," says Cardinal Wiseman, "we have precisely the same comparative, *behter*, with exactly the same signification, regularly formed from its positive *beh*, good; just as we have in the same language *badter*, worse, from *bad*."¹

The English, then, are a branch of the Aryan family. That primitive people, the mother race of Kelt and Teuton and Hindu, was devoted to the cultivation of the soil; they have, at all times, shown a fondness for the tillage of the land, except when brought face to face with almost insurmountable difficulties, as the encroachments of the sea. That mother race was passionately attached to Nature-worship; they retained that inherited love for Nature. They deified the elements, even as did their sister peoples, the Greeks and Hindus, and as did their Aryan mother prior to either. With impetuous feelings rushed they to the hunt; with reckless eagerness they committed themselves to the mercy of wind and wave. The Aryan was a people fond of philosophical speculation; the common problems and the nearly common solutions it has left the sister nations, prove as much. But the English of old became too besotted with heavy and coarse drinks, which they indulged in to excess, to be able to speculate with the acuteness of a Greek or Hindu. With the Aryan, home was a sacred refuge, and all the family relations were held in reverence as well as honor; this became, with the English, one of their most widely cherished and deeply rooted sentiments. Among the nine maidens who are represented, in Scandinavian mythology, as giving birth to Heimdall, are Jarnsaxa and Angeia. Who is more of a home-body than the Englishman, and with what other people could *Heimweh* exist than those to whom the word is native? The Aryan fell under the influences of his senses, to the clouding of his spiritual parts; so were the English greatly wrapped up in their material natures. The Aryan was given to poetry in which the greatness of man and nature were blended; so were the English, but with a difference. Living in the land of the sunny East the ancestral race rejoiced in the harmonies and beauties of form and color; but in their woody, mist-enveloped land, the English lost sight of these things, and they ceased to be for them what they were for the Kelt and the Greek, a passion.

In their Continental homestead, the English lived and worked and had their aspirations and their opinions of things. To understand aright the Englishman of modern history, we must observe him as he was two thousand years ago. We must learn his ways and penetrate his thoughts. National traits of character are not

¹ Lectures on Science and Revealed Religion, Lect. i., p. 30.

the work of a day; they are the outcome of centuries of slow, persistent action. Man begins by accommodating himself to circumstances; this is the first step he takes in the formation of his manhood. Circumstances, in their turn, react upon him, his thoughts, his ways, his dispositions; this gives the final direction to character, suggests divergence from the early home-life, and creates a new type of race. In general, the nature of the soil will determine the occupations of a people; its occupations will give color and shape to its thoughts; they, in turn, will mould the expression of its literature. The native land of the old English was a land of fog and mist, of fat, muddy soil, and of slow, sluggish rivers. It was covered with vast forests. It was a land on which the sea was ever making encroachments; and in this respect it is still the same land. Witness the untiring exertions of Holland to repel these encroachments, and to recover lost ground, by her system of dykes. But in the days of which we speak there were no dykes. The result was, that at the equinoxes the whole country became suddenly submerged, and as soon the water subsided. Tacitus describes the country under one of these visitations: "The wind blowing hard from the north, and the waves, as usual at the equinox, rolling with a prodigious swell . . . the country was laid under water. The sea, the shore, and the fields presented one vast expanse. The depths and shallows, the quicksands and the solid ground, were no more distinguished. . . . The return of day presented a new phase of things: the waters had subsided and the land appeared."¹ A people so situated must needs accommodate itself to the sea, and make it yield profit in proportion to the destruction it deals. On this principle acted the old English. They not only became accustomed to the sea; they loved it; their greatest pleasure they found in sporting in its waves. Their little boats of hide danced about upon its rugged bosom as though they were things of life. Beowulf would have been considered no fit hero for an old English poem, had he not, when a youth, ventured on the stormy ocean; and so we find him in friendly competition with Brecca, striving to perform feats of valor. Hunferth speaks:

"Then on the sound ye rowed, and thence with arms
The ocean covered, and the sea-streets measured;
With hands ye gripped and glided o'er the main;
With winter's fury boiled the waves o' the deep;
While on the waters toiled ye seven nights."²

¹ Annals, B. i., chap. 70.

² *thá git on sund reón, thær git eagor-streám,
earmum théhton, mæton mere-stráeta,
mundum brugdon, glidon ofer gársecg;
geofon ythum weol, wintres wylme;
git on waeteres æht seofon-niht swuncon.*—BEOWULF, viii., 1029–1038.

But the sea was not only a pleasure for this people, it was the sole inheritance of the younger members of a family. They had no share in the land. They had to win for themselves a livelihood and a position in society. They were regarded as *wargrs*, wolves, outlaws. It is related that every five years the Scandinavians sent away their adult sons, reserving only those who were to perpetuate the family. "The wargr shakes dust on his father and mother, throws an herb over his shoulders, and with a bound clearing the inclosure of his paternal property, he seeks adventures afar."¹ There are generally others of the same age and condition to accompany him. And with light heart and cheery voice they cast their boats upon the water and make their home thereon for years to come. They live by plunder and piracy. "They overcome all who have the courage to oppose them. They surprise all who are so imprudent as not to be prepared for their attack. When they pursue they infallibly overtake; when they are pursued their escape is certain. They despise danger; they are inured to shipwreck; they are eager to purchase booty with the peril of their lives. Tempests, which to others are so dreadful, to them are subjects of joy." Such is the picture drawn of them by Sidonius;² nor is it overcolored. They were the terror of the sea. They were as cruel and fierce as they were adventurous. They only respected the fierceness and lawlessness as great as their own. They put the vanquished to death. While their neighbors, the Visigoths, were content with two-thirds of the property,³ nothing short of extermination seemed to satisfy them. It is to be expected that such a stormy life would render any other tame and monotonous. So we find them when in trouble seeking solace in the pleasures of the ocean. Thus, Ragnar Lodbrok loses his wife in death. He leaves his government and his children in care of guardians, and betakes himself to a life of piracy, "that in the society of his vikings he might drown or mitigate his sorrow for one whom he has so tenderly loved."⁴ Here are the forefathers of the Drakes and the Raleighs. This manner of living establishes bravery alone as the ideal of life. Wisdom and prudence were only secondary by side of this one quality. Sörli and Hamdir go to avenge the fate of their sister. On their way they meet their brother Erp. They ask him what help he would give them in their enterprise. He tells them that as hand helps hand and foot helps foot, so will he help them. His prudent and truly wise answer is not in accordance with their fierce mood; they slay him and repent their rashness at leisure.⁵

¹ Cæsar, Cantù., *Histoire Universelle*, vol. vii.

² *Viii.*, 6; Lingard, vol. i., p. 75.

³ Cæsar, Cantù., vol. vii., p. 286.

⁴ Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, vol. i., p. 109.

⁵ Thorpe, *loc. cit.*, p. 108.

Could a people warring in such a spirit know mercy? No wonder that Urien calls Idda and his twelve sons firebrands.¹

III.

While the vikings developed the spirit of war, plunder, piracy, and rash bravery, their brothers at home had their own peculiar way of living. But it was not altogether a lawless one. It was not as the dumb and low herd. Wherever we fall upon a number of men we find them an organized society, living together in obedience to known and recognized laws and customs, and each prepared to sacrifice to a certain extent his own ease and happiness for the public good. Such was the condition of the old English. They were divided into companies of ten men, each of whom pledged himself to obtain reparation from him who violated the common peace. This was called a *tithing*. Each tithing had for head a *tungérifa*. Every ten tithings was called a *hundred* among the Saxons, and *wapen-tæce* among the English. The hundreds were under a *gérifa*. Several hundreds composed a shire, *scir*, commanded by a *scirgérifa*. Every man was thus bound up with every other man in mutual protection. He inherited the land to improve and defend it. To abandon it was considered a crime. The Salic Law² forbids a citizen to leave his birthplace without the consent of every other citizen in it. The Lombard Law of Luitprand pronounces penalty of death on the one attempting to leave the kingdom.³ And such, no doubt, was the universal custom in the mother-homes of these barbarians. They had a hereditary nobility; but their king seems to have been chosen from among the ablest of their chiefs, according to circumstances. Bede says of the ancient Saxons that "they have no king, but several lords who rule their nation; and when a war happens they cast lots indifferently, and on whomsoever the lot falls him they follow and obey during the war; but as soon as the war is ended, all these lords are again equal in power."⁴ This assertion might hold true of the marauding expeditions; it might even exactly represent the condition of the Teuton races at certain epochs; but it was not anciently universal. When Bede wrote these nations were in the condition of the Greeks under an oligarchy, as Corinth under the Bacchiadæ, and Athens under the Eupatridæ. But Tacitus tells us that in his day the kings were chosen from the nobility,⁵ and that dictum of Maine is confirmed by history: "With the differences, however,

¹ Flamddwyn.

² Titre, xlvi.

³ Lib. iii., art. iv.

⁴ B. v., ch. 10.

⁵ Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt. Germania, ch. vii.

that in the East aristocracies became religious, in the West civil or political, the proposition that a historical era of aristocracies succeeded a historical era of heroic kings may be considered as true, if not of all mankind, at all events of all branches of the Indo-European family of nations."¹ But the kings were among the old English limited in their jurisdiction by the nobility. These met in council, in the *gauding*,² and framed the laws that were considered needful for the people.³ At a later date this same assembly will be known as the Upper House of Parliament. And among the nobility one there was who was the chosen confidant, the knower of secrets, *rûn-wita*, and the counsellor, *ræd-bora*, as was Æschere that of Hrothgar.⁴ He will afterwards be known in mediæval times as the king's favorite, and in modern times as the prime minister.

The old English recognized two orders of society, the bond and the free. Possession of a certain amount of land was the indispensable condition of a freeman. "All that we learn," says Kemble, "of the original principles of settlement, prevalent either in England or on the continent of Europe, among the nations of Germanic blood, rests upon two foundations: first, the possession of land; second, the distinction of rank; and the public law of every Teutonic tribe implies the dependence of one upon the other principle to a greater or less extent."⁵ This was the animating principle of conquest among the English both in their old and new homes. He was nothing who possessed not land. Life was not worth the having without it; therefore the landless one was prepared to stake his all in its acquisition. He lives to acquire wealth and power; he acquires wealth and power to be held in estimation. For this purpose each chief has with him a certain number of companions who are pledged to stand by him under all circumstances; to fight with him shoulder to shoulder in combat; to avenge his death, and on no account to survive his fall in the fray. This was so in the days of Tacitus. He tells us that he who survived his leader survived to live in infamy.⁶ Death was considered preferable to such a life.

Wiglaf reproaches the followers of Beowulf for surviving their prince and their cowardice in not helping him to fight the fire-drake; and he adds the penalty:

¹ Ancient Law, p. 11.

² From *gau*, a canton and *dingen*, to deliberate; hence the old English word *thing*, meaning an assembly or judgment-room. Our modern hustings is *hūs-thing*.

³ Dans le prologue des lois des angles, il est dit qu'elles sont faites *omnium consensu*. Cantù. Hist. Un., t. vii., p. 308.

⁴ Beowulf, ll., 269-70.

⁵ Anglo-Saxon, vol. i., chap. ii., p. 35.

⁶ Jam vero infame in omnem vitam ac probrosum, superstitem principi suo ex acie recessisse. Mor. Germ., xiv.

"By our land's rights must each man of the tribe
Idly wander forth; then nobles from afar
Your banishment, inglorious deed, shall learn.
Far better death than live a life of blame."¹

This sentiment they brought with them to their British home. At the death of Byrhtnoth, which occurred about the year 991 A.D., many of the leaders express their resolution to die with their slain chief, while they execrate one they had seen fly. One "vowed in haughty words that he would not yield a foot's breadth of earth, nor turn his back in flight since his superior lay dead."² The free-men were divided into eorls and ceorls. In their language manhood was identified with eorlship.³ Of the eorls there were two classes; the ethelings or nobles, who enjoyed liberty, the right of holding property, and the power of jurisdiction; and the ahrimans, who were excluded from the *malls* or deliberative assemblies and cultivated the soil. They need not go to war; they were free to pay a sum of money and supply provisions in the stead. The ceorls or tributaries possess individual liberty, but they are alienated with the lands on which they live.⁴ Impoverished proprietors who found themselves unable to respond to the heriban, frequently renounced their civil rights and placed themselves under the protection of a richer proprietor.⁵ The serfs or slaves had no rights or privileges. Their master held over them the power of life and death. He was responsible for them as he was for the cattle of his field. If their master was held amenable before the law, they were to pay the fines for him. In time of war if it was considered expedient to make them fight, they were liberated, as it was only a freeman who could bear arms.

Nearly all crimes could be compensated for by the payment of a certain sum of money. The only exceptions were treason, desertion, and poison. These involved capital punishment, and the sentence was pronounced, not by the chief, but by the priest. He was the more immediate representative of the author of life and death. This sentiment might not be expressed; it certainly was implied. In case of homicide, which on account of excessive drink-

¹ lond-rihtes mót
thære mæg-burge monna æghwylc
ídel hweorfan, syththan æthelingas
feórran gefricgean fleám eowerne,
dómleásan dæd. *Deáth biðh sēlla*
eorla gēwhylcum ðhonne edwit-lif.—BEOWULF, xxxix., 5765, *et seq.*

² Death of Byrhtnoth. Conybeare's Anglo-Saxon Poetry.

³ *Eorlscipe* is manliness, courage. See Bosworth's Anglo-Saxon and English Dictionary.

⁴ Cantù. Hist. Un., vii., p. 297.

⁵ This was known as *mundebund*.

ing and the custom of always bearing arms in public, was frequent, the family of the slain man might either accept the compensation-money, *mæg-bót*, or take upon themselves the avenging of his death. The individual did not stand alone upon his own responsibility. His kin were held accountable for his acts.¹ And for every offence against person or property there was set down a fine. That against the person was called *werigeld*; that against property *widrigeld*.² These old lawmakers went into all imaginable details. According to the tooth that was broken was a man fined. For the wounding of the finger, the hand, the arm, the head, the eye, the ear, was there a graded list of fines. So too for property. Every implement of agriculture, every domestic animal, every piece of furniture had its set price, if stolen, injured, or broken. These laws they will afterwards take with them into England, and they will be attributed to Ethélbehrt, or Ines, or Hlothere, or more especially to Alfred. The unwritten custom may have existed for centuries prior to the written code. Laws are not invented, they grow out of circumstances. And in fact what is English law to-day but what it was under Alfred, what it had been in the Continental homestead, a tissue of particular rules based upon precedents; these precedents finally resolving themselves into a judgment passed on a particular case? There is no science, no digest of principles. The only improvement made upon the old order of things is that the laws have ceased to be a simple relation of man to man; and instead of being administered in the name of private revenge or personal satisfaction, they are laid down for justice's sake. The history of all law resolves itself into the recording of the process of this transformation. Formerly, society did not trouble itself about the individual, once he had paid the required amount to the king and the injured party.³ Nowadays, it looks to his future good behavior. There is also a difference in the manner of proceeding. Then, the accused was presumed guilty till he proved himself otherwise; at present, the law regards him as innocent till he is proved guilty. To establish his innocence his own assertion was not enough. He got his neighbors and kinsmen to swear to the truth of a fact. In their British home, these neighbors will be set down as a fixed number; they will become the judges of the law in all important cases; and men will say that Alfred the Great organized them into a jury. We have here the germ of trial by jury, with all its advantages and disadvantages. But in the old homestead there are other means for establishing the truth or fal-

¹ Thus, Ethelbiht's laws decree that if a murderer leaves the country his kinsfolk shall pay half the fine. They are as early as 600. See Tacitus, *De Mor. Ger.*, xii.

² Grimm-Deutschen Rechts-alterthümer, 650.

³ Tacitus, *Mor. Germ.*, xii., Æthelbihtes Dômas, § 9, Ed. Schmid.

sity of an accusation. One of the most popular and universal among the Germanic nations was the duel. In English law it is known as the wager of battle. Velleius Paterculus speaks of disputes among the Germans which were wont to be determined by arms.¹ And he further says that they despised the Roman method of settling difficulties by the decisions of a law tribunal. Nor were the early Greeks and Romans without this means of determining guilt or innocence. Long after the practice had been abolished the word in which it was expressed remained. With both peoples the same word meant both to fight and to judge or determine.² This is to be looked for among a warlike people. And when to this is added a spirit of ferocious independence, such as burned in the breast of the whole Teutonic people, we have all the conditions favorable to making the duel a most popular mode of trial. The primary idea underlying this practice was expressed by Gondibaud in his reply to Avitus: "Is it not true that in the wars of nations, as in private combats, the issue is in the hand of God? And why will not His providence give victory to the justest cause?" It is also true that to rely on God's direct interference on all occasions is to tempt Him. However, the duel pleased their savage natures; they loved to witness it; they honored the champion; the coward who craved³ for mercy they despised. This practice of the wager of battle will be introduced in the new home; it will be revived by William the Conqueror;⁴ it will be appealed to in 1612 and 1631, and will be abolished only in 1817.⁵

Another form of proving one's guilt or innocence was the ordeal of fire and water. This was universal among the Aryan nations. We find it in India. The beautiful Sita proves her innocence by fire.⁶ We find it in Greece. The messenger tells Creon that he and the watchmen were ready to lift masses of red-hot iron in their hands, and to pass through the fire, and to appeal to the gods by oath that they had not buried Polynices.⁷ To the old English, to whom fire and water were not only elements but deities, this mode of appeal had its attractions. Surely the gods would not harm the innocent one who would commit himself to their mercies, as surely would they not let pass unpunished the guilty one placing himself

¹ Lib. ii., chap. 118; Blackstone, B. iii., § 337.

² Greek, κρίνειν; Latin, *decernere*.

³ Hence the word *craven*. Anglo-Saxon *crafan*.

⁴ Not introduced, as Blackstone has it. Commentaries, B. iii., § 338.

⁵ 59 Geo. III., c. 46.

⁶ Ramayana.

⁷ ἤμεν δ' ἔτοιμοι καὶ μύδρους αἶρειν χερσίν,
καὶ πῦρ διερπεῖν, καὶ θεοῦς ὀρκωστέιν,
τὸ μήτε δρᾶσαι, μήτε τῷ ξυνειδέναι
τὸ πρᾶγμα βουλευσάντι μήτ' εἰργασμένῳ.

SOPHOCLES, *Antigone*, 263-6.

in their power; therefore they placed confidence in this manner of trial.

Another feature of the old English, and one which they shared in common with other Teutonic tribes, was their custom of possessing their lands in common, and moving about from place to place. "In cultivating the soil," says Tacitus, "they do not settle on one spot, but shift about different places." And Cæsar describes the process: "The magistrates and chiefs parcel out yearly to the tribes and families united together such a quantity of land and in such part of the country as they deem proper, and the year after compel them to move elsewhere."¹ Thus they were taught not to become attached to any particular piece of land, lest their ambition and martial qualities lie dormant or fall into contempt. This reveals another trait in their manner of thinking. It was not this or that piece of land that was the object of their desires, it was land, property, not for its own sake, but as representative of their relative standing in their respective tribes. "The system of an annual changing," says Lappenberg, "or at least changeable possessions of land, and the custom necessarily attending it, of migrating, prejudicial as they were to the solid interests of nations, nevertheless required activity and strength of mind; the individual, too, whose home afforded him no permanent settlement would not respect that of a stranger; while piracy, ennobled by stratagem and valor, is indebted only to an established system of social order for its disgrace and punishment."² It was a system calculated to strengthen individual liberty. And everything in their customs and laws spoke of this sentiment. Each house stood apart, surrounded by a piece of land that was reserved for the use of the proprietor. No one dare enter without blowing a horn or giving some signal of his coming, otherwise he was regarded as an enemy, and was dealt by accordingly. Each village was constructed in the same manner. It was surrounded by a march or mark of land, which was regarded as sacred ground. He who would cross it, without giving a signal, was looked upon with suspicion, and his every movement watched. Everybody entering a house was received with hospitality. Food and drink were provided for him, and no questions asked till he was refreshed and rested. "To injure guests they regard as impious; they defend from harm those who have come to them for any

¹ Neque quisquam agri modum certum aut fines habet proprios, sed magistratus ac principes in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum, qui una coierunt, quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt atque anno post alio transire cogunt.—*De Bello Gallico*, lib. vi., cap. 22. See also lib. iv., 1. The custom still exists in the Hochwald of Thor, except that the division is not made annually.—Lappenburg, ii., 323.

² England under Anglo-Saxon Kings, vol. i., p. 86.

purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable; to them the houses of all are open, and maintenance freely supplied."¹ But the host was held responsible for the guest under his roof. On his departure, he accompanied him to the limits of his *vil*, not through motives of mere personal kindness or politeness, but to be sure that his guest committed no act for which he, as host, would have to suffer. In rehabilitating the old English, we must in a great measure forget the amenities of modern life, and think of a people with selfish nature uncontrolled by conventionalities. They were ferocious, and their ferociousness spoiled the good effects of the priceless liberty of which they were justly so jealous. It was a liberty totally regardless of time and place. We find the Saxon portion of the Teutonic race afterwards carrying this spirit of personal liberty with them among other nations, to the extent that the Lombards had to enact a law banishing those Saxons who refused to abide by other than their own Saxon laws.²

The men went armed, and so universal was the custom, man came to be known as the weaponed one—*wæpned*. Thus, where the modern English use the terms male and female, their ancestors of old spoke of the *wæpned* and *wifman*.³ In every public place went they in arms. Whenever they held a council, they did so armed. They looked more to the decoration of their shields than to the adorning of their persons. To lose them was a disgrace. They took the greatest pride in decorating them in variegated colors. In *Beowulf*, the shield is called a yellow disk—*geolo-rand*. They prized their shield and their sword or spear as the instruments of the sole occupation for which they lived. To war was their ideal of life. Even after death they could think of no higher form of existence than to drink beer in the halls of the Valhalla, and fight their battles daily over again. Therefore they never put forth their strength except in the battlefield. There the energy and prowess they displayed was great. Nothing could resist it when under disciplined leadership. They became furious. They bit their shields and uttered the most horrid shrieks. Then they considered themselves under the immediate protection of the god of battle.⁴ In their fury they played with life and death. War they regarded as a play. Their war-shield they called a play-shield—*plega-scyld*. And among their synonyms for war we find *æsc-plega*, the sport of lances or spears, and *hand-plega*, a contest.⁵ But the war over, they became inactive. Occasionally they would hunt. They had a hound—a *ren-hund*—of which they were very fond. But when

¹ Cæsar, *De Bel. Gal.*, lib. vi., cap. 23.

² Cæsar, *Cantù*, t. vii., p. 315.

³ Akerman, *Remains of Pagan Saxondom*.

⁴ Woden. Hence the old English word for madness, *wodnes*.

⁵ See Bosworth's Dictionary.

not so engaged, they did nothing requiring physical exertion. "The intrepid warrior," says Tacitus, "who in the field braved every danger, became in time of peace a listless sluggard."¹ They were addicted to gambling. When they possessed naught else, they staked their persons and went into bondage to satisfy their creditors. They also gave days and nights to deep drinking. As a necessary consequence, quarrels were frequent and dangerous. "Disputes," to quote Tacitus again, "as will be the case with people in liquor, frequently arise, and are seldom confined to opprobrious language. The quarrel generally ends in a scene of blood."² In such a manner of living we look in vain for a guiding principle. There is no restraint on individual impulses. Spirit is entirely subject to physical instincts. But we get insight into the germs of those vices that have been the bane of so many individuals, and brought disaster upon so many families in the new homestead centuries after.³

IV.

Here it may be asked how a people so brutalized could hold woman in reverence, and regard marriage as a sacred institution. Still Tacitus tells us so.⁴ But it is to be remembered that Tacitus is detailing the manners and customs of the Teutonic nations, not simply as a matter of history, but as a rebuke to Roman corruption. He therefore writes with more point than history warrants. In his desire to contrast he exaggerates. The Teuton of old led a life of hardship. His was a simple mode of living. He knew few of the luxuries of an Oriental or a Roman civilization. His sluggish nature retained all its innate vigor. There was in his daily life nothing to enervate it and render him effeminate. But he entertained for woman no chivalric sense of delicacy. A creature of impulses, he was incapable of restraint. He guarded her virtue simply through the motive of right and property which was vested in her. His sense of independence could not brook encroachments upon his possessions, whether of person or property. Hence he hedged woman in with laws that were as wounding to her modesty as they were derogatory to her honor. They ignored her personality. They guarded her as they would have guarded a pet animal or a fruit-bearing tree. Thus was it enacted that the freeman who presses the finger of a freewoman is liable to a fine of six hundred pence; of twelve hundred if he touches the arm;

¹ De Mor. Germ., cap. xv.

² Ibid., xxii.

³ See Pendennis and Daniel Deronda.

⁴ Quanquam severa illic matrimonia. De Mor. Ger., xviii. . . . Paucissima intam numerosa gente adulteria; quorum poena praesens et maritis permissa. Ibid., xix.

of fourteen hundred if he places his hand above the elbow; and so on through a grade of fines, entering into details as disgusting as they must have been futile. Nor were these laws confined to the old English and their neighbors. They were generally used throughout the Teutonic races. In the Bavarian laws, he who disarranges a woman's hair or detaches her comb is fined a certain amount.¹ Legislation on such a subject, entering into such minute details, taking such stringent measures, implies great abuse, and proves conclusively that woman was not the object of respect to the ancient Teuton which some would make her, and that she was simply cared for because she was to be the mother of the young heroes and vikings who were to perpetuate the name and the prowess of their fathers. Commenting on the punishment inflicted on the woman unfaithful to her husband, as related by Tacitus, namely, that her hair was cut, and she was whipped ignominiously through the village,² Balmes remarks: "Certainly, this punishment gives us an idea of the infamy which was attached to adultery among the Germans, but it was little calculated to increase the respect entertained for women publicly. This would have been greater had they been stoned to death."³

Be this as it may, the more we study the condition of women in those early days, the less pleasing a picture does it represent. She was the companion of man in peace and war; she attended to all the indoor and outdoor work;⁴ while he sat dozing in half-stupor by the fire she was up and doing; she accompanied him to the battlefield; she stood by his side and encouraged him in moments of greatest danger. Women were known to fight after their husbands and sons had been defeated. Thus Flavus tells us that, in a battle between Marius and the Cimbri, the struggle with the enemy's wives was not less severe than with the enemy himself, "for the women being mounted on the wagons and other carriages which had been ranged around as a defence, fought from them as from towers, with spears and pikes." And he adds that, when they were refused the privilege of being committed to the custody of the vestal virgins, "they either fell, after strangling or braining the whole of their children, by mutual wounds, or hanged themselves with ropes, made of their own hair, upon the trees and the yokes of their wagons."⁵ The reading of such a page freezes the blood in one's veins, and he asks: Could this be told of mothers? The history and literature of all the Teutonic races answer in the affirmative. So do the Sagas of the North. Their ideal woman is one bloodthirsty, cruel, cold, heartless, and fatally beautiful. In

¹ Caesar, *Cantù. Histoire Universelle*, t. vii., p. 379. ² De Mor. Ger., cap. xix.

³ *European Civilization*, chap. xxvii.

⁴ De Mor. Ger., cap. xv.

⁵ *Epitome Roman History*, iii., 3.

the Völsung Saga, Signi counsels Sigmund to destroy her own children, because he does not consider them valiant enough.¹ "The daughter of the Danish jarl, seeing Egil taking his seat near her, repels him with scorn, reproaching him with seldom having provided the wolves with hot meat, with never having seen for a whole autumn a raven croaking over the carnage. But Egil seized her, and pacified her, by singing: 'I have marched with my bloody sword, and the raven has followed me. Furiously we fought; the fire passed over the dwellings of men; we slept in the blood of those who kept the gates.'"² Such is this maiden's ideal of a hero and of life. A fancy so steeped in carnage and crime could be possessed of a small share of tenderness and humanity. Nor is the ideal of woman of the Nibelungen-lied less fierce. Brunhild forces her suitors to contend with her in the games of throwing the spear, leaping, and hurling the stone, under the barbarous penalty of losing their heads in case of defeat. She afterwards has Siegfried slain; in return, his wife, Crimhild, after brooding over her wrongs for years, revenges herself by slaying his murderer. She is possessed of as little humanity as her rival. She asks Hagen where the fatal Hoard is; Hagen replies that he never will disclose it while any of her brothers lives, whereupon she orders her brother's head to be cut off, and, holding it up, exclaims; "I bring it to an end."

"Ich bringe es zu ende," sprach das edle Weib.

"Thou hast it now according to thy will," said Hagen; "of the Hoard knoweth none but God and I; from thee, she-devil—*Valendinne*—shall it forever be hid." In her rage she kills him with her own hand.³ Not in representations like these are we to find the ideal of true womanhood. Such characters bear no other traces of their sex than the name, and woman unsexed is a monster. No surprise is it, then, to read of the English lady of primitive times cruel to her servants and slaves.⁴ The types set up for her admiration were such as belittled the tenderness and delicacy of feeling and thought that belong to true wifely, motherly, and sisterly qualities. The Edda has summed up the Teutonic estimate of woman in these words: "Praise a woman when she is buried . . . praise a maiden after she is married."⁵ This is denying her all merit. But later woman will be emancipated; her rights and privileges will be recognized; she will be restored to full liberty of action; the day will come when she will no longer be ignored as heir to

¹ Sæmunda's Edda.

² Apud Taine, vol. i., p. 27.

³ Nibelungen-lied, Ed. Simrock, p. 383. See also Carlyle's Essay on Van der Hagen's edition of this poem.

⁴ Wright, History of Domestic Manners and Sentiments in the Middle Ages, p. 58.

⁵ Hava-Mal.

her father's property, and we will read among the formulas of Marculf a deed proclaiming that, as the Lord has given a father daughters as well as sons, who love him as well as they, he sets aside the former impious custom, and wills that after death they share equally in the goods he leaves.¹ But, before this change takes place, the whole framework of society must be altered. Under the old order of things woman does not inherit because she is unable to bear the responsibilities attached thereto, for with the property inherited came also the feuds, the avenging of injuries, and the vengeance to be taken for homicide,² but in the new order, men will have other things to live for than war and vengeance. The power that will bring about that change is Christianity.

Among the well-to-do class of the old English, from the second to the fifth centuries, woman's chief occupation was, what it afterwards became in the new homestead, spinning, weaving, and embroidering. The fine for injury done the hands of a goldsmith and embroideress was great.³ These two avocations were held in esteem. It is proof that gold and embroidered ornaments were manufactured and held in request. In *Beowulf*, the palace is variegated with gold—*gold-fūh*;⁴ the boar's likeness that the men bear on their cheeks is *gehroden golde*⁵—adorned with gold; Hengist's band should supply as much treasure of rich gold—*fættan goldes*—as would decorate the Frisian race in the beer-hall;⁶ Wealthow walks forth under a golden diadem—*gylðnum beāge*;⁷ Hæreth's daughter is given, gold adorned—*gold-hroden*—to the young warrior⁸—whence we learn that men and women both used ornaments of gold. But this was after the days of Tacitus, for he tells us that the use of gold and silver was unknown to them, with the exception of those who had come in contact with Roman civilization. Every house was divided into two parts, the beer-hall or reception-room for strangers and guests, and the female apartments, exclusively used by the women. These were not always contiguous. "For others," says Wright, and his description holds true for the Continental home as well as for the British, "and for the ladies especially, little rooms were built outside, often standing apart from any other building; and the Anglo-Saxons called this room a *bur*, which in our change of language answers to our

¹ *Dulcissimæ filiæ N. N. diuturna sed impia inter nos consuetudo tenetur, ut de terra paterna sorores cum fratribus portionem non habeant. Sed ego, perpendens hanc impietatem, sicut mihi a Domino æqualitur doneti estis filii, ita sitis a me æqualiter diligendi, et de rebus meis post decessum æqualiter gratulemini.*

² Thus the Thuringian law is explicit on this point: "Ad quemcumque hæreditas terræ pervenerit ad illum vestis bellica, id est lorica, et ultio proximi, et solutio leudis debet pertinere."—Canciani. *Leg. Barb.*, tit. iii., art. 5, p. 31.

³ Lappenberg, i., 94. ⁴ L., 621. ⁵ L., 614. ⁶ L., 2190. ⁷ L., 2330. ⁸ L., 3900.

bower."¹ There they sewed, and with their servants and slaves attended to their spinning and embroidery. But they ate with the men in the large hall. When Ragnar visited his friend Öston, at Upsala, the king's daughter went around the hall presenting mead and wine to Ragnar and his men.² Rowena gives the cup to Vortigern "with all the grace and neatness that might be, according to the fashion of her country."³ At the feast given to Beowulf, where he never saw greater joy, the queen, Wealtheow, was present, and "at times surveyed the hall," while Hrothgar's daughter from time to time bore the ale-cup to the earls.⁴ And on the day of his arrival, Wealtheow greeted the men in the hall, mindful of their kin—*cynna gemyndig*—and first gave the cup to Hrothgar, bidding him be blithe, and afterwards to Beowulf and his companions. And she thanked God, most wise in words—*wisfæst wordum*—that she could put her trust in any earl for comfort against crime.⁵ He partook of the cup, and in reply said that he was resolved to perform deeds of noble valor against the monster, or, if he could not subdue him, to await his last days in the mead-hall. And the poem further relates that

The woman liked the Goth's proud speech right well;
His boasting pleased the joyful people's queen;
Then she, gold-decked, went by her lord to sit.⁶

These glimpses of a bygone order of things are valuable. They resuscitate the past. We see the men and women of those old days move and speak before us. Let us approach the mead-hall and learn more of their ways.

Not very imposing looks the house. It is one story high. It is built of wood. The use of stones for building purposes is not yet known. So identified is timber with building, that the old English word for "build" is *timbrian*. You enter; but you look in vain for any of the comforts of a modern dwelling-house. There are no chairs. The luxury of a seat with a back to it is yet unknown.⁷ But you find a stool and a bench, and, if you intend staying for the night, that same bench will be your bed, with a pillow, some fresh straw, and perhaps a bear-skin. Bed-clothing was scanty in those days; nor was it much needed; the men were

¹ Homes of Other Days, p. 4.

² Thorpe, Northern Mythology, p. 113.

³ Polydore Vergil, History of England, b. iii., p. 111.

⁴ LL., 4040, *et seq.*

⁵ Thorpe's Beowulf, p. 42.

⁶ *Thám wífe þa word wel lícōdon,
gilp-cwíde Geates; eóde gold-hroden,
freólícu folc-cwén, to hire frean sittan.*

BEOWULF, ix., 1282, *et seq.*

⁷ The word chair is not found in old English; it is of Norman origin.

better able to endure excessive cold than excessive heat.¹ The floor is covered with straw. Indeed, in the old English way of thinking, to strew is to straw. The words are identical.² The table is made of plain boards, pieced together in such a manner that they can afterwards be removed.³ It was called a *bórd*.⁴ At an early day the round table was used. It afterwards became the custom that each guest had a small side-table; but it was not permitted to eat alone. One of the greatest blots on a man's character would be the fact that he dined in private.⁵ You find no glass windows in this house into which we have introduced you. You perceive only eye-holes—*éag-thyrl*. The old English do not yet know the use of glass. Later, when they will have emigrated to the new homestead, and a certain Christian bishop shall arise among them, Benedict Biscop by name,⁶ they will learn its use and convenience. At present, the birds can fly through the hall in winter; not only are the eye-holes open, but the doors as well.⁷ The fire burns in the centre of the hall; there are no chimneys. Perhaps near-by is a large tree whose roots are under the floor, and whose branches cover the roof.⁸ In a prominent place is the boar's head in honor of Frey.⁹ The host occupies the highest seat, at about the middle of the table. Near him sits his wife. Upon the table are cheese, and bread, and vegetables, and meat, boiled or roasted. The meat is generally salt. Pork was a favorite dish. A servant holds the spit while each guest cuts from it a piece to suit himself. The use of forks is still unknown. Near the fire are ranged the vessels containing the beer. The beer-horn is first handed to the host across the fire. He drinks first. Then all goes merrily. Conversation flows freely. Many are lovers of social converse, haughty war-

¹ Tacitus, *Germania*, cap. vi. ² So also *strew* means a bed. See Bosworth.

³ The following riddle of the old English writer, Tahtwin, who lived about A.D. 700, tells how the table was broken up after having been used. The table is supposed to speak:

Multiferis omnes dapibus saturare solesco,
Quadrupedem hinc felix ditem me sanxerit ætas,
Esse tamen pulchris fatim dum vestibibus orner,
Certatim me prædones spoliare solescunt;
Raptis nudate exuviis mox membra relinquant.

⁴ Whence our words, board, boarding, and the like. The original of our table—*tæfl*—was confined to the gaming-table. *Tæflung* meant playing at dice.

⁵ Wright's *Domestic Manners and Sentiments*, p. 19.

⁶ Misit legatorios Galliam, qui vitri factores, artifices videlicet Britanniis latenus incognitos.—Bede, *Oda Benedicti*.

⁷ Bede, *Ecclesiastical History*, b. ii., chap. xiii.

⁸ Müller, *Sagabibliothek*, ii., *Saga Völsungs*.

⁹ Kemble, *Anglo-Saxons*, vol. i., p. 357.

riors. In pleasant cities they sit at the feast and recount tales; then wine wet's the man's breast-passions; suddenly rises clamor in the company, and a various outcry is sent forth.¹ The shot makes it a point of honor to quell all disputes. At intervals the harper plays his harp. He is also a poet. He sings the soothing lay, the song serene. He recounts the tales of old. He tells of battles fought and victories won. And, as the wine or beer begins to warm the breasts of the hardy warriors who listen to his lay, they feel the spirit of war rise within them, and in fancy they fight their battles over again. Then they talk of their deeds of prowess, of their hairbreadth escapes; they laugh over their cruelties; they rejoice in their wounds, for, to their thinking, he who had received no wounds knew not the glory of living. From the life we have traced, we can infer the kind of poetry most in harmony with its sentiments. Let us examine the pieces that have escaped the ravages of time.

V.

But first a word upon their language. It is the same in which we now write. If it sounds differently, if it requires a special study to understand, it is because English is a living language, and has received new modes of expression, changed the pronunciation of old words, and, in consequence, their spelling—for it has followed the law of language laid down by Max Müller, in its twofold phase of phonetic decay and dialectical regeneration.² But Lappenberg tells us that, of the old language, "about a fifth only is to be pronounced obsolete in the present English."³ In its use of particles the old English resembled the Greek. It also had, like the same language, a certain facility of making new compounds. This facility it has mostly lost. It seems to have been transferred to its sister dialect, the German. The old English mind possessed but a small share of philosophic acuteness. It was rather blunt. It saw the surface well enough, and what it saw it expressed without circumlocution. Language, in a more civilized condition of life, seeks to veil certain ideas in less offensive words. There is no attempt of this kind among the old English. They speak as they think; and they think in the concrete. There are no abstractions, no generalizations, no metaphysical terminologies. Every word is uttered with an individualizing force. It stands for a thing. There is a certain bluntness about the language. It has no power of insinuation; it is not the language of address; it would never have

¹ Exeter Book, p. 314.

² Science of Language, vol. i., p. 51.

³ England under the Anglo-Saxon Kings, vol. ii., p. 306.

become the vehicle of 'diplomacy. It moves in a narrow circle of thought. The material, the finite, the tangible, it has words for; the spiritual, it can only approximate in the expression of. Such a mind, using such a language, will not be prolific in works of a philosophical character. It will make reflex acts with difficulty; it will not adequately express the sentiments of the heart. It will, properly enough, express emotion, courage, the impulses of nature, action.

1. We possess three precious relics of those old English days that give us glimpses of the literary spirit of the people who then lived. It has already been seen that no festival was complete without the gleeman and his harp. He travelled far and wide. He was everywhere received with consideration. And one gleeman, after passing through various lands, returned to his home and settled down upon his paternal estates. There he recorded his experience, told where he was, and how he was received, together with his friend, Scilling. It is thus we possess *The Scôpe, or Gleeman's Tale*. It is attributed to the fifth century of our era. The author was well liked. Often had he received a memorable present.¹ In return, he extended the praises of his benefactors over many lands—*geond londa fela*—and when to the harp his voice resounded, many high-born men, who well knew, said they had never heard better song.² Finally, he concludes with a burst of praise upon the standing of the bard with every generous prince:

“Thus North and South, where'er they roam,
The sons of song still find a home,
Speak unreprieved their wants, and raise
Their grateful lay of thanks and praise;
For still the chief, who seeks to grace
By fairest fame his pride of place,
Withholds not from the sacred Bard
His well-earned praise and high reward;
But free of hand, and large of soul,
Where'er extends his wide control,
Unnumbered gifts his princely love proclaim,
Unnumbered voices raise to heaven his princely name.”³

2. Another very ancient fragment of Continental song among the old English is *The Fight at Finnesburgh*. Fin, the Frisian prince, is awakened by the glare of the light caused by the firing of his palace by the Danish invaders. The poet is in sympathy with the scene. He contrasts, with no small degree of poetic art,

¹ LL., 6, 7.

² 207, *et seq.*

³ Conybeare's Anglo-Saxon Poetry. The writer takes this spirited version in preference to any translation of his own which he might make.

the stillness of the night with the woful deeds caused by the hatred of the people:

"Sweetly sang the birds of night,
The wakeful cricket chirrupped loud;
And now the moon, serenely bright,
Was seen beneath the wandering cloud,
Then roused him swift the deadly foe,
To deeds of slaughter and of woe.

"Now, beneath the javelin's stroke,
The buckler's massy circle rung.
Anon the chains of slumber broke:
That chieftain great and good,
He whose high praise fills every tongue,
First in valor as in blood,
The matchless Hengist to the battle woke."¹

Fin cries to the warriors: "Awake, my warriors! hold your ground; be mindful of valor; fight in the van; fight as one man!"² And, after words passed between themselves and the invaders, they fight. Each encourages the other. In this fragment we have none of those encouraging speeches, but in two leaves of a cycle of the eighth century, treating of the deeds of King Theodoric and his men, lately discovered by Mr. George Stephens, of Copenhagen, we find such a speech between two friends in fight: "Ætla's van-warrior! let not thy courage fail thee to-day, for the day is come when thou art doomed to lose thy life, or thou long shalt have power among men. O Ælfhere's son! may I never say, my friend, that I saw thee at the sword-play, through fear of any man, decline the combat, or flee to fortress thy body to defend, although many foes thy mail-shirt hew with bills, but rather that thou sought to fight beyond the limits of valor."³ No doubt, had we the whole of this poem, we would find many such, but as it stands it simply describes the fight:

Through hall did sound the din of slaughter stroke;
The shield they could not grasp—the bone-helm lacked,—
The floor resounded till fell Garulf dead,—
Though not alone,—fell also many foes;
The raven wheeled above, swart, fallow-brown;
The sword-gleam flashed.

They fought five days. Never heard the poet that sixty conquering heroes behaved so well. Never did song requite as Hnaef requited his young warriors.

Then sought the vanquished train relief,
And safety for their wounded chief.

The battle of Finnesburgh was a great favorite with the old English. When great rejoicings fill the hall of Hrothgar, after

¹ Conybeare's translation, p. 179. ² LL., 18, *et seq.*

³ "Mark over border" is the original expression.

Beowulf has killed the fell monster, Grendel, no more popular song can be sung for the occasion than that of Finnesburgh. But who is Beowulf?

3. The grandest monument of old English poetry we possess is the poem of *Beowulf*. It is an epic dictated by the feelings and thoughts of "the days of yore." Those were times when personality was all; the hero counted for everything. There were no systems; no institutions for levelling up or levelling down the masses; no theory of equality; no scientific, religious, or literary proselytism. Personal energy was the lever upon which men raised themselves above their companions; and that energy was all exercised in the direction of skill in war and the performance of feats of valor and prowess. A hero according to the old English heart is Beowulf. Hrothgar builds a hall—of halls the greatest—and gives it the name of Heorot. Therein are held feastings and rejoicings; the gleeman sings; treasures are dispensed and presents made. But a grim and greedy being who haunts the moors, the fen and fastness, is envious of such joy. Grendel is he called. He enters the hall when the earls have retired to rest; rugged and fierce, he takes thirty of their number; and in his prey exulting goes to his home. Then was there much sorrow in Heorot. During twelve winters' tide did Hrothgar endure the frequent incursions of this foul fiend, till his land was despoiled of its best men, and empty stood the greatest of houses. Then was it noised abroad how Grendel waged war against this good prince and made havoc in his peaceful dominions. It came to the ears of Beowulf. He sets out with his companions to conquer the fiend. He is received with great rejoicings by Hrothgar and his queen. Night comes and the men seek their beds. When all is still Grendel arrives. There had arisen in him hope of a dainty glut. And first he takes a sleeping warrior, bites his bone-casings—his skin and flesh—drinks his blood; and having devoured him feet and hands, he takes hold of Beowulf. But soon he discovers that he has never encountered a stronger hand-grip; he grows sore afraid, and would fain return to his haunt; but the hero holds him.

These warders strong waxed wrathful—fiercer grew—
The hall resounded; wonder much there was
That it so well withstood the warring beasts—
That fell not to the earth this fair land-house.

* * * * *

And then arose strange sound; upon the Danes
Dire terror stood, of all who heard the whoop—
The horrid lay of God's denier—
The song that sang defeat and pain bewailed—
Hell's captives lay—for in his grasp too firm
Did he, of men the strongest, hold his prey.¹

¹ Beowulf, xl., 1543-1585.

The noise arouses the men; they take their swords; but no weapon has effect upon this monster. Still in his efforts to get away his sinews spring asunder; the bone-casings burst; he leaves his hand, and deathsick flees to his joyless dwelling; for he knows that his days are numbered. Next day were great rejoicings in Heorot. Thus ends the first encounter of Beowulf.

We learn nothing of the shape or size or nature of this mysterious being. That is one of the characteristics of the old English mind—and one it shares in common with all the Teutonic tribes—that it delights in the mysterious, the undefined, the horrible. In this respect it contrasts with the Greek intellect. Only the sensuous, the palpable, the thing of definite form and beauty, has for it any attraction. Its education is a constant struggle to bridge over all mystery, to cover all deformity, to give everything a name of good omen, to see but the sunshine of life. Homer describes Menelaus as wounded. He forgets the pain and anguish to compare the limbs of Menelaus, stained with gore, to the ivory tinged with purple. The image is too much in accordance with his thoughts to drop it immediately; he tells how the Carian woman lets it lie in her chamber, an object of desire to many a charioteer; but it is intended as an ornament for the king alone, a decoration to the steed and a glory to the rider.¹ The Greek did not live in a land of mist and fog, of marsh and fen and dense forest. He had the sunshine in all its brilliancy; he had a bright atmosphere and clear-cut landscape; therefore his eye was educated to color. The Kelt also was fond of color. And this is for us a fact of still greater importance; for the old English will come in contact with him after a while, and will learn from him how to appreciate beauty of color. Thus, in one of the most beautiful episodes of the *Táin Bó Chuailgne*, the fight of Ferdiad and Cuchulaind, the former says to the latter:

What has brought thee, O hound,
To combat with a strong champion?
Crimson-red shall flow thy blood
Over the trappings of thy steed;
Woe is thy journey.²

Not of wounds or of slaughter does he speak, but of the flow of the crimson blood. And when Læg saw his weapon red-colored by the side of Ferdiad he spake these words:

O Ferdiad! sorrowful is the fate!
That I should see thee so gory and pale;
I having my weapon yet unwashed,
And thou a blood-streaming mass.³

¹ Iliad, ii, 140, *et seq.*

² O'Curry, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, vol. iii., p. 431.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

And in like manner, when Cuchulaind laments his death, he speaks of the blue eyes and the golden hair. Nothing of the kind read we in *Beowulf*. The man, the monster, the deed performed are all before us; but the distinct coloring, the picturesque detail, had no existence, even in the mind of the poet. But to return to the poem. The labors of *Beowulf* are not yet ended. Grendel has a monster-mother, who is bound to be revenged. This is a repetition of the northern conception of "the devil and his dam." She comes the night following and bears away the king's chief counsellor. In sorrow the king, his retainers, and *Beowulf* go to the pool which they know to be her residence. The flood boiled with blood; the folk surveyed the hot gore; the horn sang a death-song. *Beowulf* plunges in; the ocean surge received the battle-warrior; it was a day's space ere he could perceive the ground-plain. Forthwith she descried him, seized him in her horrid clutches, and to her dwelling bore the prince of rings. He aimed a powerful stroke at her with his war-bill, so that on her head the sword sang a horrid war-song. Then found he that the war-beam would not bite, and in sore straits was he; but trusting in his strength he drags the fiend to the floor; again she overthrows him; but rescuing himself from her, he perceives an old eotnish sword, the pride of warriors, the work of giants. This he wields and angrily strikes, so that it grips her neck, breaks her bone-rings, and passes through her fated body. On the ground she sank. *Beowulf* was once more triumphant. Heorot was again secure. Joy reigned; the gleeman's song was heard; the bowl went round; presents were dispensed.

The poet never forgets the mention of presents. After the great warrior he loves to sing of the generous giver. This is by reason of the nature of the bond that kept companions around their leader. They stood by him in hopes of receiving a share in whatever booty might be taken, whether on land or sea. In proportion as he was brave and generous was he popular. And it added not a little to the popularity of *Beowulf* that in his old age he loses his life in slaying the dragon, guardian of hoards, and leaving his people immense treasures. We will not go into an analysis of this part of the poem. One of the most universal traditions among the Teutonic race is that of the dragon brooding over vast treasures hidden in some cave or ravine. *Beowulf* killing the dragon will be known in England by every child as the story of St. George and the dragon, only in this instance the saint will not be himself injured in the contest. This leads us to think that *Beowulf's* adventure with the dragon does not properly belong to this poem; but that it is part of another saga cycle which has been transferred to it, perhaps by the last bard who made a new version thereof. For, be it under-

stood that the poem now known as *Beowulf* stands not as it originally stood when chanted in the forests and on the seashore of the old homestead. Much has been added; no doubt much also has been subtracted. He who wrote the version we possess was a Christian. None other could have spoken of Cain; none other would have called the people heathens; none other would have said that they knew not the Creator.¹ He was in all probability a monk. No one else could scarcely attempt to preach after this fashion: "Woe to him who shall through cruel malice thrust a soul into the fire's embrace; let him not look for comfort."² No one else would lay down so nicely the doctrine of repentance as he does in these words: It was no longer than one night when he committed more murders, and mourned not for his enmity and crime; he was too confirmed in them.³ He also has glimpses of true poetry; here is a genuine beam:

When sorrow on him came, and pain befell,
He left the joy of men and chose God's light.⁴

But who this poet-soul was, we know not; when he lived we can only conjecture. That he wrote this version of *Beowulf* after *Cædmon*⁵ had sung of the creation is certain; for to his poem he alludes in unmistakable language when he represents the gleeman singing of the origin of things: how the Almighty wrought the earth; how he set the sun and moon to give light to those dwelling on land; how he created plant and animal.⁶ It is the probable opinion that he lived about the time of Canute. There are many theories concerning the poem. Thorpe considers it "a metrical paraphrase of a heroic saga composed in the southwest of Sweden, in the old common language of the North, and probably brought to this country during the sway of the Danish dynasty."⁷ Haigh rejects Thorpe's view, considers the poem entirely English, both in scenes, incidents, and personages, and believes it to have been composed in England.⁸ Henry Morely is disposed to follow him. He says he is almost tempted to make Bowlby Cliff the ness on which *Beowulf* was buried; "Bowlby then being read as the corrupted form of *Beowulfes-by*."⁹ Kemble was at first inclined to regard the poem as historical, and so expressed himself in the preface to the text which he published in 1833. But in the preface to his translation issued in 1837, he announced an entirely new

¹ II., 360, *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*

³ II., 273-5.

⁴ He thá mid tháere sorge; thá him sió sár belamp,
gum-dreám ofgeaf; Godes leoht geceás.—xxxv., 4928-32.

⁵ A.D. 670.

⁶ I., 180-198.

⁷ *Beowulf*, Preface, ix.

⁸ *The Anglo-Saxon Sagas.* ⁹ *A First Sketch of English Literature*, p. 14.

theory. With Grimm, he regards it as mythic. He finds that the old Saxons called their harvest-month Beo or Bewod, after the god of fertility. This god he identifies with the hero of the poem. It is a good instance of the extravagance of the mythists. The poem will not bear out the supposition. It deals with historical personages. Some of them can be identified with well-known records. Thus, Hygelac is spoken of by Gregory of Tours, under the Frankish form of Chochilaic, just as Hülfrich is called Chilperic.¹ According to Thorkelin Beowulf was a living personage also. He assigns, upon authority other than his own, the year of his death as A.D. 340. Now, the name of Beowulf must have been popular in song and story; and as it receded in the past, to the deeds of valor of which its bearer was the author, were added others of a marvellous and mysterious character. Traditions of time immemorial were strung upon it; these were sung in the old homestead; they were remembered in the new; but the scenes of the ancestral home becoming effaced from memory, men sought in the new country to give them "a local habitation and a name." Never seeing the ness upon which the hero was buried, and a mound erected to his honor, they are only following their instincts in designating a place to which they transfer the interest vested in the old scenes. As the poem passes down from mouth to mouth, the descriptions become changed to suit the newly designated places. Such, in our opinion, was the fate of Beowulf. When the Danish dynasty held sway, such a poem was calculated to be recited with renewed interest, and at this time we conceive it to have received its present form.²

In the poem of Beowulf, especially in those parts of it savoring of the old Continental homestead, we find an absence of a spiritual and a spiritualizing ideal. Physical prowess is personified in the hero. The people are hero-worshippers. The assistance of God alluded to is an after-thought improvised by the Christian poet. No visible intervention of supernatural powers fills the narrative, as in Homer; no sentiment of chivalry or love; but the seeking of a mere selfish glory. Brute force is the ideal; Beowulf is the war-beast. It is the poem of a people living to war, glorying in battle, and dying to renew their fights and repeat their deeds of valor within the halls of Valhalla.

¹ His gestis Dani cum rege suo, nomine Chochilaicho, evectu navali per mare Gallias appetunt. III., 3. It may be remarked with Ettmüller that all the Northern pirates were sometimes called Danes. See Thorpe, *Int.*, xxv.

² Thorpe considers the only MS. extant (MS. Cott. Vitellius, A. 15), "to be of the first half of the eleventh century."—Beowulf, Preface, xi.

VI.

Such is the literature of the old English. And now we come to their philosophy. Let it not be said that they possessed none. There is no people without a philosophy, for all have reason, all ask the why and wherefore of things. Whence came I? who made this earth? these stars? the seasons? the heat and the cold? the winds and the rain, and the refreshing springs and cooling streams? These are questions that occur to the most primitive people. And sometimes they even reflect on the more difficult issues of life and death. They ask: Why am I here? what is the motive of life? who guides, directs the actions of men? Are they the result of chance, or is there order in events? The old English reflected on all these questions, and had their answers for them. Their sagas, and still more, their mythology, are so many efforts to solve these ever-recurring thoughts. They themselves may not have suggested the solutions; in all probability they did not; from other and more distant sources did they come. They are to be found in the Scandinavian mythology of the Edda. Composed by a people who abandoned their country and sought in the cold regions of Iceland a home in which they might cling to their traditions and their gods, this book is the one certain source whence we can draw their solutions of the world-riddle. It was the common inheritance of the Angle and the Saxon as well as of the Norwegian. Malte Brun recognizes the fact, but accounts for it by supposing that the Scandinavians are descended "from a primitive race, indigenous to the countries which it still inhabits;"¹ and that it was this primitive race that peopled the South from the North. The truth is the reverse of this. The first migrations were northward. Those from the North in after ages were a reaction and a compensation of the primitive migrations. We distinguish two of them. The oldest has left its traces in the traditions of giants and dwarfs, of magical influence and communication with evil spirits. The later is that distinctly recorded by Snorri Sturleson in the Prose Edda. While the local coloring and specific naming are his, the tradition is substantially that believed by his forefathers. He tells us: "Othin had spædom, and so also his wife; and from this knowledge found he out that his name would be held high in the north part of the world, and worshipped beyond all kings; for this sake was he eager to go on his way from Tyrkland. . . . But whithersoever they fared over the land, much fame was said of them, so that they were thought to be liker gods than men, and they stayed not their faring till they came northward into that land that is now called

¹ Geography, vol. iii., bk. cxlvii., p. 1038.

Saxland;¹ there dwelt Othin long time, and had that land far and wide for his own. . . . These Asa took to them wives there within the land, but some for their sons, and these races waxed full many; so that about Saxland, and all thence about the north country they spread, so that the tongue of the Asiamen was the true tongue over all these lands; and men deem from the way that the names of these forefathers are written, that these names have belonged to this tongue, and the Asa brought the tongue hither into the north country: into Norway, into Svithiod, into Denmark, and into Saxland. . . ."² One fact underlies this remarkable passage, and it is all we are concerned with at present, that the mythology of the Æsir was universal throughout the Teutonic nations. Let us see how they questioned and how they answered on the great problems of life, creation, and thought.

They contemplated the heavens and the earth, and they wished to account for their existence. This question they solved on the same principle that the Chaldæans of old had solved it. The Chaldæan found, in two primary elements, the igneus and the humid, the source of all things; from their union did he conceive all things to spring.³ The old English imagined all things also to spring from the union of heat and cold. We are told that from Niflheim,⁴ the home of mist, issued cold, and from Muspellzheim, the home of fire, issued heat. The heat melted the ice; the drops formed thereby, through His power who sent forth the heat, received life, and a being, called Ymir, was produced. We are further told that while Ymir slept, offspring came forth from him.⁵ This account of the origin of man nearly coincides with the Hindu, which represents the various classes as springing respectively from the heads, the arms, the thighs, and the feet of Brahma.⁶ But there is a difference. Brahma is the Author of all things, while back of Ymir seems to be a Creator. In fact, Ymir is the primeval chaos. His other name is Aurgelmir.⁷

"When Ymir lived
Was sand, nor sea,
Nor cooling wave;
No earth was found,
Nor heaven above;
One chaos all,
And nowhere grass."⁸

So we are further told that Bör's sons, having slain Ymir, carried

¹ The whole of Germany was frequently known by the old writers as Saxland.

² Foreword to the Edda. Translation of G. W. Dassent, pp. 109-111. Stockholm, 1842.

³ Lenormant, Legend of Semiramis, p. 62.

⁵ Thorpe, Northern Mythology, vol. i, p. 3.

⁷ Aur,—matter, mud, clay.

⁴ Nefl—νεφέλη—nebula.

⁶ Manavadharmastra.

⁸ Völuspá.

his body to Ginnunga-gap—the yawning gap or the abyss of pure space—and formed of it the earth; of his blood they made the sea and fresh waters; of his bones the mountains; of his teeth and grinders and those bones that were broken, they made stones and pebbles; in the great impassable ocean, formed of the blood that flowed from his wounds, they set the earth around which it circles; of his skull they formed the heavens, which they set up over the earth with four regions, and under each corner placed a dwarf, the names of whom were Austri, Vestri, Northri, and Suthri—the four points of the compass; of his brain they formed the heavy clouds; of his hair the vegetable creation; and of his eyebrows a wall of defence against the giants; this they placed round Midgard, the midmost part of the earth, the dwelling-place of the sons of men.¹ In this manner, the saga goes on to say how sun and moon and stars received their proper places in Nature, and how the days and the years came to be reckoned. In this first lisp of philosophy the problems of time and space are considered. The heavenly origin of things is kept in view; knowledge comes from above. But there is a principle of evil in things of earth; for Ymir, the shapeless mass out of whom hill and dale, river and ocean were framed, “was evil, together with all his race.”² And this evil race dwelt in Jötenheim. They were giants and the sworn enemies of the Æsir. When Ymir was killed all the giants were drowned, save Bergelmir and his wife, who escaped in a chest, and thus continued the hateful race. Is there not here a clear reminiscence of the Deluge recorded in the Bible?

And there is another fact recorded in that Book which was not forgotten by these peoples of the North. We are told therein that in the garden of Paradise stood a certain tree on which depended the life and death, the happiness and misery, of the human race. In this mythology is it also set down concerning a tree of life. It was called Yggdrasil. It was “a stately tree, with white dust strewn: thence came the dews that wet the dales; it stands, ever green, over Urda’s well.”³ Beneath the roots of the Yggdrasil, by the well of Urd, there stands a fair hall, whence go forth three maidens, Urd, Verdandi, and Skuld. They are called Norns. They engrave on the tablet of time; they determine the lives of men; they fix their destinies. In modern language these maidens are known as Past, Present, and Future. They are the moulders of man’s destiny. Life itself is ever green, ever fresh, ever flowing; but time is all the same, determining each individual’s course. This idea of a fate influencing men, decreeing their deaths, and shaping

¹ Völuspá, see also Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, vol. i, p. 5.

² Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, p. 3.

³ Salmunda’s Edda. Völuspá.

their lives, was deeply implanted in the Teutonic mind. There are the Valkyriur. They are ever in attendance upon Odin. Prior to a battle they come from afar to sway the victory¹ and choose those who are to fall and dwell in Valhalla. In the myth of Frey and Gerd, Skimen sings: "My life was decreed to one day only, and my days are determined by fate."² The Christian poet who revised the poem of Beowulf was not able to rid himself of this philosophy as well as he did of the mention of the heathen gods. Thus, the hero says: Fate goes ever as it must—*gaeth á wyrd swá hió sceal*.³ But already it is coupled in the poet's mind with the idea of direfulness; he speaks of it as the grim power—*geósceaft grimme*.⁴ His ancestors would not have so qualified it. For them it possessed nothing grim or dreadful. Death in fight was their joy and the ideal termination of life. Old age was not held in honor.

"The coward thinks to live forever,
If he avoid the weapon's reach;
But age, which overtakes at last,
Twines his gray hair with pain and shame."⁵

But the Christian poet is moving in a new sphere of thought; he stands outside the magic circle of his forefathers; the truth has made him free, and he beholds things in their true light.

The growth of plant and animal was another problem contemplated by these peoples. No vision of cell-theories floated past their mind; no doctrine of protoplasm entered their brain. Everything living and active was endowed with a personality. Nicors inhabited the running stream. Tree and plant were the dwelling of the genius that made them grow. Nature was a vast laboratory in which inert matter was transformed into vegetable and animal life by a personal being. Dwarfs were the instruments by which many changes were brought about. They had charge of the gold and precious stones concealed in the bowels of the earth. The echoes in the mountains were the answers of the dwarfs.⁶ The creation of man these peoples conceived to have been the work of three of their gods. The saga tells us that Odin, Hænir, and Lodur, meeting the ash and the elm, changed the one into a man and the other into a woman. And Odin gave them soul; Hænir, mind; Lodur, blood. Thus did these simple peoples distinguish between the material and spiritual elements in man, although they never defined what was matter and what spirit. Indeed, in spite of the

¹ Völuspá.

² Thorpe, Northern Mythology, vol. i., p. 47.

³ Beowulf, vol. i., 915.

⁴ xviii., 2472.

⁵ Saemunda's Edda. Hava-Mal. tr. W. Taylor. So, too, Beowulf, xxi., 2781-3.

⁶ Grimm, Deutsch. Myth., 421, O. N. Dvergmal. So, rock-crystal was known as dwarf-stone, *dværg sten*, and in Denmark certain stones are still called dwarf-hammers. See Thorpe, Northern Mythology, vol. i., p. 8.

distinction in their mythology, their thoughts became too materialized. But there is one passage in *Beowulf* which has the ring of an old English idea. It asserts the supremacy of the understanding. It is a remarkable expression; for it is one of the very few that anywhere assert the superiority of spirit over matter. "Understanding, deliberation, forethought of mind," says *Beowulf*, "is everywhere best."¹ This is a thought as old as the Aryan family. In the *Hitopadśa*, or book of good advice, it is asserted that knowledge is the fountain-head of all happiness, and by a most illogical process it is shown to be so. "Knowledge gives good behavior; from good behavior one attains worthiness; from being worthy one gets to be wealthy; from wealth one reaches religious merit, afterwards happiness."² The ideas in both are of a piece with the thoroughly English maxim, Knowledge is power. That in *Beowulf* reveals the germ of modern English philosophy. The human understanding is the one theme it seems to have fathomed, from the problem of knowing discussed by Locke, to that of the unknowable treated by Herbert Spencer. And that problem, when made the exclusive one of philosophy and identified with it, has only the same outcome it has had with the Hindu mind; it will end in Nirvana; it will make nihilism the last word of English philosophy.

The question of good and evil was a puzzling one for the old English mind. It recognized the one and the other; there never was a nation without primary ideas of right and wrong; but the explanation that each people gives varies. To the Teuton, when men were first formed they were happy. But the frost-giants came among them and taught them evil. One especially, called *Gullveig*,³ spread avarice and the love of gain among them; and though she was thrice burned, she arose as often from her ashes, and she still lives. She was the first to cause human blood to flow, and the saga tells us that it is because of her decree that it still flows. The suffering of the good and innocent was also a difficult problem for these peoples. Life was not to them what it is to the Christian, a period of probation and meriting; it therefore never entered their minds that misery might be a boon. They cut the Gordian knot by saying that some men fell under the influence of good spirits and some of evil. Even among their gods they recognized one as actuated by wickedness. He was a spirit of craft and cunning. He was known as *Loki*, and was the source of innumerable annoyances to gods and men. Still he seemed to have made

¹ xvi., 2123-5.

² *Vidyā dadāti vinayam vinayātyāti pātratātām pātratvaddhanamāpnoti dhanaddhar-mam tatah sukham.*—*Hitopadesa*, B. I., 6.

³ *i. e.*, gold-matter.

himself necessary for their goodnesses; for when Thor loses his hammer, to Loki he goes to find it for him.¹ Philosophy was for the Northman made up of riddles. Odin undertakes to contend with Vafthrudni in learning. He approaches him in disguise. Vafthrudni tells him:

“ Know that to thy parting step
Never shall these doors unfold,
If thy tongue excel not mine
In the strife of mystic lore.”²

It is a question of life or death to answer his questions. Thus is knowledge a prize to be struggled for; if needs be, to die for.

Such is the people we have attempted to describe; we have dived into its thoughts; we have measured the beatings of its heart; we have seen how its days were passed in the mist-land of its Continental homesteads; we have contemplated the germs of important modern institutions, but we have noticed very few indications of the great irresistible nation which was in after times to play such a conspicuous part in moulding the civilizations of Europe and America. But who sees the hero in the infant child?

THE FRAMEWORK OF SOCIETY.

Theory of Social Organization. By Charles Fourier. With an Introduction by Albert Brisbane. New York: C. P. Somerby. 1876.

The Relations of the Church to Society. By F. O'Reilly, S. J. (Irish Monthly Magazine, 1876.) Dublin: McGlashan & Gill.

THERE is a harmony in nature which is exceedingly grand. It sounds forth from earth, and sea, and sky. Artists have listened to it and loved it with the wildest passion; scientists have worn their lives away in search of the keynote to its songs. Geologists hear it in the heaving of the earth's vast bosom; physicists in the light, and heat, and motion that surround us on all sides, in the clouds that gather above us, and in the storms that sweep over us; and astronomers catch its echoes as they reach them from the remotest stars. This harmony is the unceasing hymn of order which rises from the universe, like the voice of devotion, giving to the Creator His glory and His praise.

¹ Thrym's Quida.

² Vafthrudni's mal.

Now no one who has made himself familiar with the study of nature, and with the order which thus disposes all things well, has failed to perceive that in the great storehouse of beings, the radical elements of this harmony are no other than multiplicity and unity, many reduced to one. But why this multiplicity, and whence this unity? St. Thomas answers the one, St. Augustine the other:

“Dicendum est,” says the Angelical Doctor, “quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas representandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter representari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas; ut quod deest uni ad representandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia. Nam bonitas quæ in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et representat eam totum universum, quam alia quæcumque creatura.” Sum. Theol., p. i., 2 q. 47, a. 1.

And St. Augustine, speaking of that natural impulse by which all things are urged on to the formation of their respective unity, tells us that this unity is no other than society, and that the motive power which makes them seek it is the inborn love of peace and concord.

“Ipsæ enim sævissimæ feræ,” says he, “genus proprium quadam pace custodiunt, cœundo, gignendo, pariendo, fœtus fovendo atque nutriendo, cum sint pleræque inso-ciabiles et solivigæ . . . ut leones, vulpes, aquilæ, noctuæ. Quæ enim tigris non filiis suis mitis immurmurat, et pacata feritate blanditur! Quis milvus, quantumlibet solitari-
us rapinis circumvolet, non conjugium copulat, nidum congerit, ova confovet, pullos alit, et quasi cum sua matre familias societatem domesticam quanta potest pace conser-vat! Quanto magis homo fertur quodammodo naturæ suæ, legibus ad ineundam socie-tatem pacemque cum hominibus, quantum in ipso est, omnibus obtinendam!”

All things, then, must balance with one another, that the multi-plicity may find the repose of equilibrium; for equilibrium is peace, and peace is the stillness of order. And just as the great planetary worlds need to be influenced by one another's attraction, to the end that they wander not too far, nor strike in jarring dis-cord with the harmony of the whole; and just as every little drop of water which helps to swell the stream, needs the sweep of the mother current to bear it on to the sea; so men, if they would give to this life the harmony of order, and move forward in peace and security to their last and common end, must lean one upon an-other; and, leaning, form the bond of social unity.

Society, therefore, is man's element. Nature made him for it, for nature alone can be the author of that which is as universal in time and place as the dwelling of man in society. The helplessness of his infancy is only nature's assertion that he needs the assistance of his fellow-man. For, even the beasts of the field are better able at their birth to battle for life than man is when left alone in his early childhood. Only society can protect him, only society can perfect him, only there can he exercise his inestimable privilege

of speech, and find his life varied "with gleam and shadow and a peace supreme." His heart yearns after the social throng; his faculties need it for their development; his inborn aspiration to happiness leads him on almost of necessity. Nature even forestalls the longing by giving him birth in society. Man is born a social being. Social ties bind him with his swathing bands; social loves nestle in his heart when the first rays of light nestle on his brow. It is useless to talk of "*Status Naturæ*." Hobbes, and Rousseau, and those that follow them, may labor hard as they will to rob man of one of his inherent qualities; but they will never induce him to believe, if he study himself well, that nature made him but little better than the brute, a mere savage, with none but sensible appetites, and fit only "for treason, stratagems, and spoils." For nature does not change, and such as our natural aspirations now are, such were they in the beginning. Man now seeks, and he has ever sought, the delights of peace, not the inquietude of constant strife, as Hobbes would have us believe; and how much soever Rousseau may vaunt man's so-called freedom, he can never blot out the well-drawn line of demarcation by which every thinking man is forced to distinguish liberty from license. Hobbes would make man an earthen vessel of seething passions which in their base fury boil over; Rousseau would have him be an ideal bundle of contradictions which no one can understand. The former misunderstood the nature of man because his own material mind could see nothing but matter; the latter missed his aim because the shrine of his devotion was self-will, and the truth that man is a social being by nature, was probably made dark to him because of his own misanthropy.

Relying, then, upon the conviction that man was made for society, that nature destined him to it as to the crown of his highest perfections, and left in his heart a thirst for joys which only society can alleviate, it is worth one's while to examine the nature of this source of human pleasure, looking into the elements of which it consists, seeking the mainspring whence all its efficacy comes, and gazing upon it in the light of the beautiful exemplar which philosophy holds up before us, with truth for its foundation, with harmony for its action, and with the perfection of order as the object at which it aims.

I might proceed with the course of nature, and recall to mind the gradual evolution of man's social tendencies in the family, and in the filial and servile relations which the family circle most generally involves. But this would take too long. I wish to dwell upon that more developed form of social organization, civil society.

What, therefore, is civil society? It may be called "a perfect union of men gathered together for the enjoyment of their rights,

and for the sake of the common good." Hence we find in it two elements, a multitude possessing individual rights, and an influential and effective principle, reducing all to order, making the many one, and directing the activity of that one to the end which is to be attained. Both of these elements are essential. For, just as there can be no society without a multitude, so can there be none without authority. Moreover, in their union they make an organic whole, a whole whose parts are vivified and active, a whole whose members have their own private and independent functions; for, society is not a mere mechanism in which man must lose the dignity of his personality, the father give up his relationship to his child, and the master forego his right to command his servant; but a more perfectly developed moral person, a public guardian by whom all rights are protected and strengthened, and by whom other rights are superadded even to generosity.

Now, it matters little whether the principle of authority, the life-giving element of society, be intrusted to one or to many; it matters little whether it be the birthright of the prince, or a dignity consequent upon the choice of the people; it matters little whether it be wielded with unlimited freedom by a supreme ruler, or whether it must wait in its action for the voice of general assemblies; but it matters exceeding much that it come from God, that it be the Angel of Order sent down from heaven. Rousseau would have it otherwise; as, according to him, society is something accidental to man, something which nature did not have particularly in view; it is not necessary that authority should take its origin from any other source than man's free will. Having, on the one hand, established it as a starting-point, that man is in society, not by any necessity or law of nature, but by a *social pact* dictated by his own choice; and seeing, on the other hand, that there is now in society, and has ever been, a certain element called authority, the so-called philosopher dreams a queer dream concerning its birth. His confusion arises from a confused idea of liberty. Man, he says, is so essentially free that it is not in his power to dispose of that freedom. He cannot rid himself of it even if he desires to do so. True enough, it is convenient for him to enter society, for there he will enjoy many advantages; but, that society must be such as will allow every subject to remain perfectly free and obey no one but himself. How, therefore, is such a form of society to be brought about? Behold the social problem! Now see how the moralist attempts to explain his own puzzle: Let every individual citizen give up to society all his rights entirely, without reserve. Let it be an absolute grant, a perfect concession, and let it not be made to a chosen few, but to the whole community at large. It will follow, then, that every citizen will receive back from the public fund a certain amount

of rights equal to that enjoyed by any one of his fellow-men, and will, moreover, because of the reciprocity established, receive in return as much as he has given, thus losing nothing by the concession. Hence will arise the general will of one social person possessed of supreme authority, which, though made up of many, is, in its unity, superior to all. This supreme authority cannot be taken from the people. They are essentially and necessarily the ruler, and their authority is so sacred that it can neither be represented nor limited. Princes, therefore, and general assemblies, and, in fact, all who hold authority, are only ministers and magistrates of the people. Majesty is the populace; rebellion is only a name, for it is but the just exercise of a natural right. The people, as a body, may rise up against the ruler, because he is only the keeper of their trust; an individual, however, must not complain, for his contribution to the public fund is comparatively nothing.

Such is the "social contract," a system, which, to say nothing of the evil consequences it entails, is directly opposed to the voice of nature and the dictate of order. Socialism and communism, rebellion and anarchy follow logically in its train; the first two, because all men must, in such a society, be equal, and the rights of one must not exceed those of another; the last two, because the people are the monarch and their authority is supreme. What the people say is law, what they sanction is good, what they condemn is bad. Rulers are their servants only, and must obey their good pleasure, or be deposed. How could such a society exist without constant revolution?

But this theory, moreover, is *radically* false. The very foundation upon which it rests cannot stand. What is that liberty which the lovers of this "pact" pronounce so essential to man? Do they mean that one is so necessarily free that his free will cannot become enslaved? Such freedom is readily granted. But is subjection to the law, slavery? Is the preservation of order, tyranny? Is there no objective rule of rectitude to which man must conform? Surely no man of sense would ask for a liberty which is irrational, which reason shrinks from; and yet a liberty which is opposed to authority and lawful subjection is irrational; for, reason itself tells us that we must dispose the means to the end, that we must maintain order; and what is authority but the preserver of order, and an assistant in the right disposition of means to the end.

On the other hand, if by the word "liberty" in this system is meant an exemption from all law and order, man, in his dignity of a rational creature, spurns such an attribute. It would degrade him. He would no longer be rational, he would only be licentious, provident only against the present evils incident to mere animal existence, and he might be truly said:

"Propter vitam vivendi perdere causas."

And this is not all. The social "pact" would have all men give up all their rights, completely and unreservedly, in the formation of the social body, that they may contribute an equal share. But men do not possess equal rights. All, it is true, possess equal natural birthrights, rights which spring from human nature by the mere fact of birth; but there are other rights to be considered—acquired rights—rights whose variety springs fundamentally from man's liberty, inasmuch as various free wills adopt various lines of conduct by which these rights are won. Such rights are by no means equal in all men. They are different, for instance, in the rich and the poor, in the learned and the ignorant. Hence were men to give up all, wholly and entirely, into a public fund, their contributions would be far from equal.

Moreover, the efficacy of authority pronounces against the possibility of such a contract. The origin of a thing is known from its action. In the effect nothing can be found which is not virtually in the cause. Now in the action of authority there is something which never was and never can be in the people. It is the power of putting a necessary, a riveted and binding connection between man's acts (otherwise indifferent), and his last end. Authority tells me, "do this, else you will not reach your *summum bonum*;" and by the mere command my will is morally bound, and I must either execute that injunction or forfeit my good standing in the moral order. I have no choice. The act, it is true, was not of obligation before, and I could have gone on toward my last end without performing it; but now I cannot. I must do it, for authority has made it necessary. If I neglect it I shall lose my way to my final term, because I shall be thrown off the track of moral goodness. Now has any man, or has any body of men the right to lay down conditions to me which I must observe in order to work out my destiny? Where did they get such a right? I have not got it myself, and never had it, and hence I could not put it into the public fund. I cannot say to myself, "I will make the performance of act A and the omission of act B necessary means to my last end." The objective order of morality lies before me. I did not put it there, nor can I take it away, nor change it. Only He who gave me my last end can mark out the path which leads to it. Only He can know that path and will it; and when He knows it and wills it, it is. Now, authority puts this mysterious connection in my actions, and hence this efficacious principle cannot come from the people, but must, of necessity, come from God.

Not a little striking in regard to this theory of Rousseau, is the fact that some of its adherents pronounce it one and the same with the scholastic doctrine on this point. Nothing, certainly, could be farther from the truth. For whether we consider the scho-

lastic view as proposed by St. Thomas or as offered by Suarez, there is no similarity whatever between it and the system of "social contract." As to the doctrine of St. Thomas there can be no possible misunderstanding; for, in the opinion which he holds, authority comes directly and immediately from God to the ruler. The people do not meddle with it at all; they have nothing to do but to obey it. They may choose the subject in whom it is to reside, but the authority itself comes to him directly from heaven. The plea for confusion is drawn rather from the opinion of Suarez expressed in his writings against King James of England. It is not much of a plea, to be sure, but "confusion still confounded;" for, the weak ones of this world love to lean upon the mighty, and boast of fellowship with those whom they never knew. The sum and substance of the explanation of Fr. Suarez is as follows: The perfectibility of man requires a more complete and more widely developed society than the family. Man, therefore, is social by nature. For the sake of order and unity this society must have authority, or the supreme power of ruling. Authority, considered in itself, and abstractly from this or that form of government, comes immediately from God as the author of nature, and it is by no means either *totally* or *partially* in the individual, considered as such. Nevertheless it is bestowed upon the community at large, which can, in turn, confer it upon an individual person or a general assembly, or, for some just cause, be deprived of it and reduced to the subjection of a ruler. But, in all cases, the reason of authority being granted to any one is the consent of the people, either free or forced. Civil authority, therefore, in itself, is immediately from God; but in the subject who possesses it, it comes from God through the medium of the people.

Now, there is no one who cannot see the vast difference between this theory and the "social pact" of Rousseau. According to Suarez, authority comes from God; according to Rousseau, it is a creation of man's free will. The former asserts that it is neither *totally* nor *partially* in private individuals; no, not even in the whole collection of them, unless so far as they form a community and aim at some common end; the latter, on the contrary, maintains that it is but the sum total of individual rights, and, hence, may be found partially in each and every citizen. Suarez admits that the consent with which the multitude confers it upon some one person, may be forced consent; Rousseau admits no such thing. The one teaches that the supreme power, when once transferred, cannot be recalled; the other holds that it is so essentially and unchangeably in the multitude that the people cannot rid themselves of it even if they wish. It is apparent to every one how widely different these two systems are from each other.

It must be maintained then that authority, the animating element of society, is either directly or indirectly from God; and when it is vested in the rightful subject society is complete.

But the constitution of society will help little to man's perfection, if it be not firm and constant in carrying out the design for which the Almighty intended it. The mere formation is not sufficient. The body politic must look earnestly upon the work to be done, and do it nobly. It is no easy task to shape the conduct of man. His free will is always ready to imagine that it sees fetters for its freedom. His passions are strong even under restraint; and the spirit of egotism is like a shadow over his mind. At all times he leads a double life, and he can "smile and smile and be a villain." On the other hand, authority too often loves to walk side by side with tyranny. It is but a step from the ruler to the despot, and the playground of civil authority borders upon sacred precincts where no magistrate of temporal power must intrude.

There, then, lies the circle in which civil society must move, for it is necessary that it be marked out clearly. Let us listen to the voice of reason proclaiming the dictates of order. It tells us that man is a wayfarer upon earth; that the term of his journey is a spirit land; that he must tend to it with all his might and main; that he must allow nothing to thwart him in his course; that while he is on his way nothing is good save that which helps him thither; that nothing can give him this help but the powers of his soul, knowing and loving the true and the good; and that if he fail, he alone is responsible for the failure. So far, then, as civil society is concerned I can think and wish as I please. Public powers have nothing to do directly with my interior life. If God had meant civil society to direct my conscience He would have given it the means to know my conscience, for He never asks impossibilities; He gives means for the end. But we must not suppose that society has no control over the exterior manifestations of that conscience. It certainly has. It must have a care of external order, and it has a right to know the thoughts of even my inmost mind, when those thoughts concern matters over which society has control. Hence the civil magistrate demands my oath as to the rights of my neighbor in litigation; and the criminal court bids me call heaven to witness that my testimony concerning the prisoner is true. Such matters touch closely upon my sacred, private, individual life; but as that life may at times bear largely upon external order, the guardian of that order may command my better life, for his obligation of reaching the end includes the privilege of using those means without which the end cannot be attained. The sphere, therefore, of civil society is confined immediately to man's external conduct, extending now and then to his inner life, not because of any juris-

diction over that life, but because of that action which the powers of the soul exert in shaping the destinies of the outer world.

But this is not all. Civil society must seek not only the external good, without detriment to the internal, and without intruding upon its sanctuary; but it must, moreover, search diligently after the universal good. It is supreme in its order, and intended by nature to confer upon man the finishing touch of his social perfection. It must not limit itself to the welfare of a chosen few, for it has to do not with a heap of *things* but with an assemblage of *persons*, bound by nature with the link of mutual benevolence, and singly and separately enjoying a dignity of personality which society must respect, and to whose well-being it must direct its efforts.

What, then, must we say of governments which seem to exist only to enrich those in power, and those who by money, chicanery, and deceit succeeded in putting them there? What shall we say of public men who, chosen by the people for sacred trusts, spend the wealth of society for private interest? What must be said of useless expenditures from the public fund, and taxations so exorbitant that the poor man must sell his little property because the keeping of it costs more than its value. What of compulsory education, the public school system,—base, barbaric inroads upon the private home circle and the sacred conscience? What of the enormous sums laid out in empty decorations and political pomp when thousands upon thousands of the country's best children are begging for bread? What of public railways when there is nothing to transport, and standing armies when no enemy is near? It is vain to talk of national greatness and public prosperity when no progress is discernible save that which may be found in any noisy machine-shop—a mere multiplication of wheels, and bands, and lathes, and trucks, and patent brakes, and such conversation as: “I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following; but I will not eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you. What news on the Rialto?”

“And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe,
And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot,
And thereby hangs a tale!”

It should not be so. Let authority keep within its limits, and make the people keep within theirs. Let the exercise of power be intrusted to such men as will deem the trust sacred. Let the legislative assembly be made up of such as are wise and prudent, and familiar with the public wants. Let the judiciary be learned in the law and just in judgment. Let the executive be firm in its best purpose and efficient in its action. And, above all, let officials be convinced that their life must be a life of unflinching duty to the public weal, not an idle pastime of personal pleasure.

On the other hand, subjects should remember that man is always more ready to contend for his *rights*, than for his *duties*. He forgets that duty is the very foundation of all his rights. Had he no duty to perform he would have no rights to claim, for he has no right to anything except to do his duty. Now it is authority which points out this duty to him, and it is civil authority which points out a great part of it. Civil authority is, therefore, his benefactor, and must be considered as such.

Moreover it is, as we know, divine, rendering sacred the person in whom it resides. Hence so far should subjects be from sedition and ill will, that love and reverence ought to be their main and constant attitude toward their ruler. After all, what is he but a guide to help them to reach their last end? a human guide, it is true, and, consequently, liable to weakness and error, but none the less, on that account, the magistrate of the Most High, presiding over the temporal affairs and the destinies of men.

But one can hardly help seeing, that to bring about results so desirable is no easy task. The perfection of society is something, it seems, to be hoped for and prayed for, but never to be realized. And why is it a thing so difficult? Simply because the free will of man acts unseen, lays its own plans, and matures its own projects without the slightest check or influence from without. Our higher life, the life of calculation, of forethought, and the power to foil, may be degenerate in its action. It may stoop to scheme against the law, and shirk the labors of duty, and smooth its face with the sweetness of innocence when led to the bar of justice. "The genius and the mortal instruments are then in council, and the state of man, like to a little kingdom, suffers then the nature of an insurrection." External actions of rectitude cannot long subsist unless supported by a firm and upright will. Man's internal actions, then, need a check and a spur. The unseen life which every one enjoys in the secret chambers of his own mind must be a life of order, and there must be some authority to put that order there. Civil society cannot do it, but there is a society which can. It is religion. Hence civil society cannot make one step towards stable perfection without the help of religion; for the perfection of society is unity and efficacy, and this unity must be a moral unity—the unity of love. Now the first element of moral unity is unity of minds, and this cannot be had with any stability whatsoever, unless the internal man be kept in the path of order. Nor can this be done by mere religious toleration, a complete separation of Church and State. Something positive is necessary, something active and efficient. A distinguished moralist speaking upon this point says:

"Is it not plain that a philosophy which preaches indifferentism attacks the very root and essence of true unity in society? Men grow enthusiastic over the flourishing con-

dition of commerce in its various branches, over the ingenious application of steam, over its annihilation of distance, its victory over mountain ranges and deep, dark oceans. It is all well. But if they expect more than a *physical* union and facility of communication, if they expect by these mechanical means to obtain a *moral* union, they mistake sadly. The moral order is based on the judgments of minds, and, consequently, moral unity requires a unity of judgment. But unity of judgment, in a school of mere toleration, means only that no one be contradicted. That is, it consists of a purely negative judgment. A negation, then, a nothing, forms the support of that social unity, truly a support worthy of a society which feels weighed down by the light burden of the Divine Sovereign. It is not difficult to foresee the fate of such an intellectual edifice which has less than the point of Archimedes for its foundation. Even a material tower built on solid ground must fall when the corner-stone crumbles."

It is religion then, and religion alone, which can unite the social elements, multitude and authority, in the bonds of love. No other power can effect that moral union which is so essential to society, without which the social body is a mere collection of many men working for their individual profit and respecting authority only because they fear it; but with which it is not only the final term of all man's natural perfections, not only the garden of his dearest delights, and the fair field of labors in which he is to work out his task of time, but something ennobled, something personified, aye, even deified; for with this union of love society is, as Father Tapparelli says, an image of the Trinity itself. Whatever be the relation of Church to State, whatever the rights and duties of religion in society, certain it is that the Church cannot be ignored by the body politic, nor the influence of religion be eliminated from the social throng. If civil society mean anything at all, it means a moral being constituted of a twofold element whose union is effected by a moral, not by a physical agent. Armies might march and countermarch through the length and breadth of the land; navies and flotillas might be fitted out and floated on every sea and lake and river; penal laws might be multiplied, and the hangman might hoist his gibbet on every public square; but such means could never beget the bond of moral union—the union of hearts and of minds. It would, at best, give us serfdom, not society, and the multitude would be as so many slaves that hang around the palaces of their lords waiting to do the bidding of a self-appointed master.

We cannot ignore the fact that where religion is discarded, patriotism degenerates into policy, and principle into a spirit of self-advancement, which, to great manhood, must be most contemptible. It is the logical outcome of a godless crowd. If authority be not divine, and if my neighbor was meant only to be my tool, why should I regard the one, and why should I not make effective use of the other? Am I not a man as well as he whom the wave of circumstance has washed to a higher surface? Have I not a right to win my game of wit and wisdom, if I can play upon the simplicity

of my fellow-man, or foil the thrust of my social foe? Without religion society takes the form of a motley crew, the "high thoughts of the children of God" are materialized into passions and pleasures that centre upon self, and the honest and upright are forced to bear the "proud man's contumely and the oppressor's wrong."

It is strange that men wonder at the seeming impropriety of dragging religion into the contests of civic broils! By the very nature of things religion is a part of the civic whole, and without it the civic throng would be *uncivil*. If our civil obligations are based upon the nature of society, and if society needs religion to give union between the multitude and the powers that be; they, chiefly, are civil and logical in their demands, who require some link divine between themselves and authority, before they feel constrained "to groan and sweat under a weary life." And we find it ever so.

Hardly a move is made in the political world, the world of trifles, trade, and traffic, but the holy name of religion must be dealt with as if a byword! It is forgotten that religion is the gathering up and the striking of ten thousand chords which bind the creature to the Creator, making the harmony of the world's worship; it is forgotten that religion is a thing divine, a diplomatic scheme, surpassing in its order all powers of human intelligence, and lifting man, in his littleness, to the high and glorious plane of supernatural greatness; but it is not, and it can never be forgotten, that without religion society is moral chaos. "Go and teach all nations!" said the Divine Founder of both church and society. "In thee, my Church, my spouse, I have embodied whatever religious obligations the human mind can dictate. Teach thou the nations of the earth! If they be simple in their faith, and true in their devotion, teach them that as civil societies they are the means to a glorious end, the path to a high and holy heaven; but if they be too worldly-wise and proud in their generation, and cast away thy yoke as galling, and thy burden as more than they can bear, teach them in my name that their wisdom is the fool's folly and their progress, moral corruption, social decay!" Religion is an essential ingredient of society; not an element, precisely, but an agent whose action affects the elements and their union most intrinsically; and it is but logical that those who wish to build their fortunes on the ruins of society, should mark with scorn that Church which alone is the expression of religion, and pronounce her a stumbling-block in the way of their selfish schemes.

The history of this, our native land, is urged as a proof of civil success where the service of God has been nobly ignored, and a spirit of toleration, a negative element, introduced as a substitute for positive, practical religion. But it can be seriously doubted if

such a conviction exist in the mind of any one who has studied our history in its philosophy. An able and interesting writer reviewing our centennial retrospect in the *Catholic World* for July last, makes plain the fact that our spirit of toleration, our negative bond of union, was only a conciliatory measure, acted upon in hurried and trying moments, and necessary at the time, amid so many religious factions, for that physical union of rank and file which was to withstand all armies from abroad. The very framers of our Constitution knew, in their deeper minds, that in the after time, in the periods of peace, such a link could not hold. Was their better judgment a forecast of the present hour? We cannot tell. But it seems to clearsighted men that our social tie at present is a complicated thing; and that our bond of union is something of a Gordian knot which may yet have to be cut with a soldier's sword. God forbid a result so disastrous. But the sacred writer tells us:

"Nisi Dominus ædificaverit domum, in vanum laboraverunt qui ædificant eam. Nisi Dominus custodierit civitatem, frustra vigilat qui custodit eam." Ps. cxxiv. I, 2.

Religion, then, is the bond of society. We must meet the emergency. False science, impropriety, and impurity of art, are against us. So-called principles of light and heat and motion are noised abroad like voices from heaven, destroying in their logical sequence all spiritual, and consequently moral life; and we are heralded as fools unless we can find wisdom in folly. We are pronounced stupid if we cannot admire what our religion teaches us to forget. Such a state of things cannot last, for though an individual may be outcast and immoral during the long years of a mortal span, society must move on steadily to its perfection, or fall suddenly into corruption and decay. And while we trust that better times await us, and that our multitude and authority may in the future be blended by something more than policy and personal profit, let us not forget that society is made up of individuals, and that the social elements will be safely and surely united, only in proportion as every individual is true to his religious duty.

THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.

THE TWO "CITIES" IN THE PRESENT AGE.

Christianity and its Conflicts, Ancient and Modern. By E. E. Marcy, A.M.
New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1867.

Essays on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism. By John Donoso Cortes. Translated from the Spanish by Rev. William McDonald, S.Th.L. Dublin: William B. Kelly, 1874.

ALL the States of Europe have, in a greater or less degree, broken loose from the Church, and it seems to many that the Church is a great loser—nay, the only loser—by this deplorable fact. They imagine that in the separation that has taken place all the power, greatness, prosperity has remained with the States, and that the Church has been reduced to insignificant inferiority. This is undoubtedly the idea many men of our age have formed of her actual situation. Was it with this conviction that our previous papers on the subject were penned? Was it ever granted in them that the Church's influence has so far dwindled away that it is now almost a cipher? Did we concede that the European States acquired, by separating themselves from her, such an independent and superior standing that they have become at last masters of themselves and of the world, and reached the acme of prosperity and grandeur? God forbid that this should have been the result of our previous considerations. Nothing, certainly, was further from our mind.

To correct, however, any misapprehension of the kind, it is proper to place, face to face, the Church on the one side and the European States on the other, and see which of the two possesses more real power and true pre-eminence. A more just estimate of the actual situation of the Church will undoubtedly be the consequence of such a comparison, and the loud boasts of her enemies may be considerably lowered in tone. In the title of this paper the Church and the State are called "the two cities"—an evident allusion to the work of St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*. In order to speak correctly from the outset of what we shall say, and to have exact ideas all through this discussion, the reader must understand that the "States" are placed in antagonism to the "Church," not absolutely, not in the sense that they are already the incarnation of Antichrist, but because they are in a great degree ruled over by really anti-Christian ideas, and thus form a City opposed to

the City of God. This last assertion needs no proof. The historical facts of anterior ages, and the present bias of civil rulers in Europe, as portrayed in previous articles, are sufficient evidences of the unpleasant truth that Christian countries, so called, are ruled by men who have in fact repudiated Christianity.

Have their schemes thus far attained complete success? Have they reduced their antagonist to the position of a suppliant or a slave? Far from it, thank God! Both parties being represented under the figure of a City, it will not be difficult to prove that the Church is yet, (1) the City of God; (2) a universal City; (3) a fast increasing and prosperous City; (4) a harmonious and happy City. The European States, as at present constituted, can lay no claim to any of these characteristics, but just the reverse, and it is chiefly in these four particulars that their pretensions to having become superior to the Church will appear preposterous. In this discussion declamation must be avoided, and it is believed that none of the facts that we shall place before our readers can be contradicted or gainsaid. Warmth, however, is not declamation, and when the case is clear, proved, demonstrated, an exhibition of feeling from the heart is not a fault.

I. THE CHURCH.

I. What is, what must be the City of God? A reflex of His great attributes. Two of them particularly must shine in it—His unchangeableness and His holiness. Built by the Almighty on "eternal hills," it must be like God himself, ever ancient and ever young, and, moreover, it must be holy and perfect in its interior essence. God is absolutely unchangeable in His eternity; He is also holiness itself. The Church evidently possesses both these prerogatives, and consequently she is called His City. First, therefore, ancient and hoary as the world, young and blooming as a bride, the Church is now what she ever was. Innumerable eons, interminable ages may pass over her without leaving on her the imprint of time. As nature every spring is as young and fresh as on the first day of creation, so the City of God is ever the same which St. John announced would come down from heaven on the last day, "prepared as a bride adorned for her husband." And the reason is given by the Prophet of the Apocalypse reporting to us the words of God: "Behold I make all things new." How can the "daughter of the King," the "betrothed of the Almighty," she whom God holds constantly in His loving hands, whom the creative breath from His lips ever permeates and vivifies, ever become old and decrepit, senile and obsolete, though ever so ancient?

Yet many lying lips have uttered the words: "The time of the Church has gone; she is now too old; she will soon be dead and

buried out of sight." Who are you that give the lie to God, and pretend that what He once said can ever become untrue? Are you so blind as not to see that the Bride of Christ is yet a virgin, as sweet, and pure, and young, and fresh as on the day when she was born from the side of the Saviour hanging on the cross? Are not the words she daily pronounces over every child brought to the fount in this nineteenth century the words of a young mother with smiles on her lips and perfume in her breath: *Ephpheta, adaperire, in odorem suavitatis*? It requires a great deal of unconscious ignorance or wilful blindness not to know that this, her spell, is as powerful now to open the ears of a babe to the doctrine of Christ, by infusing faith through them, as it was when it fell on the ears of infants in the very age of the Apostles. Does she not thus renew the world by her breathing and touch? Is not every new generation of Christian children a proof that she is as young as she was eighteen hundred years ago? Go and inquire in all the great cities of this country how many thousands are thus regenerated by her every year. Judge by it how many millions you would find if you could compass the whole globe in your search. And bear in mind that most of these babes will grow up to manhood, and many of them will devote their life to God and His Church not less now than three, and four, and five hundred years ago.

But she is not satisfied with filling the atmosphere with her youthful breath, and spreading faith as a cloud charged with dew to refresh the earth. Besides the silent operation of grace which God gave to her keeping, she dispenses her blessings by her sweet voice, and her infallible teaching is as powerful now as it ever was—another proof of her perpetual youth. For it is the Church that inspires so many of her servants to devote their lives to the instruction of their brethren. It is in fact the word of the Church which issues from the lips of those innumerable instructors. Can any one imagine that their utterances convey only an effete doctrine, which was listened to, it is true, by our priest-ridden ancestors, but which everybody in this age of light laughs at and rejects? Any one who imagines this is greatly mistaken. The Christian doctrine is never antiquated and time-worn, because it is the only doctrine really adapted to human nature and to human spiritual needs and aims, which is absolutely required by our highest aspirations, and cannot be replaced by anything else in the world. If you are not fully persuaded of this, go into one of our churches whenever the Word of God is preached, and see with what avidity it is received, with what open ears it is drank in, with what beaming eyes it is approved. As a famishing man, able at last to satisfy the cravings of hunger, shows his keen appetite for the food and

drink his body needs, so likewise the mind of every man, to whatever race he may belong, rejoices to have found what his soul absolutely requires, whenever the Church's teaching is imparted to him.

And yet in this age when the prodigious development of the Church, morally, intellectually, numerically, must astonish every impartial beholder, men pretend she is old, dead, or at least dying; and in countries where she is literally covering the soil with innumerable institutions of learning, of morality, of benevolence, she is accused of being effete and worn out. Has there ever been an age since Christ came, always excepting the apostolic period, when her activity was greater, her progress more triumphant? And this is the case not only on this continent of North America. Go to Europe whence the people of this country originally came, and inquire what the Church is doing in France in restoring what was destroyed a hundred years ago. Go to England, to Germany, to what are called the Protestant States of Europe, and ask if she now is buried there after having been pronounced dead fifty years ago. Pass on then to the antipodes, to Australia, to China, to the South Seas, and see if she is not giving signs, in those immense countries sitting in the shadow of death, of all the freshness of youth and the strength of maturity. Like Christ she is evidently *heri et hodie et in sæcula sæculorum*.

Has the apostasy of rulers in this age injured her prospects and left her without hope because without earthly support? No, no; the world will finally be obliged to acknowledge that she still is young. Happy if it would learn the true reason of this, namely, that she has a spouse who constantly renews her youth by His tender embrace. That spouse is Christ Himself, who "abides with her," as he promised; who does not leave her children "orphans" but ever "comes to them," as he announced by the lips of St. John.

There is, no doubt, in this age, a great activity displayed by the world for the material welfare of mankind. The earth seems to be on the point of being renovated; but the description of this would carry us beyond the limits necessarily imposed upon us. An analogous development of facts would show that the energy manifested by the Church for the salvation of souls, is at least equal to the prodigious worldly activity now so remarkable all over the earth.

The second characteristic of the Church, on account of which she can rightly be called the City of God, is holiness. Her children know this thoroughly, as they are fully conscious that if they desire to be holy they must place themselves entirely under the gentle guidance of the Church. But men who in fact can have no idea of sanctity, since they seem to have entirely forgotten, or at least

never reflect upon, the commandments of God, on which alone true morality reposes, declare that instead of being holy she is the "mother of abominations." Men who can scarcely be said to have a conscience, because owing to their utter abjuration of the supernatural they admit of no sanction whatever for it, have pretended and still pretend that holiness does not belong to the Church, and that in point of fact her best children are no better than pagans. There even are people who have not forgotten the commandments of God, and who therefore may really have a conscience, who yet, carried away by extraordinary sophisms, assert that the sum of morality or immorality has always been about the same on earth, about the same in modern times that it was in the ante-Christian period.

But the voice of mankind, the verdict of history, innumerable testimonies rendered in all ages by the very adversaries of the Church, prove that all these assertions are either one-sided statements or absolute falsehoods. There is no need of a long discussion. A simple remark will be sufficient to settle the question beyond dispute. It is the simple incontrovertible fact that, Christ being the acknowledged exemplar of all holiness (very few persons, indeed, daring to carry profanity to the extent of impugning His sanctity) the Church continually holds up to her children Christ crucified as the pattern for them to imitate in the cultivation of every virtue. How many millions have loved Christ to the shedding of their blood, because they were so taught by their mother, the Church? How many millions, placing themselves altogether under her gentle control, in this age of cold apathy, love Christ above any human love? Yet, who can love Him without being pure, holy, a true copy of the great original? Who can imagine that in the old pagan world, or that in modern times outside of the Christian pale, there could be, or can be, anything approaching to the perfection of His sanctity?

It is true the world does not know these humble lovers of the Son of Mary. They, like the Pharisees of old, do not publish their sanctity with a trumpet. Nay, should you question them, particularly when in the secret of Christian confidence they pour the anxiety of their soul into the ear of a spiritual friend, they will tell you that they are great sinners; they will express vividly their fear of the judgments of God. The world may smile at this and pretend that it is pure hypocrisy, but they are truly in earnest, and often it is a difficult task to quiet their apprehensions and enable them to repose sweetly on the mercy of God. Now when saintly men thus tremble at the thought of the unapproachable holiness of God, will any one dare say that the holiness of the Christian is not above that of the pagan?

I put it to you, men of the world, whose intellect is undoubtedly powerful, and who are able to judge of what is true and sincere, can there be a stronger proof that holiness exists in the Church than these anxious fears of the Christian? If the pattern of sanctity placed by the Church before the eyes of her children were not the highest, do you think that the human conscience could be so sensitive and so much afraid of evil, when evil is only a shadow, as is often the case for these pure souls? Only for this reason those who never offend seriously against the commands of God can imagine and think in all sincerity that they do not deserve that God should press them to His bosom. It is certainly strange, and there is a difficulty to explain these groundless fears. But Eliphaz, in the Book of Job, has done it in our opinion when he exclaimed that "in His angels God hath found depravity"—*In angelis suis reperivit pravitatem*. Even angelic purity compared to that of God is depravity; and on this account the purest and holiest souls feel more keenly their unworthiness in the eyes of God.

Independently of this consideration, which of itself would settle the question we discuss, every candid man must admit that in the Christian Church alone a thorough moral training is gone through by all human souls subjected to her control. What was the moral training of the pagans? What is the moral training of those whose parents have altogether rejected the authority of the Church? Do they ever examine their conscience? Do they put any restraint on their passions, except so far as the maxims of the world compel them? But no one is unaware of the extreme care taken by Christian parents under the Church's advice to mould the souls of their children from the very start, so as to make them moral and pious. No one can deny that God's ministers in the Catholic Church embrace zealously every opportunity of training the young in the practice of virtue. And this priestly oversight and zeal is not confined to the young; but people of every age, every rank in society, every disposition of mind and heart, are the objects of it in season, and also occasionally perhaps out of season. But this very occasional excess so much resented by the worldly is a proof that it is active and energetic. Now, who can believe that the pagan system of leaving every one to his own guidance, and never attempting to train men morally, can produce as abundant fruits of holiness as the Christian system?

But I hear from some an absolute dissent as to my conclusion. "Whatever, it is said, may be the means taken to insure holiness in the Church, the fact is that Christians are often as bad and occasionally worse than other people. St. Paul himself found it out among the Corinthian Christians (1 Cor. v. 1), *talis fornicatio qualis nec inter gentes*. In every age since his time the world's history

has been the record of many crimes and a few virtues." Many other statements of a like character might be made. These few will suffice.

It is not true that the world's history has always been the same in this respect. All intelligent men recognize an immense difference between the long period which preceded our Saviour's advent and the eighteen centuries which have followed. Many books have been written on this very subject, and the demonstration furnished by them is unanswerable. But, besides this general remark, it is a fact which cannot be separated from the subject we are discussing, that whatever crimes have been committed by Christians, the Church has always reprobated them, whilst in paganism they were never publicly rebuked. When St. Paul, addressing the Corinthians, wrote the words which have just been quoted, he made the charge against one individual, but reproved the whole community for not having sufficiently punished the guilty person. In this he established a custom which forever provided in the Church a remedy against excessive corruption. There is among us, since that time, a public authority to denounce guilt and bring it under censure, which never existed and could not, in fact, exist before.

The consequence of this is very remarkable, namely, that Christian nations when they become corrupt are reclaimable. This was not the case anteriorly. Reformation is a word which has become common since that time, but which the Latin world previously never used in the sense in which it is now employed. As to the extraordinary simplicity of those good souls who believed that Luther was the first to speak of and bring on reformation among Christians, it is more to be pitied than blamed, owing to the atmosphere of cant in the midst of which they have been brought up. Even a very superficial knowledge of ecclesiastical history proves that nothing has been so common as the reclaiming of cities, tribes, and even nations, from vice and loose habits of life by zealous apostolic men, as St. Paul was. All ages of the Church, without exception, have witnessed remarkable examples of it; and the same process will continue to the end of time.

This has never happened among pagans, except when true prophets of God were sent to some of those people, on a particular reformatory mission, as Jonas to the Ninevites and Elias to the schismatic people of Israel. The reformation of pagan peoples, by their own moral efforts or under the guidance of their own pagan priests or philosophers, is a Utopia which is yet to be discovered in ancient history. Mr. Franz de Champagny thought he had found an example of it in the Antonine dynasty among the Roman Cæsars; but it can be easily proved that there was no real reformation in Rome at the time; that the few stoic philosophers of the epoch

cannot be called reformers of the nation; that the little which they did among an insignificant number of the upper classes soon evaporated under the infamous reigns of Commodus and Elagabalus; and, finally, that a great part of the change effected for the better through philosophical maxims, which came then into vigor, was the result of Christian doctrine, which was already spreading itself through the city from the catacombs. In the old pagan world the decline was constant and apparently irremediable. Holiness did not belong to it. The student of history has to go up through the ages towards the very origin of mankind to find pure morality. Morality once lost could never be recovered except through divine intervention, which did not take place for the ancients until Christ came. In the Christian Church that supreme intervention is always at hand. The Holy Ghost "has filled the universe," *replevit orbem terrarum*, and henceforth cannot be driven away. This is the source of the Church's holiness, and of the possibility at all times of her renovation. On this account there is always in the Church *regnum sanctorum cum Christo*, "the reign of the Saints with Christ," as St. Augustine said, and because of this she is to-day the "City of God."

2. For this reason likewise the Church is a *Universal City*. Her name alone proves it, for she is, and always has been, and always shall be, the Catholic Church. The meaning of this word is apparently well understood; still men do not conceive thoroughly enough its whole purport. By the strength of her Catholicity she not only exists everywhere, which is usually the only thing considered in the meaning of the vocable—Catholic; but she has the right and the duty to address all nations; she has a claim upon them all, and when she has once established herself among any of them, she keeps her place and refuses to be driven away. Less than a hundred years after the death of the Apostles it already was so; it has continued to be so ever since; it will continue to be so to the end of the world. Doubts may exist in the minds of some as to whether what we have said holds good of so early a period of the Church's history. But apart from many details which cannot be mentioned here, there is a celebrated text of Tertullian, which conclusively settles the question (*Adv. Judæos*, cap. vii.). We copy from the translation of the Edinburgh edition of 1870:

"Upon whom else have the universal nations believed, but upon the Christ who is already come? For whom have the nations believed, Parthians, Medes, Elamites, and they who inhabit Mesopotamia, Armenia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, and they who dwell in Pontus, and Asia, and Pamphylia, sojourners in Egypt, and inhabitants of the region of Africa which is beyond Cyrene, Romans and sojourners, yes, and in Jerusalem Jews, and all other nations; as for instance, *by this time*, the varied races of the Gætulians, and manifold confines of the Moors, all the limits of the Spains, and the diverse nations of the Gauls, and the haunts of the Britons inaccessible to the Romans, but sub-

jugated to Christ; and of the Sarmatians, and Dacians, and Germans, and Scythians, and of many remote nations, and of provinces and islands many, to us unknown and which we can scarcely enumerate? In all which places the name of Christ who is already come reigns, as of Him before whom the gates of all cities have been opened, and to whom none are closed, before whom iron bars have crumbled, and brazen doors been opened. . . . All these prophecies (of Isaias) have been evidently fulfilled, inasmuch as in all these places dwells the 'people' of the name of Christ. For who *could* have reigned *over all nations* but Christ, God's Son, who was ever announced as destined to rule eternally over all nations."

This passage and many others of like import have been impugned by modern critics as full of vague exaggeration. But to our mind the meaning of the passage is well defined, and Tertullian could very well have had positive information of the spread of Christianity among all the nations he names; the others are only intimated in general terms, as was proper. He is, indeed, very guarded—certainly more than usual with him—in stating openly, not that in those various countries all were Christians, but that "in all those places dwelt the people of the name of Christ."

The Church was, therefore, already actually Catholic when Tertullian wrote. Do people generally reflect sufficiently on this prerogative which is as perfectly her own to-day as it ever was? Her influence may have declined in Europe, but not an inch of her possessions has she lost. Is it not a wonderful fact that, after all the victories her enemies boast of having achieved against her, she yet is everywhere on earth, claims every human child as her own, proclaims her intention of making all nations one family, and, when driven away by force from a country, does not give up the idea of conquering it, but returns to the attack at the first opportunity, and invariably succeeds in the end?

See, too, how compact and homogeneous is this universal city, though composed of so many jarring elements. Within its folds all the races of man are comprised, and what no human ruler could do, she does with perfect ease. The supernatural dogmas of her belief and the strict code of her morality are adopted by peoples who are supposed by many philosophers to have naturally and essentially discordant principles of ethics. Montesquieu has pretended that morality changes with the latitude, and that what suits admirably northern nations cannot possibly rule those of the south. The Catholic Church proves every day that she is entirely above such a pretended discordant rule; and it is well known that what she obliges her children to believe and to do is the same for all, and she would refuse to acknowledge as her own any people who would ask the most trifling exemption in essentials. Thus her subjects are the same everywhere. The most eastern Asiatics as well as the western Europeans, the nomad Tartar as well as the scientific Frenchman, when once they are Catholics, have precisely

the same ideas on God, on the human soul, on a future life, on the conditions required to insure happiness in heaven, on everything which pertains to religion and the higher world. Is this possible, humanly speaking? Has any conqueror ever attempted it? In the whole history of mankind three or four heroes, as they are called, have conceived the thought of subduing the world and establishing a universal empire, but not one of them was ever so out of his senses as to suppose that he could impose the same belief and the same morality on all nations. Rome herself, in her dream of a perpetual and universal dominion, took good care not to attempt to establish a universal religion. Still the Catholic Church has this precisely as her great, almost only, object,—to spread the doctrine of Christ to the utmost bounds of the earth, and she does it in the most simple and natural manner. She merely places in the hands of her missionaries a catechism which they have to teach to the converted nations. Look into those apparently insignificant little books, and you will remark that the doctrine is absolutely the same, whether they are designed for the most distant tribes along the Mackenzie River, or for those who live in tropical countries along the Amazon and the Ganges.

Has this universal proselytism and absolute sway been curtailed in the least, in modern times, by the otherwise successful efforts of the enemies of the Church to weaken her influence? By no means; the reverse rather must be acknowledged as the truth. Her missions are every day expanding; new districts are constantly added to the administrative system of her hierarchy; hundreds of churches are built every year; and territories which had never before been embraced by her loving grasp are gradually invaded by her mild proselytism. Thus the Church, notwithstanding the vexations of the State, encircles the whole globe, and extends evermore her peaceful conquests. We shall soon see what figure the State makes in comparison with her.

3. This leads us naturally to consider the continual increase of the Church, at a time, too, when she is said by many to be on the point of disappearing. This will require but a few words. It would be curious, indeed, to look into this matter, had exact statistics of the number of the children of the Church been kept all through her career. It would then be possible to ascertain if there have ever been in her life periods of decrease as well as of increase. It is quite possible, for instance, that at the outburst of Protestantism, when the majority of people in the north of Europe apostatized from the faith, there may have been a sudden and considerable falling off in the number of Catholics. This is, however, doubtful, because it happened at the precise epoch when the discoveries of the Portuguese in the East, and of the Spaniards in the West,

opened the doors of the Church to a very considerable number of far distant nations who for the first time heard and received the good tidings of the Gospel. It is, indeed, very likely that, instead of a falling off, there may have been a large addition to the number of the faithful. If an impartial study of the question were made, by examining carefully its elements as found in the Christian annals, especially, say, for every fifty years during the last five centuries, we would not be surprised if the law should be found to be that of constant increase. It is certain that at this moment the children of the Church are increasing in number all over the world at a remarkable rate. That this is the case everywhere out of Europe will not be denied, when the present labors of Catholic apostles in foreign missions are strictly inquired into.

But in Europe it may be said "that the apostasy of States as States—that is, the refusal of the rulers of nations to consider the Catholic Church as a social element, except in a very subordinate capacity—must have greatly diminished the number of the faithful." We think thus far it has had very little influence. The Catholic Church never depended much on the State. Had she been like Anglicanism as regards the sources of her strength, a bill of Parliament in each of the various States would have sealed the fate of religion. But Catholicity has a Head and a foundation different from the State. When the State abjures its moral subordination to the Church, it becomes a mere *abstraction* for her. But all the units composing the religious Society of Christ are *concrete*, and know that they have a Head distinct from that of the State. Their number, therefore, cannot be seriously diminished by the State's action.

A more precise analysis of the chief elements of this question will make the true state of the case still more evident. In the strict union between Church and State, such as it was formerly, the religious body enjoyed two advantages which it has now very nearly lost. The first was the wealth, the pomp, the exterior display attendant on the honors bestowed by the State; the second was the enforcement of the ecclesiastical rule by the civil power. The average class of mankind is strongly acted upon by each of these, and it is possible that in the present *status* a number of people neglect the practice of their religion, because almost all exterior motives to it have been taken away. But have these men actually apostatized, though they are lukewarm and thoughtless? By no means. Most of them are Christians still, and remember it, at least at the hour of death. Nay, on many occasions during their lives they wake up, and religion makes the more impression on account of her exclusively heavenly character. This awakening was particularly remarkable in Paris on Easter Sunday, the 1st of

April last. A daily paper, *La France*, expressed it to perfection by saying: "Had a stranger suddenly found himself in Paris for the first time in his life on that day, at the sight of so many magnificent and vast religious edifices crowded with people from morning to night, he would have been ready to swear that the French capital was the most Catholic city in the world." Let the government in France, therefore, become yet more anti-Christian than it is, let the radical party succeed and break asunder entirely the connection of the State with Catholicity, the French people and the Parisians among them, many of them at least, will continue to be Catholic, and show it, too, as they did last Easter-day.

4. A fourth and last consideration in regard to this branch of our subject is the harmony existing among all the faithful members of the Church. Admirable spectacle offered by the Catholic religion! Whoever believes in it and practices it is in perfect communion of mind and heart with hundreds of millions of fellow-beings, among whom there is a perfect unity in necessary things—*In necessariis unitas*, as St. Augustine says.

This seems but *natural* to many good people unacquainted with the world. For is it not true that the souls of men have all been endowed with an intellect whose first principles clearly must be the same, as every sound philosophy proves? The same is true of the will of man, which has received from God the same unerring principles of morality going to form the human conscience. St. John, at the very beginning of his Gospel, states it with his usual majesty and clearness when he says that the Eternal Word is "the light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world." Yet, strange to say, every-day experience shows that the intellect of man, now at least, is exceedingly obscure, and does not unite in admitting the same first principles, and the human conscience is far from acting as if moral principles were the same for all. In the Catholic Church alone does this take place, and the consequence is evident that the Catholic Church alone enjoys the prerogative of restoring man to the right use of his natural faculties. This must be examined somewhat more in detail.

Where will you find at this day harmony of belief among men in matters of pure intellect? Donoso Cortes has admirably said in his *Essays on Catholicism*:

"You, who aspire to subjugate peoples, to domineer over nations, and exercise authority over human reason, do not declare yourselves the depositaries of clear and evident truths; above all do not produce your proofs, if you have any, for the world will not recognize you as masters, but will rebel against the brutal yoke of your evidence. Announce, on the contrary, that you have an argument which upsets a mathematical truth; that you are going to prove that two and two do not make four, but five; that God does not exist, or that man is God; . . . that the beautiful is ugly and the ugly beautiful; that good is evil and evil good; that the devil is God and God is the devil.

. . . If to the good sense of which you have given such ample proofs, by announcing the demonstration of all these things, you afterwards add the good sense of not demonstrating them at all; or if, as the only demonstration of your blasphemies and your affirmations, you give your blasphemies and your affirmations themselves, then the human race will extol you to the stars! . . . I know not if there be anything under the sun more vile and despicable than the human race outside the Catholic lines."

This is strong language which we perhaps would not have dared to use as coming from ourselves. But it comes from a greater man than we are, and, moreover, it expresses the truth; "outside the Catholic Church there is at present a perfect anarchy of thought; but within her precincts there is unanimity of belief." This anarchy of mind is still more perfectly expressed by D. Cortes in another passage of his book, where he says in substance that the absurd seems to be made purposely to suit the great intellects of our day, and the more absurd a thing is, the more readily will it be adopted, announced, and proclaimed as *the* truth, precisely because it is absurd. The consequence is that in the impossibility of agreeing on anything whatsoever, men, to live at peace with each other, have finally adopted the *golden rule* to come to a compromise on every thing, and *agree to disagree*. Sublime adage, which makes of men a society of idiots, we presume from *ἰδιῶται* in Greek, for whom truth is an impossibility and common belief an intolerable burden!

But the Catholic Church has declared that three things are indispensable to man on earth, on his way to eternity. These are Faith, Hope, and Charity. The only one of these three essential requirements which is of importance at this moment is the first,—namely, Faith. By proclaiming, as revealed by Almighty God, a certain number of truths and supernatural facts which men must believe absolutely, the anarchy of the human mind is suddenly arrested, and a real society becomes possible; so that men have at last common principles and common aims. In this alone is the true source of harmony of belief in mankind. Take this away and there will remain only opinion; and opinions may justly differ, because none of them can impose absolute assent. Look around you and say if there is faith anywhere on earth except in the Catholic Church. You will not find it certainly in the Protestant sects, which have all rejected the necessary dogma of infallibility, and are thus left entirely at the mercy of mere opinions. If you look for it in the Oriental churches, you will find it only in a fragmentary state, as their schism has deprived them of a continuation of the life in which they once fully participated. For they admit three or four general councils only, namely, all those held by the Church previous to their separation. Thus their very history indicates the precise time when faith became for them crystallized or rather fossilized. From that moment down there is not for them any means

of ascertaining what the Church believes. Besides, by rejecting the authority of the first pastor, they are deprived of the greatest privilege of supreme harmony, which consists in the impossibility of disunion. Any individual bishop among them can originate a sect, because they recognize above themselves only metropolitans and a national council, to whom unerrancy has not been given by our Saviour. In the Catholic Church, on the contrary, disunion is impossible as was just said, because, should any one dissent, he is by this very fact separated from the body in which the strictest union continues still to exist, and which thus cannot suffer from the apostasy of any individual. The Pope, therefore, is the keystone of the whole edifice, and as from him "unity finds its source," according to a beautiful thought of St. Cyprian, without him there can be no unity, and men remain in the condition just described by Donoso Cortes.

It is evident that the decline of the outside influence of the Church in this age cannot affect in the least the complete accord among her children secured by her constitution; and thus the Church remains the same powerful body that she has ever been. Any doubting inquirer has only to go through the various countries where Catholics are found, to convince himself of this wonderful agreement. The most remote from the centre are as firmly attached to every dogma and moral principle as those who live around the Pope himself. The doctrine taught to the most distant and rude tribes of America and Australia is absolutely the same as that which feeds the mind of the child of a refined European. And it has always been so, and it shall continue to be so to the end of time, because the Church is unchangeable, and the withdrawal of all possible worldly influence cannot deprive her of this high prerogative which God communicates to her out of His own unchangeableness. The violent outcry so prevalent in our days among men who cannot themselves have, nor even pretend to have, a permanent belief, namely, that the Church invents new dogmas, and increases constantly the number of her articles of faith, is absolutely preposterous. Whatever she defines was always believed before. She never decrees anything except when it is clearly contained in Holy Scripture or tradition. People speak as if the popes and bishops were so many politicians meeting occasionally in councils to debate among themselves what is the best in their opinion, and to declare as the truth the mere expression of a human policy! They actually imagine that the decree declaring the Pope infallible in certain contingencies is a new device of this age, to prop up the crumbling edifice of the Papacy, and replace by a bold spiritual pretension the loss of nearly everything earthly. When they are told that the doctrine of the infallibility of the Head of the Church

has always been held by the greatest number of theologians, and is clearly derived from some most striking texts of Scripture, they will not listen to you, and continue to assert that the Catholic Church is not what she pretends to be. Yet if Augustine, Ambrose, nay, Irenæus, and Clement of Rome came back on earth, they would undoubtedly recognize the Church of our day as their mother, perfectly identical with that of their own time. They all had the same idea of faith that we have; and, consequently, their belief was identical with our own. Is it not wonderful thus to see a society spread everywhere, having enjoyed so far an existence of nineteen centuries, yet animated with the same spirit, imbued with the same ideas, professing the same principles, believing the same truths, and united by the bonds of the same love? A society that is unchangeable, harmonious, powerful, and unassailable in its unity?

To appreciate more fully, however, all these high prerogatives of the Church, the City opposed to her must be examined and studied. What we call the "State" must be subjected to a thorough investigation in order to see what advantages it has derived from its supposed victories over the Church. By getting loose from her it pretends to have recovered its independence, and to be able to fulfil henceforth its destiny without interference and obstruction. It proclaims to the world the brilliant achievements that lay in store for it, and the supreme prosperity it is hastening to reach. It is as important as curious to examine these pretensions; and it will not be very difficult to uncover the nakedness of the idol, and show how empty are the boasts and how false the assertions of its deluded worshippers.

II. THE STATE.

I. In the ages of faith the State formed a part of the City of God, because it was united intimately to the Church, and made one of the elements of Christendom. But in breaking asunder those holy bonds, it has come at once to deny its subordination to God. This is a very remarkable fact. It might have apostatized from the Church, and yet remained *theist*. England appeared inclined to do so for two hundred years at least after its separation from Rome. She proclaimed herself a Christian State, and boasted even of a spirit of religion deeper and purer than could be found among "Papists." But England now, following the example of other European States, has entered upon a new path. It consists in thinking that complete indifference to any kind of religion whatever, absolute abstention from all dogmas, total forgetfulness of Christian morality as such, is the policy best adapted to secure the happiness of nations. But that this is really and in fact atheism, no one can deny; and indeed no one now even attempts to deny it. Either entire silence is main-

tained on the subject, or it is unhesitatingly admitted that the State must be godless. That this is not an exaggeration is proved by many facts, which unfortunately cannot be gainsaid, and which prove that European States are in the act at least of abjuring their former belief in God. As this is an extremely important point, it must be proved somewhat *in extenso*.

Any nation professing belief in God must admit that power comes from Him, and that subjects obey God in obeying the State. This is now spurned as a childish notion by all the statesmen of Europe, except in Russia. They all, with the exception mentioned, admit practically that power comes from the people, that human laws have no other source than the will of the majority, understood as politicians understand it, and that the citizens must obey because force obliges them to do so. This is emphatically modern atheism. Secondly, all nations which profess their belief in God necessarily attach some importance at least to divine worship. Sometimes they have a State religion which all must follow. Sometimes without going so far as this they forbid openly the avowed profession of total unbelief, and foster in all manner of ways the honor due to God by public worship assisted at by the State authorities, by contributing largely to the building of temples for public worship, to the celebration of religious festivals, to the bringing up of youth in the fear and love of God. But the States of Europe have openly discarded, or are in the act of discarding, all such proofs of their belief. There is no law anywhere proscribing atheism even as a doctrine dangerous to the State; and the controversy going on in the *Dublin Review* on that subject proves how far this is now the case. In scarcely any European State are there stated occasions for the authorities to show their faith in any manner soever. Religious ceremonies partaken in by the citizens are rather discouraged than the reverse. If the State still contributes in any way something for the expenses of worship, it is done very parsimoniously, and so as to indicate that the practice is not to continue long. As to the bringing up of youth in the fear and love of God, it is evident that this is one of the last concerns of the State in modern times. Again, a State professing to believe in God shows it invariably by its code of laws, by its prescriptions as regards births, marriages, and burials, by its preservation, as much as lays in it, of the great primitive traditions of mankind on which rests the security of society, as for instance the purity of women, the tender care of the family, the horror of atrocious crimes. All these things may seem to some not to have any connection with the profession of theism, but they are greatly mistaken. The ancient nations knew it well. They were persuaded that God must be the inspirer of good laws, that the three great epochs of human

life, its dawn, the period of sexual union, and after the body breathes its last, were to be most strictly cared for by the State, at least so far as to see that the prescriptions of religion were well observed at these three important moments of human existence, because of the peculiar rights the Creator has reserved to Himself in that regard. Finally the interests of woman and of the family, the preservation of society from crimes crying to heaven—so well guarded in primitive times—are certainly fostered by the State in proportion as it believes in God, and are, on the contrary, left to chance when God is forgotten or ignored. But every one must be fully aware that the least concern of the State in the present age is to provide that the laws respecting these matters bear the imprint of religion. The whole ceremony attending the birth, the marriage, the burial of human beings, consists in coldly registering their names. As to the family, woman, and the preservation of society from atrocious crimes—crying to heaven as the Bible says—the only prescriptions found on the subject in modern legislation regard merely unimportant material interests which have no reference to the deep views which true and sincere religion takes of these mighty subjects.

Practical atheism has, therefore, invaded the State. The invasion is not yet complete; but the decline in this direction is so rapid that if it is not soon arrested, men now living will see the day when European nations will be bowed under the yoke of entirely godless rulers. The reader is left to consider himself what will be the dreadful situation of Europe when this will have completely taken place. No one but a fool can imagine that the State will have acquired additional strength by having deliberately brought about this state of things. The State may one day require the help of the Church to repair its error. At present it spurns the Church.

But if the State is no longer one of the component elements of the City of God (having abjured Him), what can be said of holiness of life in the new state of society? The office of the State, certainly, is not to raise up the nations to a higher plane of sanctity; but a great part of that office is undoubtedly to see that society does not become entirely gangrened. And what must be the consequence of the godlessness we have just considered? Evidently, to inoculate the people with a like indifference to religious considerations in the actions of their daily life; to render them callous to the sense of duty; to take away from them the fear of God and of His judgments; to deaden their conscience, and in the end stifle entirely its voice; to leave them consequently at the mercy of their passions, and to the sole guidance of what they may imagine is their interest. When these baneful effects shall have been pro-

duced on a great mass of people it is easy to foresee the dreadful invasion of vices and crimes that will ensue. If among nations remaining to a great extent religious, and preserving the salutary fear of divine retribution, it has happened that luxury, wealth, and a great development of material prosperity have opened the flood-gates of corruption, and sped those nations on to destruction, what will it be when to all those causes of ruin, which undoubtedly exist in our day, is added the open denial of a hereafter, or at least of a strict judge and avenger of wrong? The wisdom of ages has taught us to believe that the fall of the most powerful empires of the world has invariably been due to the moral gangrene engendered by sensual indulgence and by unbelief. When both these causes of degeneracy come together the fall is always frightful and the destruction complete.

It is a patent fact that in Europe, in the present age, there is a universal aspiration for material enjoyment, and for the acquirement of wealth which procures it, together with a stolid indifference as regards the spiritual world, a sentiment becoming stronger every day; that duty is a humbug, conscience a bugbear, the fear of God a nursery tale. This deplorable accumulation of causes of ruin has certainly been fostered, if not produced, by the modern State doctrines. When the day shall arrive for the full development of the inevitable consequences, the crash will probably be one of the most terrible recorded in history.

Meanwhile, except the holiness of the "House of God," which is yet able to arrest His avenging hand, except the purity of many Christian souls unseen in the midst of corruption, wherever you turn your eyes you see the unblushing effrontery of men to whom nothing is sacred in heaven or on earth. You will find them in all stations of life, even the highest; in the *honorable* professions which formerly secured respect for those who held them; in the legislative halls where the laws of the nation are elaborated; in the mansions of those who administer public affairs, and the palaces of kings and emperors. The most pardonable of their offences are often reputed to be those which merely stop at the plundering of the people. They deserve the thanks of the community when they are satisfied with merely enriching themselves at the public expense, and do not take advantage of their high station to pervert entirely by their example public morality. Is this the road that leads to prosperity and happiness in a State? Is it thus that modern institutions merit the gratitude of mankind?

2. Perhaps, however, the State can boast of universal success in its recent undertakings, a success far more brilliant than the universality of its adversary, the Church. It is proper to examine this second point, and judge if this is not also an empty boast. At

first sight the exhibit on the part of modern governments and institutions appears to be a triumphant one. Observe in how short a time the modern doctrines have come to prevail, and how they have been adopted everywhere. The very phraseology of the system has become a universal language. They have been helped, moreover, by a multitude of investigations. Have not numerous scientists, collecting together all the newly discovered facts, endeavored to give to the whole Cosmos a meaning altogether favorable to the recent State measures? Yes, they now combine all their efforts to make people believe that God's action is to be seen neither in nature nor in man's history. They try, apparently with success, to explain by purely natural causes all that we see in the universe, even its first cause—their celebrated protoplasm—and all that has ever happened on earth from its first day. They thus justify the State in excluding God from politics, from legislation, from education, from the whole social world. We all can hear their boasts, witness their triumph, see the waves of "modern ideas" spreading farther and farther every day, so that they have attained a kind of universality which they boldly oppose to that of the Church. Not satisfied with Europe, where their cause seems to be on the point of a general acceptance, they look to the whole world beyond its limits. America, both North and South, has already caught up the cry. But America is practically European, and there would be little to wonder at if European delusions would invade the Western Continent. And go to Asia, Hindostan, for instance, and hear what the *Madras Mail* of October 6th, 1876, says on the subject of education in the *whole* peninsula:¹

"In the government schools a purely secular education is given, and no influence whatever is exerted on the religious opinions of the scholars, but the necessary consequence of a culture of the intellect, totally destitute of all moral and religious instruction, is the gradual uprooting of all religious belief in the children, and the substitution in its place of a deplorable skepticism. . . . 'Willing or unwilling,' says Sir Bartle Frere, 'we have sown the seed of a physical, intellectual, moral, and religious revolution, and who of us will dare to predict all its consequences before a new generation has passed away? . . . In India everything is in a revolutionary state. Happily for mankind this state of affairs is tranquil, often unperceived, but in spite of it it is revolution, more general, complete, rapid than the one which is now progressing in Europe,'"

Besides Hindostan, in Asia, Japan, it is well known, has been already inoculated with the godless spirit of advanced ideas. Oceania in its entirety is on the high road towards it, and the whole expanse of that ocean presents the spectacle of numberless islands whose natives are disappearing rapidly as if by magic, to be re-

¹ Taken from the *Missions Catholiques* of March 16th, 1877. The text consequently uses a different phraseology, but the thoughts are identical.

placed by a mongrel population from Europe or Eastern Asia. Even Africa is invaded by the new system of godlessness. Egypt in the northeast, Cape Colony in the south, and Algeria in the northwest, are examples.

These are facts which are often brought forward as proofs of the vitality of the new system, that it is spreading rapidly and being adopted almost universally. But this is only a superficial view, and proves nothing against the Church's real universality. The Catholic Church, in extending her empire, forms really "one family of all nations." When they have been baptized and instructed by her they have the same ideas on God, on the soul, on duty, on everything connected with the inner and higher world. They are homogeneous and harmonious. Man is moulded in his entirety. The new principles he imbibes do not foster his material interests alone by raising him up to a higher plane of exterior civilization, but develop likewise the necessary aspirations of his soul toward a happy hereafter. The new social state thus established among converted nations is favorable to their peace and happiness, and the principles inculcated by the Church form a solid basis for true virtue and a high morality.

Would it be so if the new measures introduced everywhere by modern statesmen and rulers were finally to prevail? It is evident that the civilization fostered by them is all materialistic, regards only the physical man, cannot touch his soul, and tends to an unchecked development of his passions. Can any one imagine that the whole universe will ever form "one family" under such a system as this? How can men unite in harmony when they are left entirely under the control of selfish passions? They will never regard each other as brothers. There is no brotherhood among wild beasts, and lion fights against lion when they meet by chance on a carcass to be devoured. When God is absent, when duty disappears, when conscience is dead, men are reduced to the state of wild animals, and there can be no fraternal union among them.

This is probably the reason why, in "modern thought," great respect is always paid to nationalities. The system, as it is in process of development, cannot go beyond nationalities. The Socialists alone seem in their aspirations to go beyond them. They proclaim the *universal godless republic*, which they place under the iron sceptre of an autocrat ruling over their monstrous organization. But Socialism cannot succeed in permanently comprehending the world in its monstrous embrace. Liberalism on this account seems to carry the day, and Liberalism is satisfied with nationalities, and declares itself impotent to neutralize race characteristics. The only absorption of society it proposes to itself is on the surface, regards exterior comfort and appliances, does not touch the

internal play of the passions. These will remain as wild as ever, nay, will grow wilder, by the removal, which Liberalism aims at, of the wholesome restraints of faith in those who are Christians, and of superstition in those who are not.

But, independently of these considerations, which alone would prove the deficient character of the universality which the new State measures claim, it is proper to say a few words on the help these are supposed to receive from modern discoveries in the field of science. They pretend, as we saw a few pages back, that natural causes are sufficient to explain everything in nature and in history without any intervention of God, and that politics, legislation, education, the whole social world must be constructed anew without any reference to God. "Final causes are exploded," they exclaim. This means that there is no design visible in anything, and that there is no need of a designer. With the greatest coolness they assume that this is a universal principle which has come to be accepted everywhere. Some of them, it is true, faintly protest that modern discoveries do not altogether forbid people from admitting a designer if they choose, and thus they pretend not to be atheists, or rather antitheists. (We find that this new word has just been coined.) They insist, however, that although in the abstract this is true, in a concrete sense, however, and practically, there is not anything known in nature and in history which cannot be naturally explained. Creation, therefore, according to them, is a word without meaning and should be expunged from the vocabulary; as to successive creative acts, there is nothing any longer to sustain them; and in history it may be assumed that man is and always has been the only factor. The Providence of God is no more needed. Why not, therefore, complete the system, and carry it out fully in legislation, etc., etc.? When this will have been effected, then indeed "modern thought" will have perfected its evolution, the State will be paramount in the world, and the Church may hide her diminished head.

Suppose these *agreeable* anticipations are realized, and that everything which is thus assumed as true is positively demonstrated, will it be a real boon to mankind? Every honest soul must shudder at the very idea of it. What in this case will be the rule of the State, the position of the citizen, the relations of man with man, the constitution of the family, the government of cities, the aspect of the moral world? Their development would be too horrible and shocking even to imagine. People may perhaps call this declamation. Yet the pen, though guided by the most holy indignation, would be incapable to do justice to the reality.

But, thank God, nothing of this is proved, and every word of it is false. Nature is not explicable without the intervention of God.

History supposes at its very beginning a Supreme Ruler, whose interposition is visible throughout its whole course. Politics are not left to the vagaries of man, but power comes from God in spite of popular theories. A tyrant is not allowed to do his worst without the fear of a supreme avenger of wrong. Man is not a machine, nor human society a herd of animals. Who dare say that everything is naturally explained, when everything in fact is still a mystery? The more the supernatural is attempted to be expelled, the more the sphere of mystery increases. For the admission of the supernatural is often the only way to reach an intelligible account of the most simple workings in the soul of man, as well as in the external world. Let any scientist tell us how the words of Ovid have always been considered as sublimely truthful: *Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor*. After this, thousands of questions of the same kind offer themselves for solution without greater probability of success. But the limits assigned to this paper oblige us to speed on, since so many things remain yet to be said.

3. In speaking of the universality which the State boasts of with regard to the system of distrust and opposition it has adopted toward the Church, it is not so much the State *in abstracto* that has been considered, as the widespreading party on which it leans, and whose doctrines are a strong support to modern State measures. At this moment that party boasts loudly of its numerical strength and of the probability of its further increase. They think they have with them the intellectual world, and that the masses must follow. Their opponents are alarmed at the progress made by these doctrines during the last twenty years in Germany, England, and France. Are these fears well founded? Will the number of adherents to modern ideas of the State continue to increase until they silence all opposition, and sweep the last vestiges even of Christianity from the face of the earth?

The reflections indulged in a few pages back with regard to the remarkable increase in number of the children of the Church, during the last fifty years, forbid us to despond, or rather imperiously bid us to hope. But it is proper to examine coolly how far the hopes of the adverse party are well grounded; and in the first place it might easily be proved that there have been other periods during the last nineteen hundred years, when the apparent danger was as great, if not greater. Yet the peril passed away without impairing in the least the vitality of the Christian faith; and not unfrequently made it stronger. Like results will surely follow the storm which is now raging, and the fear will turn out to be a delusion. Mr. Mivart, in his recent *Lessons from Nature*, has depicted in the most gloomy colors the inroads of this frightful evil; and he has rendered by it a great service to truth; for previously he was thought to be

dallying with this pest. But at the end of his book he has greatly relieved the anxieties of his readers by repeated statements of the really small number of those who adhere thoroughly to these theories. Of the danger itself he is now fully aware. In his thirteenth chapter he passes in review the chief leaders of the new party in England, namely, Prof. Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, Prof. Huxley, Mr. Barratt, Winwood Reade, and others, and states pointedly the doctrines advocated by these "advanced thinkers." To give an example, the author of *Lessons from Nature* reduces the doctrine of Herbert Spencer, as expressed in the *Fortnightly Review*, for April, 1871, to the following plain and undisguised propositions:

Theism is false and absurd. Rewards and punishments in a future life are the delusions of superstition. Prayer is an absurdity, inasmuch as there is no God having any sympathy with us. There is no difference of kind, but only of degree, between the intellect of a sage, the emotions of a saint, and the psychical faculties of a mud-fish. There is no such thing as free-will; man having no more real option as to his thoughts and intentions than a leaf has to resist the action of the wind.

This is plain enough. It is well, however, to remark incidentally here that what in this paper is called the State has not yet reached the point of inscribing these articles of the new creed of atheists in its programme, and placing them openly at the head of its anti-religious catechism. But no State in Europe forbids these doctrines to be proclaimed; all of them allow its professors and endowed lecturers to teach them to the new generation, until they have come to be indorsed by State authority. They form in part the last and most radical conclusions of the principles advocated by the State itself; and all the modern axioms of politics and religion logically end in these monstrosities.

This certainly is frightful; and the reading of this work of Mr. Mivart is calculated to impress the reader with the thought that the actual position of the Church, face to face with such enemies, is perhaps worse than was the case at any previous period. But all this is greatly modified when the author comes to consider how far the evil has spread, and is destined to spread, in education, for instance. "Only a very small minority of people," he says, "will probably persist in advocating the education of children . . . in the tenets of one, as yet, very inconsiderable sect, that of the secularists, when once they fully understand that this is the result of secular or unsectarian education." Other expressions of the same author might be quoted of like effect; but we would go still further; for he speaks only of England, and we would say openly that the doctrines of the supporters of the new State measures being grounded in undisguised atheism and materialism cannot spread anywhere

to a great extent. For it is only at the end of the world, when Antichrist will inoculate the madness of his fanaticism into people deprived entirely of faith, that this may be the case. The world has not yet come to this; the great mass of mankind would certainly at this moment refuse to follow the lead of such a precious set of "advanced thinkers." How long this is to continue, and when the world will be entirely ready for the final apostasy, does not belong to the plan of this paper. It is sufficient for the purpose of our argument that the evil, in its excessive form, has not yet spread far enough to justify its boast of universality.

There is, it is true, the large array of doctrines, mainly denounced and opposed by Pius IX in his *Syllabus*, which undoubtedly the State has openly embraced, and which are doggedly sustained by a large number of men. These doctrines are embraced within the circle called by Donoso Cortes *liberal opinions*; and he has conclusively proved that they lead irresistibly to the extremest radical doctrines. It is by their help that the State has reduced the Church to the situation so often described in previous papers; and they are the arsenal out of which the most deadly weapons are procured for an unholy warfare. But these axioms of modern statecraft have been introduced surreptitiously. People have swallowed them blindly. When their purport is fully known and duly appreciated, multitudes will, it is certain, scornfully reject maxims which tend evidently to the curtailment, or rather absorption, of all liberty by an autocratic State. Those maxims have spread very extensively without being fully understood. The light of argumentation will certainly show them in their true colors; and as they lead evidently to the total denial of faith, an inexorable logic will necessarily render them at last odious to the majority of mankind.

It is to be remarked that the origin of these "advanced ideas" is of yesterday. Most of these axioms, if thus they may be styled, are not yet a hundred years old. They can scarcely be said to have acquired the right of citizenship among the friends of true liberty. They are very far from having reached the degree of universality which the maxims of the Church have enjoyed for eighteen centuries. In this respect, therefore, the State is far from competing with the Spouse of Christ. Let another hundred years roll by, and all those State maxims which seem now to have secured the assent of millions, may be despised and repudiated by the sons of their present advocates. In politics such revulsions as this are common enough to render this result far from impossible. It is, consequently, very evident that the peril which threatens the Church, from the open opposition of the State, is far from being as alarming as were many of those which the Church has lived through.

4. The harmony necessarily pertaining to the Church, owing to her divine constitution, and absolutely fostered by the spirit of faith, which makes her not only unchangeable, but likewise perfectly homogeneous, and places her out of the reach of internal strife, belonged formerly to the States of Europe in a certain degree, as forming Christendom. The common belief and identical principles of morality which prevailed everywhere, for the mere reason that they were Christian States, gave to the earthly society a semi-divine look, so that, as has been stated previously, it formed an element of the City of God. This homogeneity is now entirely gone, and in its place discord, strife, and contention have been unfortunately introduced. At least the fatal germ of all those evils has been planted in the soil by the breaking down into fragments of the former common understanding in faith and morals. From this, that is to say from the domain of religion, the same want of harmony has passed into that of politics, philosophy, social aims, and nationalities. Into all these various aspects of the European commonwealth mental anarchy has penetrated, and to-day Europe presents to our view the unwelcome spectacle of a "City of Confusion," a real Babel, in common parlance "a bear garden." The expression is strong, but graphic, and, after the few pages which yet can be devoted to its consideration, no one, it is believed, will feel inclined to dispute its correctness. The subject is a very copious one, and we are compelled to select only a few points for presentation, and leave many others unmentioned. The first that presents itself is the political aspect of Europe; and, indeed, on this branch of the subject it will be easy to prove that the rather strong expressions which have just fallen from our pen are just and true to the letter.

To hear some people talk, it would seem that the "science" of politics had no existence in previous ages, and that during the last hundred years it has well-nigh reached perfection. It would be impossible to prove, in the very short space left us for discussion, that this is a delusion, or rather just the reverse of the truth. We must be satisfied with a short sketch of the actual state of the political world in Europe, and as there are exterior or international politics ruling the relations of various States, and interior politics having regard to the national affairs of each State, it is necessary to look into both these branches of the subject.

As to the first, Comte Franz de Champagny, somewhere in his *Césars*, has justly remarked that, since the Protestant Reformation, but chiefly in the last century, the rivalry of nationalities, that is, the hatred of peoples against peoples, has become a feature of modern society, and we are afraid that the international politics of Europe have not changed for the better since Mr de Champagny wrote.

Christendom, he remarked, had made one family, as it were, of all Europeans. It had softened down those angular asperities which generally distinguish nations from each other and place them in fierce antagonism. It is undeniable that religion alone formerly united all the nations of Europe, and formed of them a kind of commonwealth. It is the Catholic Church only that could thus induce races of so great a variety of character to coalesce in a friendly spirit, and if God had not imbued it with a pre-eminent aptitude to that effect, it would never have been called the Catholic Church. Catholicity or universality must smooth over, nay, eradicate what is antagonistic in each tribe to obtain the union of all, and this result had been clearly obtained for the whole of Europe.

But the spirit of division natural to ancient paganism has revived to a great degree, and now Europe, says De Champagny, is divided into three great antagonistic families, namely, *the Slave race* aspiring to place itself under a powerful chief—the autocrat of Russia—outside the Catholic communion, and to form a vast and threatening unity; *the German race* separating itself proudly and scornfully from its previous associations with the South of Europe like a feudal chieftain of past ages, and building its eagle's nest north of the Rhine; and, finally, *the Latin race* remaining isolated in the southern and western part of the Continent, gradually becoming disintegrated and broken up into smaller fragments, and forming itself into distinct and already opposite camps, as if the same blood did not run in their veins, as if the same civilization had not raised them up to their present position, and the same religion had not long united them and made them happy and prosperous.

It is surely on account of those divisions, which cannot but bring on universal strife, that Europe is preparing for a conflict such as the world has scarcely ever witnessed. The treasures of all those States are daily emptied, and have to be constantly replenished, in order to pay for maintaining armies comprising nearly the whole of the adult male population. Space and time prevent us from giving the exact statistics of those monstrous military agglomerations. It was recently calculated that six millions of soldiers were actually under arms, and at this moment, when a universal war is expected, the number must have been increased. Look around and see on the soil of Europe those countless legions of soldiers, numbering more than a million in each of the great States, hundreds of thousands in insignificant little kingdoms whose troops previously consisted of only a few thousand, perhaps even a few hundred men. Look likewise at the laws. Everywhere elaborate enactments are ingeniously contrived so that not a single individual under legislative control shall escape being trained up for war, and kept ready for any emergency—an emergency soon expected to

arrive. Should you continue incredulous, contemplate the material preparations actually made on all sides for the most effective and thorough destruction of life, improved arms of every description, rifles of every name and shape, enormous guns, and monstrous mortars. Count, if you can, the inventions of that kind which are patented every day. Reflect well on this, that the most scientific and thorough tests are applied to judge of their destructive efficiency. The inventors are ready to swear that nothing better can be imagined to kill the greatest number of men in the shortest possible time. Finally, look at the sea covered with ironclads, look at the land bristling with bayonets, look at the homes of citizens empty of youth, look at the numerous camps and barracks crammed with conscripts under training. You see nothing of this in this country. We had a glimpse of it a few years back, but, thank God, we see nothing of it here to-day. But at this very moment Germany, France, Italy, count nearly as many soldiers liable to be called to arms at any moment as they have men above eighteen and below fifty. And this has been going on for many years, to prepare for the fray which is now just beginning at both ends of the Black Sea.

Has the proud European mind in these days any object more worthy of its deep attention than the extirpation of the human race? Can you find in Europe any pursuit followed with more ardor, engaging a greater number of designers, inventors, perfectors, and artificers? Nobody can pretend that all this is for nothing, has no object whatever. For if this were the case the treasures of all those nations would be squandered, the majority of able-bodied citizens would be taken from their useful occupations, the activity of an immense number of men would be engaged uselessly in the pursuit of an *ignis fatuus*. Who can pretend it?

Turn now from the international to the interior politics of each European State, and we are confronted by a spectacle not less appalling, for, besides the antagonism of European nationalities, each one against all the others, there is a fierce opposition growing up in the very heart of each European nation between the State power and the subjects, the rulers and the ruled, the influential and rich classes and the poor. There is, consequently, threat of war outside, and threat of war inside. It is a terrible actualization of the Scripture text, *Foris gladius, intus pavor*. The chief cause of this last-mentioned symptom of internal strife is the spread of the doctrines which have formed the chief theme of this paper. They have reached the people in many countries; they have borne their baneful fruits among men who specially need the teachings of religion. Numerous sects of a pretended philosophy have been set on foot; innumerable books have been written to develop their dis-

organizing tenets; secret associations have been formed to give unity to those schemes. All this has been done to corrupt the people and take from them the restraints of religion. Every one has heard of the Socialists, the Communists, the Internationals, etc. For a long time Catholic writers were the only ones to fight against the threatening evil. At last others than Catholics have become aware of it. Mr. Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, recently uttered a word or two on the subject, ominous enough, but far from sufficient; and, stranger still, Count Bismarck found those sectaries in his way, and acknowledged their power by the fear which he exhibited. It is known that the objects of those vast associations is for the most part to destroy society as it has existed since the establishment of Christianity, and build on its ruins a new edifice raised on atheistic and materialistic principles. To succeed in doing this war must be declared against every social institution now in existence. It is, therefore, the announcement of a universal civil strife when there are at the same time fearful international wars in immediate prospect. And the projects that are openly advocated by the new sectaries are of such a nature, that, if there were even only a partial application of them to society, it would involve a return to barbarism. The reader can form some idea of this by reading what Mr. Mivart has said in his recent book on *Contemporary Evolution*. There any one can see to what state Europe is reduced, at a time when it is generally supposed that she has reached the highest point of civilization.

The expression, "it is a return to barbarism," has been used, and this deserves a word or two of comment. It is known that the Roman empire was destroyed by barbarians in the fifth and following centuries. It may be useful and important to ask what difference there is between the dangers which now threaten society and those which then were impending over Rome? There is this, exactly: Rome, apparently so prosperous, was in fact unable to cope with the barbarians of the North. When these came they found only victims ready for immolation, a multitude of defenceless people offered to them for promiscuous slaughter. After having scourged the Roman dominions, those ferocious tribes, full of vigor and life, settled in their new country, and began a national existence on a basis very different from that from which any other previous race started. The Church was there on every spot they occupied, facing them boldly, and offering them the Cross and the Gospel. She purified them by baptism, opened the ears of their understanding by Christian doctrines, and their hearts by the sweet emotions of charity. We know what results followed, for all of us are the children of those barbarians.

But when war, interior and exterior, shall begin on the condi-

tions just summarily stated, all men will be found with arms in their hands, yea, with the most approved weapons and the most scientific processes of warfare, with an equal ferocity in the hearts of all, and a corresponding prospect of mutual and universal destruction. The Church will be there, no doubt, ready to bless whenever called upon, and in her alone will there be hope for society, exactly the same as was the case in the fifth century. But the dispositions of the new barbarians will be very different from those of fourteen hundred years ago. Mr. Mivart, who does not use this ugly word, *barbarian*, endeavors to describe the means which will be again used by the Church for the salvation of society. In this he seems to us less successful than in the other portions of his book. We would not ourselves attempt any prediction of the probable way in which society is to be restored again on a Christian basis. If we relied only on human means we would despair, and the social revolution which has now begun in earnest would seem to us destined to rush along with more and more fury, until it had accomplished its fell purpose by a universal devastation. When, for the great majority of men, revelation is a myth, the communion of earth with heaven a delusion, force is put into the place of right, paganism revived—as they already speak of doing—but in a much worse form than in ancient times, every one of the new social institutions based on the footing of perfect independence of any Superior Power, etc., etc., all human hope must be given up, and the only help which can be relied upon is that of heaven. But, fortunately, there is a passage of Holy Scripture which can restore the confidence of the most despondent, and in the eventual success of the party on which we have commented, a few phrases of the Book of Wisdom (i. 13, 59) suffice to furnish ground for the firmest hope. Here it is, from the Douai translation :

“God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living. For He created all things that they might be; and He made the nations of the earth for health (*sanabiles*, curable); and there is no poison of destruction in them, nor kingdom of hell upon the earth.”

We must believe, therefore, that as far as God is concerned, and He is the master after all, His designs are all-merciful, and He will never suffer the existence of a “kingdom of hell upon the earth,” and consequently that those formerly Christian nations, now withered and decayed, can be healed and restored again to the possession of their pristine vigor.

This remarkable passage of the Book of Wisdom gives an adequate explanation of a most surprising characteristic of human history, which is also perceptible in every single nation, and in individuals to a certain extent. It consists in the singular fact that there is nearly always a *point d'arrêt* of corruption, to use a French

word for which there is no exact English equivalent. Gangrene once begun in the human body must necessarily go on until the whole is invaded by the virus, and death ensues. Not so in human history as a whole; not so in nations generally; not so even morally in most human individuals. The time comes when the process of decomposition is arrested and life returns. The evil is not worked out fatally to the end; but before this is reached there is a happy crisis which turns the life-stream again into its natural course.

It is on this account, we believe, that the fell doctrines of materialism, atheism, communism, and *id genus omne*, can never spread utterly and without limits. They are invariably rejected by the mass of mankind; and it is precisely when they appear to be on the point of corrupting all classes of society that they are, at that very moment, contemptuously and scornfully rejected by the good sense of all kinds of people. This is a safer ground of hope in our opinion than any philosophical system of moral weights and counterweights between the doctrines prevalent among men.

But, meanwhile, the truth must be now apparent to all readers, that if the State, as it is usually called in this paper, has any prospect of succeeding against the Church, it will not be for the good of society. These two great organisms—cities they were called at the beginning of this discussion—are evidently now arrayed against each other and engaged in a deadly conflict. The true characters of both have been portrayed as faithfully as was possible. There cannot be any doubt on which side is the promise of a long life in spite of present appearances. If any one still hesitates and doubts, he will not have to wait long before reaching a clearer conclusion. European armies will decide many most important questions besides that of Turkey; and the soundness of the basis on which the European States and their new theories rest, will soon be thoroughly tested, so that no possible doubt will be left in the minds of men.

THE RUINS OF EPHESUS.

Discoveries at Ephesus, including the Site and Remains of the Great Temple of Diana. By J. T. Wood, F.S.A., Fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects. With numerous illustrations from original drawings and photographs. London: Longmans & Co., 1877.

PERHAPS no discovery of the present age is more extraordinary, and certainly no history of any discovery can be more interesting, than that which forms the subject of this beautiful volume. To have brought to light, after years of patient search, repeated disappointments, and great personal risks and discomforts, the site and the ruins of one of the greatest and most celebrated Temples in the world, the Temple of the Ephesian Diana, mentioned in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, the temple described in detail by Vitruvius and Pliny the Elder, and now clearly and distinctly identified with their accounts, to have done this, and yet more, to have deposited in the British Museum some hundreds of extremely important and highly interesting Greek inscriptions and many massive sculptured fragments, is an achievement which it has fallen to the lot of few indeed to perform. The Temple itself had been lost sight of for seventeen centuries, and the ruins, when at last found, were covered over with alluvium twenty feet deep, brought by the adjoining rivers from the mountains in the immediate neighborhood. No one had any idea where the site of the most ancient building was, beyond a rather vague expression in Xenophon, that "at Ephesus too the river Selinus runs past the Temple of Artemis."¹ Strabo, who describes the geography of Ephesus rather minutely, as it was in his time (that of the Emperors Augustus and Tiberius), states that "on the sea border a little higher from the sea is the grove of Ortygia, through which the river Cenchrius flows, and above which stands Mount Solmissus."² He goes on to say, that "there are *on the spot* (ἐν τῷ τόπῳ) several temples, some early and some built later." Now, both the grove

¹ Xen., Anab., v. 3, S.: καὶ ἐν Ἐφέσῳ δὲ παρὰ τὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος νεῶν Σελινοῦς ποταμὸς παραρρεῖ. This passage, written nearly four hundred years B.C., is the earliest historical mention of the Temple, excepting the statement of Herodotus, in i. 26, which is also of topographical importance, that between the Temple and the old city was a distance of seven stadia (the greater part of a mile).

² Strab., xiv. ch. 20, p. 640.: Remains of a second Temple were discovered, but not fully explored, by Mr. Wood close to the great Temple (p. 249). "It was raised, as we afterwards learned, on three steps, and was adorned with Grecian Doric columns and entablatures, the columns being as much as twenty feet, six inches apart."

(which is marked in Mr. Wood's plan of Ephesus as still existing) and the hill Solmissus can be identified. The latter is close to the modern Turkish village of Ayasalouk, just below which the remains of the great Temple were actually found. Mr. Wood, however, was misled by another passage of Strabo,¹ who states that the boundaries of the Asylum were extended by Alexander for a stadium (six hundred feet) towards the city, and that this distance was doubled by Antony, so as to include within the right of sanctuary a certain portion² of the city. Mr. Wood says (p. 20), "From this it appeared that the Temple could not be much more than a stadium from the city; and this passage misled me, and prevented my entertaining the idea of searching for the Temple at a much greater distance³ when I first commenced the excavations." If Mr. Wood had looked at the passage of Strabo a little more carefully, he would have seen that the Asylum extended more than *two* stadia between the Temple and the city. This Asylum or sanctuary was a belt of consecrated ground extending westward of the Temple precinct (τέμενος) towards the banks of the Selinus and the city beyond it. The wall of this precinct (περίβολος) was the first indication discovered by Mr. Wood of the true site of the Temple. As a matter of fact, "the portion of this wall which intervenes between the Temple and the walls of the city, at the nearest point, would be something more than two stadia from the southwest angle of the Temple." It would seem therefore that the city itself must have been somewhat further from the Temple than Strabo's account appears to indicate. Indeed, by the measured scale on Mr. Wood's plan it seems to us that the "seven stadia" of Herodotus⁴ are strictly correct. On the whole, the ancient accounts, though somewhat vague, were not far from the truth. The statement which ultimately led to success was that in a passage of Philostratus,⁵ in which he states that one Damianus, a rich Roman, united the Temple to the city by carrying towards it a road which descends

¹ xiv. 23, p. 641.

² So Mr. Wood renders μέρος τι τῆς πόλεως. Classical usage would justify the translation "a considerable part of the city." The sanctuary of the Ephesian Diana formed the subject of a special mission to Rome, described by Tacitus, Ann. III, 60-1. It was marked by boundary stones, about the placing of which important information has been derived from the inscriptions. The word "asylum" is derived from the persons and the properties of those who took refuge, not being liable to be carried off as plunder, συλᾶσθαι.

³ The statement of Herodotus (i. 26) cited above might have saved him from this mistake.

⁴ The "old city" stood on the slopes of the mountains, and so remained till the time of Croesus; but afterwards the town was transferred to the site near the Temple, till the time of Alexander. Then Lysimachus, finding the situation too low, made them move off to higher ground more to the west. See Strabo, xiv. 21, p. 640.

⁵ Lives of the Sophists, ii. 23. He flourished about A.D. 200, or a little earlier.

through the Magnesian Gates. This roadway, or causeway, he describes as a *stoa*, a *piazza* or covered portico, extending to the length of a stadium, and built entirely of stone. All that now seemed necessary, says Mr. Wood, was to find the Magnesian Gate, and follow the road from it to the Temple. From the words of Damianus he inferred that between the Gate and the Temple only six hundred feet intervened. Yet, on studying the site he could see no probable position for the Temple "within even a few stadia of the gate," *i. e.*, of the spot where the gate and road leading to Magnesia were likely to be (p. 21).

At length his attention was attracted on the outside of the city to "a long strip of land standing several feet above the general level of the plain between the city and the sea. At the western end of this strip an open space is reached, which would have been of all others the best possible site for the Temple. There it would have been a most conspicuous and beautiful object from nearly every house in the city, as well as from the suburbs, and from the sea" (p. 23). Neither here, however, nor in cross trenches on the raised strip of land, did Mr. Wood as yet find any indications of either portico or Temple. He then tried, of course equally in vain, excavations between the city and the sea, and on the north side of the city port and the adjoining land (p. 26). Completely at a loss, and beginning to fall short of funds, the idea happily occurred to him, that if he could obtain a grant of money from the trustees of the British Museum, or from the Treasury, to explore first the ruins of the public buildings in Ephesus, it was just possible that he might find some rude sketch or some inscription giving a clue to the site.

And so it proved. In the month of February, 1866, having obtained the necessary grant of money, Mr. Wood began his explorations of the Great Theatre, one of the largest, as it proved, in Asia Minor, and capable of seating nearly twenty-five thousand persons. The diameter of it was found to be nearly five hundred feet, and the stage or *pulpitum* one hundred and ten feet long by twenty-two feet wide. This was the theatre in which the people assembled to protest against the doctrines preached by St. Paul, and in which for the space of two hours the multitude kept crying out, *Great is Diana of the Ephesians!*¹ Here a most important and truly astonishing discovery was made. "When I came to clear the southern entrance, I found the whole of the eastern wall of that entrance inscribed with a series of decrees, chiefly relating to

¹ Acts xix. 34: Ephesus was, in a religious sense, the metropolis of Asia. The worship of the goddess was paramount, as Pausanias expressly says, iv. 31, 7: "All the cities accept it (*νομίζουσιν*), and private persons hold her in more honor than any other of the gods" (*θεῶν μάλιστα*).

a number of gold and silver images, weighing from three to seven pounds each, which were voted to Artemis, and ordered to be placed in her Temple by a certain wealthy Roman, named C. Vibius Salutarius."¹ Now in one of these decrees it is enacted that on the birthday of the goddess these images are to be carried in procession from the Temple to the theatre by the priests, accompanied by a staff-bearer and guards, from the Magnesian Gate, and on their return they are to be escorted by the procession as far as the Coressian Gate. This latter gate led from the old high town on Mount Coressus due northwards to the old road to Smyrna. The road winds round towards it from the Magnesian Gate in a westward direction. "The intention," says Mr. Wood (p. 81), "was evidently to make as complete a circuit as would enable the inhabitants of the city generally to see the images as they passed along." Both of the city gates having been found—the Coressian at the foot of Mount Coressus, which had hitherto been wrongly called Prion²—the explorations were at last fairly commenced in the right direction. Mr. Wood was now, literally, on the "high road to success." He began by clearing a large space near the Magnesian Gate. He soon came upon a road leading to Ayasalouk, and therefore (as it proved) in the direction of the Temple, "thirty-five feet in width, and paved with immense blocks of marble and limestone, very deeply worn into four distinct ruts,³ showing the passing and repassing of chariots and other vehicles" (p. 114). Along the side of this road, which soon began to assume evident marks of being a *Via Sacra*, many interesting tombs and monuments were discovered for the distance of nine hundred yards, beyond which none were found. Still no vestiges appeared of the Portico of Damianus. "There was, however, one promising feature, which I did not overlook; this was a decided *καθόδος* or descending road, similar to that described by Philostratus, where the Portico was said to begin, that is at the Magnesian Gate" (p. 117).

After exploring the road round the mountain for five hundred yards further, Mr. Wood "found the stone piers of a portico which must have been that of Damianus." He now concluded that the

¹ P. 73. It was doubtless by multiplying these images or portraits from the original statue in the Temple (which are called in the inscriptions *ἁπεικονίσματα*), and the manufacture of small shrines to contain them, that Demetrius, the silversmith, "made a great trade for the workmen." Acts xix. 24. The very curious inscriptions found by Mr. Wood are in the British Museum. That especially bearing on the subject is given (with a translation by the writer of the present article) in the appendix to Mr. Wood's work. The date of the inscription is about A.D. 104.

² In Pausanias, vii. 5, 10, and Pliny, N. H., v. 115, it is called *Pion*. But Mr. Wood sagaciously remarks that its long hog-backed ridge was called *πρίων*, "sierra" or "saw," from its jagged outline.

³ Such a road is called by Euripides *ἱκροτος ἀμαξίτης*, Electra.

portico was of great length, and that the six hundred feet of it mentioned by Philostratus as having been built of stone, was of a more ornate character than the rest. This particular part Mr. Wood believes to have been that nearest the Temple, and as that which he traced appeared to have been a kind of pent-house roofed with wood,¹ he concluded that the stone-roofed portion of it remained still unexplored.

Subsequently, however, Mr. Wood found "the remains of a portico which surrounded the Temple on at least three sides. This portico was nearly thirty-one feet distant from the lowest step of the Temple, and was twenty-five feet wide" (p. 250). It does not seem to have occurred to him that, in all probability, Damianus's portico was a prolongation or extension of this in the direction of the city.

Passing over the interesting account of the numerous monuments discovered by Mr. Wood in exploring this road, we come to a new evidence of much importance. Pausanias says that even in his time the tomb was shown of Androclus, the son of Codrus, who was worshipped as a local hero and benefactor by the Ephesians. He states that this tomb, distinguished by the effigy of a man in full armor—doubtless representing the hero himself—was to be seen "on the road leading from the Temple, near the Olympicum, and towards the Magnesian Gates."² The Olympicum (Temple of Jupiter) was not found, but the basement of an important and imposing fabric was discovered twenty-six hundred feet distant from the Magnesian Gate, and Mr. Wood had every reason to think that this was the veritable tomb of Androclus. The foundations, he says (p. 127), consisted of several courses of cushioned masonry, composed of immense blocks of white marble mounted on a plinth which formed a base forty-two feet square. The whole superstructure had been carried away, a fact indicative, we may surmise, of its superior workmanship.

The next "great stride towards success" was the finding of a still wider road—not less than forty-five feet across—with marble sarcophagi on both sides, leading directly from the foot of Mount Coressus, and, therefore, from the old or upper city, almost at a right angle, directly towards Ayasalouk. The grand object of his search now seemed almost in his grasp, but it was not destined to be quite so soon attained. He was now stopped from further exploration by the harvest, just then in its full height. A journey

¹ Precisely such structures were used round some of our English abbeys, the holes supporting the timbers being still, as at Furness in Lancashire, visible in the walls.

² Pausan., vii. 2, 9: *δείκνυται καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μνήμα κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ παρὰ τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον καὶ ἐπὶ πύλας τὰς Μαγνήτιδας ἐπίθημα δὲ τῷ μνήματι ἀνὴρ ἔστιν ὀπλισμένος.*

to Constantinople was absolutely necessary, in order to obtain a renewal of the firman for another year (p. 130). He returned, however, in a week, "with renewed power to continue the excavations" (p. 131). He now set a dozen men to dig trenches on the very spot, near a clump of olive trees, where he had before sunk a trial-hole without any satisfactory result. Now, however, they struck upon a brick wall, built with large blocks of stone and marble. He hoped this would prove to be the peribolus or inclosure wall of the sacred precinct, and the result proved him to be right. A second trench—made, however, not at random, but upon certain ingenious calculations (p. 132)—opened out most fortunately an angle of the wall, into which were built two large stones, equidistant from the angle, with duplicate inscriptions in Latin and Greek. They stated that the wall had been built by the Emperor Augustus, in the twelfth year of his consulate, and was to be paid for and maintained out of the revenues of the Artemisium and the Augusteum. "The great question," he says (p. 133), "as to the whereabouts of the Temple was now decided, six years after the search was begun." A proud moment it must have been for the distinguished explorer when he first read those inscriptions!

Tracing the course of the peribolus wall for not less than sixteen hundred feet from the angle first found, he ascertained that it went off in a due northern direction.¹ He therefore commenced sinking trial-holes within the inclosure. He first found the remains of some Roman buildings, with fragments of mosaic pavements, pertaining, as he supposed, to the dwellings of the priests. The discovery of all these buildings led him to believe that he was close upon the Temple, and he continued sinking trial-holes to the depth of twenty feet and upwards (p. 154).

It was on the last day of the year 1869, that the marble pavement of the Temple was discovered at the depth above mentioned. Mr. Wood at once recognized it as being the first piece of *thick* pavement he had found within the sacred precinct. It consisted of two layers, the upper one of rubbed white marble, nine inches thick, the lower one, roughly tooled, of gray marble, fifteen inches thick (p. 155).

Thus it proved that the Temple was built on the northeast corner of the great alluvial plain of Ephesus, which Herodotus compares with the deposits of silt in the lower valley of the Nile, and considers to be, as it doubtless is, a filled up bay of the sea.²

¹ The outer wall of the *τέμενος* in which a Greek temple stood is exactly analogous to the boundary wall of a mediæval abbey, which inclosed a large area of ground and a number of buildings grouped round the great central church.

² Herod., ii. 10: τῶν οὐρέων τῶν εἰρημένων μεταξύ ἐφαίνετό μοι εἶναι κοτε κόλπος θαλάσσης, ὥστερ τά τε περὶ Ἴλιον καὶ Ἐφεσόν τε καὶ Μαιάνδρον πεδίων.

Lying between two confluent of the Cäyster, the Selinus and the Cenchrius, the site had been silted up to that depth in the course of many centuries. Thus the prophecy that the Temple would not be found covered by river silt has been falsified.¹

On the 6th of February, 1871, Mr. Wood made the important discovery of the base of one of the great marble columns in position. Of the immense blocks, which are now re-erected in the British Museum, a photograph is given in page 176. When first found, it retained traces of the red color with which it had originally been tinted. At length traces of the steps of the platform and more drums of columns were exposed to view. On the pavement in many places were found ashes, in some spots six inches deep, showing the destruction of the roof by fire.² Pliny says the roof was of cedar beams, *e cedrinis trabibus*, and the context shows that he believed it to be very old.³

In September, 1872, further important discoveries were made, in a very fine sculptured block from the frieze of the west front of the Temple, and the large sculptured drum of a column from one of the "columnæ cælatae" described by Pliny.⁴ This immense block, measuring six feet in height by a little more in diameter, and weighing more than eleven tons, was found deeply buried in sand and marble chippings at the west end of the Temple (p. 189). After innumerable difficulties the huge stone was raised to the surface, nearly two months after its discovery, and conveyed to the station of the Smyrna railway.

Two photographs of the "diggings" as they appeared at this time, strewn thickly with blocks and broken drums of fluted columns, are given in page 192 of Mr. Wood's work. There is also a photograph of one of the great capitals, of which one volute remains nearly perfect (p. 197).

As the excavations proceeded, "a considerable portion of the western and southern walls of the cella of the last Temple but two was found in position. They were remarkable for their exquisite finish and the extreme beauty of the marble of which they

¹ Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Geography, i., p. 838: "The supposition that the basement of the Temple has been buried by the alluvium of the Cäyster is very properly rejected by Hamilton, who has pointed out the probable site." This site, in the plan of Ephesus given in the above dictionary on conjecture, is too far to the west. Hamilton supposed it was near the western extremity of the town, overlooking the marsh, which was the ancient harbor.

² A small beam of wood was found here, part of which is in the possession of the writer. It looks like the heart of the olive or the ilex tree, and is extremely hard and in very good preservation. It was doubtless the roof of the Temple when St. Paul visited Ephesus.

³ N. H., xvi., § 213.

⁴ Both these are now in the British Museum. The sculptured fragment appears to represent Hercules struggling with an Amazon.

were built" (p. 216). On clearing a large space near the cella the effects of an earthquake were seen, which had raised the pavement in one part nearly five feet above its original level.

The inner portion of the Temple, which was decorated with Corinthian pillars, Mr. Wood supposes to have been restored, if not rebuilt, in the time of Marcus Aurelius (p. 218). At p. 269 he gives a longitudinal section of the cella as he supposes it to have been, with the statue of the goddess in position. Of this statue we have many extant representations on coins, gems, and medals. It is Eastern, almost Indian, in character, and appears to have been made of wood.¹ Tradition said, as it has falsely said of many other statues, that it fell from the sky.² Certain it is, that this monster of an idol was an object of worship to all the Greeks in Asia, till St. Paul boldly taught the people that "those are not gods which are made by men's hands."³

The fortunate discovery of a short length of the lowest step at the east end enabled Mr. Wood to determine the exact length of the whole structure, measured on the lowest step (p. 246). This was four hundred and eighteen feet, the width being a few inches under two hundred and forty. Now Pliny gives the measurements of the whole area of the Temple at four hundred and twenty-five feet by two hundred and twenty-five.⁴ The coincidence is near enough (allowing for a slight difference between the Roman and the English foot, and perhaps for a slight error of transcription, ccxxv for ccxxxv), to be very interesting as one of the proofs of identity.

Mr. Wood's ground-plan (on p. 262) of the Temple, shows that on each side there was a double row of columns, each row of twenty, and a triple row at each end of eight, the inner row, next the cella, being of six, there being two pilasters in a *pronaos* with a portico, or *in antis*, as it is technically called. Now, if we count, as is quite natural, the end pillars twice, as we stand either at the front or at the side, we thus get one hundred and twenty-four. Pliny states there were one hundred and twenty-seven;⁵ but again, how easily might cxxvii have been wrongly written for cxxiv!

¹ Ebony or else vinewood, according to Pliny, N. H., xvi., § 213. It has been doubted, with good reason, whether it was originally designed to represent the Virgin Huntress.

² *ἀγαλμα διοπετὲς*, Acts xix. 35. The same was said of the statue of Artemis at Tauri (Balaclava in the Crimea); see Eurip. *Iph. in Taur.* 188; and of that of Athena Polias at Athens. The legend may probably refer to the fall of a meteoric stone at some remote period.

³ Acts xix. 26: οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοὶ οἱ διὰ χειρῶν γινόμενοι.

⁴ N. H., xxxvi., § 14: "Universo templo longitudo est ccccxxv pedum, latitudo ccxxv." The area of the Parthenon at Athens was not one-fourth of that of the Temple of Ephesus, which was the largest of the Greek temples. (Dr. Smith's *Dict. of Geography*, art. Ephesus.)

⁵ N. H., xxxvi., § 14: "Columnæ centum viginti septem a singulis regibus factæ lx

Colonel Leake had conjectured¹ that the Temple had a double row of twenty-one on each side, and a triple row of ten at the two ends, thus making one hundred and twenty by counting twenty-four columns twice and adding four columns *in antis*. The conjecture, though not strictly accurate,² was extremely sagacious, and wonderfully near to the truth.

The height of the columns is given by Pliny at sixty feet, which we may fairly suppose includes both capital and base. He gives a very interesting account of the contrivance by which the architraves (*epistylia*) were raised and laid upon the capitals. A gently inclined plane (*mollis clivus*) was constructed, either of timber or earth (although his expression *exaggerato* suggests the latter), and the architraves were made to rest at first on hampers of sand, and allowed to settle gradually on the capitals by letting out the sand underneath.³ In another passage he tells us the proportion of ancient Ionic columns was in height nine times the diameter; the height of the capital was a third of the diameter, and the old rule for the height of the columns was a third part of the width of the Temple.⁴ He goes on to say, that "in the old Temple of Diana at Ephesus for the first time base-mouldings were put at the bottom and capitals on the tops of the pillars." The diameter was to be one-eighth of the height, and the base-mouldings were to extend to half the diameter; the pillars at the top to be one-seventh less in thickness than at the bottom. Mr. Wood has not referred to this interesting passage, which furnishes so exact a testimony to his great discovery. The diameter of the columns which he found being a trifle (half an inch) over six feet at the bottom, we have $9 \times 6 = 54$ for the total height of the drum, to which we have to add five feet for both base-mouldings and capital, viz., three feet for the height of the base-mouldings ("*crassitudinis dimidium*"),

pedum altitudine, ex eis xxxvi cælatæ una a Scopa." If this number be correct, the double row of eight at each end were thus sculptured in the lower parts of the shaft (as Mr. Wood found them), making thirty-two, and the two at each entrance of the cella in the third row, making in all just thirty-six.

¹ Asia Minor, p. 346, quoted in the elaborate article on Ephesus in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of Geography, vol. i., p. 835. Mr. Wood does not appear to have consulted either this work or others referred to in the same article, viz., Hamilton's Researches or Chandler's Tour in Greece and Asia.

² We know that there were *eight*, not *ten*, columns at the ends, from an extant medal hereafter to be mentioned.

³ N. H., *ut sup.*

⁴ N. H., xxxvi., § 23: "Quæ nonam (partem altitudinis in crassitudine ima habent, vocantur) Ionicæ. Ionicis capituli altitudo tertia pars est crassitudinis. Antiqua ratio erat columnarum altitudinis tertia pars latitudinum delubri. In Ephesiæ Dianæ æde quæ prius fuit, primum columnis spiræ subditæ et capitula addita, placuitque altitudinis octava pars in crassitudine et ut spiræ haberent crassitudinis dimidium septimæque partes detraherentur summarum crassitudine." The Doric column, our readers are aware, has no base, and little more than an *abacus* for capital.

and two feet for the capital ("tertia pars crassitudinis"). The square plinth on which each column stands, with the small excess in the diameter not accounted for above, will make up the sixty feet given by Pliny as the height. Nor is the proportion of one-third of the width of the Temple far wrong; indeed, it is almost exactly right, if we take the height of the pillars *without* base or capital; for $54 \times 3 = 162$, and Mr. Wood gives the width of the Temple at one hundred and sixty-three and a few inches,—Roman feet, as we said, differing slightly from English.

Pliny says that the Temple was built on marshy ground that it might not be affected by earthquakes, nor those openings or rifts in the ground which occur in volcanic countries.¹ That this precaution was vain we have already shown. Colonel Leake suggests, as the real reason for the site chosen, that "the tall Ionic column was more appropriate for a building in a plain, and the shorter Doric column looked better on a height;" adding that "all the greatest and most costly temples of Asia, except one, are built on low and marshy spots."²

Pliny gives a curious account, which does not seem very credible in itself, that a layer of trodden-down charcoal and then another of wool was placed as a foundation for the edifice.³ Bearing in mind this account, Mr. Wood sunk four deep holes, one inside against the west wall of the cella, in which he found at a depth of about six feet a layer, four inches thick, of a composition resembling glazier's putty. Next below was a layer of three inches of charcoal, and then another of the same material and thickness as the uppermost. This, on being afterwards submitted to an analysis, proved to be a kind of mortar mixed with silica.

Proofs were found, in the different levels of the pavements, that the Temple had been rebuilt on the same site and on the same plan not less than three times, the earliest, probably, about five centuries B.C., and the latest in the time of Alexander the Great. Strabo and Pliny record the name of the first architect, Chersiphron of

¹ N. H., xxxvi., § 14: "Id solo in palustri fecere, ne terræ motus sentiret aut hiatus timeret."

² Quoted in Smith's Dictionary of Geography, *ut sup.*

³ Pliny, *ut sup.*: "Rursus ne in lubrico atque instabili fundamenta tantæ molis locarentur, calcatis ea substravere carbonibus, dein velleribus lanæ." From the results obtained by Mr. Wood, we are tempted to think that *calcatis* is a corrupt reading for *calce*, "with lime,"—"calce ea substravere et carbonibus." The point we might have looked for in Pliny's statement was, that these precautions were taken to keep the damp from injuring the Temple. But he seems to speak of laying down a kind of concrete to make a firm foundation, for which purpose wool, at all events, would have been useless. In plastering walls, it is still the custom to mix hair with the lime used. Anyhow, the finding of the charcoal, a material so unusual in any but sepulchral buildings, was very remarkable.

Cressus in Crete.¹ The second and somewhat larger edifice was set on fire and burnt by one Herostratus on the very day of the birth of Alexander the Great.² The third Temple was built by one Dinocrates, a Macedonian,³ who was also the architect of the city of Alexandria, and the money was collected from the sale of ladies' trinkets, which they voluntarily offered, and by disposing of the marble pillars of the last edifice.

It was this Temple, improved as it may have been internally in the time of some one or more of the Roman emperors, that Mr. Wood discovered; and the sculptured portions he was able to remove undoubtedly show that decadence in Greek art which marked the Alexandrine period. But Pliny, in speaking of the great antiquity of the statue of the goddess, affirms that it had never been changed, though the Temple had been restored *seven* times.⁴ In one place⁵ he assigns four hundred, in another one hundred and twenty years to the completion of so vast a building.

The most remarkable, and we believe unique, feature of the great pillars at two ends was their being carved in bold relief with groups of figures. These are the *calata columnæ* of Pliny, who says they were in number thirty-six. It is fortunate that we have representations of them, though very rude in detail, in two medals of the ages of Hadrian and Gordianus, engraved in p. 266-7 of Mr. Wood's work.⁶ By a very ingenious calculation of the reduction of the diameter in the portions discovered by him, viz., from six feet to five and a half, Mr. Wood concludes (p. 266) that the sculpture was carried up to the height of about twenty feet, and was separated into compartments by three bands. It is a doubtful point, he says; but above the sculpture the pillars were certainly fluted. Their appearance anyhow must have been magnificent, and a gift worthy of the kings, who are said to have presented one apiece.⁷ On some of the broken portions of the outer columns of the peristyle

¹ Strabo, xiv. 22, p. 640: τὸν δὲ νεὼν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος πρῶτος μὲν Χερσιφῶν ἡρχιτεκτόνησεν, εἰτ' ἄλλος ἐποίησε μείζω ὥς δὲ τοῦτον Ἡρόστρατος τις ἐνέπρησεν, ἄλλον ἀμείνω κατεσκεύασαν συνενέγκαντες τὸν τῶν γυναικῶν κοσμον καὶ τὰς ἰδίας οὐσίας, διαθήμενοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς προτέρους κίονας. See also Pliny, N. H., vii. 37, and xxxvi. 14.

² Cicero, De Div., i., § 47: "Qua nocte templum Ephesiæ Dianæ deflagravit, constat ex Olympiade natum esse Alexandrum."

³ Strabo, *ibid.*, § 23.

⁴ N. H., xvi., § 213: "Nunquam mutatum septies restituto templo."

⁵ That just referred to, and in xxxvi., § 95: "Templum Ephesiæ Dianæ cxx annis factum a tota Asia." In both he says it was built by "all Asia" (*tota Asia*). Mr. Wood (p. 623), following apparently another text, says the Temple was "two hundred and twenty years building."

⁶ In both of these the front elevation of the Temple is represented, and the statue of the goddess as it was seen in the *cella* between eight columns.

⁷ "A singulis regibus factæ," Pliny, N. H., xxxv., § 14.

Mr. Wood found "fragments of dedicatory inscriptions deeply incised" (p. 267).

Not the least interesting part of Mr. Wood's splendid and interesting volume are a series of careful drawings in perspective, in section, and in elevation, of the Temple as it stood in all its ancient beauty, the pride of Asia, and the wonder of all beholders. An architect by profession, and, therefore, thoroughly competent to draw the right artistic conclusions from comparatively small data, he has been able to present to us, not a mere fancy picture or vague conception of what the Temple might have been or ought to have been, but the actual reality, drawn to a scale from the measurements recorded by Pliny, and verified, as we have shown, by the remains found *in situ*. It was beyond question one of the largest and finest Greek temples in the world. Not less in size than a mediæval cathedral, though much more massive in outline and proportion, it must have been visited annually by thousands of worshippers from all parts of the world, votaries of the monster goddess whose effigy Mr. Wood gives us on page 269, from the statue in the Museo Reale at Naples. "Great is Diana of Ephesus!" the people shouted, when St. Paul visited that city. What has become of the Temple? No one knows. It has simply vanished. The thousands of tons of marble which composed it have been dragged away to construct other buildings, or burnt in lime-kilns,¹ and the statues and decorations of its high altar, described by Strabo as the works of Praxiteles,² have been carried off to adorn Roman villas in another land. The great folding-doors of cypress wood, which, Pliny tells us,³ after standing four hundred years were as sound and fresh as if they were new—where are they? We cannot exempt from blame the intemperate zeal of the early Christians, who were as eager to obliterate the shrines of idols as the Protestant reformers, under Henry and Elizabeth, and the Puritans, in the time of the Commonwealth, were to destroy the works of the Catholic architects of the Middle Ages. The iconoclasts in the reign of Theodosius the First⁴

¹ One of these Mr. Wood actually found on the site of the Temple (p. 238). Close to it he came upon "an immense heap of small marble chippings standing ready to be thrown into the kiln."

² Strabo, xiv. 23, p. 641: τὸν δὲ δὴ βωμὸν εἶναι τῶν Πραξιτέλους ἔργων ἅπαντα σχεδόν τι πλήρη.

³ N. H., xvi., § 215: "Valvas esse e cupresso et jam quadringentis prope annis durare materiem omnem novæ similem."

⁴ A. D. 378. "It was in his reign that the formal destruction of paganism took place, and we still possess a large number of the laws of Theodosius prohibiting the exercise of the pagan religion, and forbidding the heathen worship, under severe penalties, in some cases extending to death." (Smith's Classical Dictionary of Biography, etc.)

would be little likely to spare such a temple as that of Ephesus. Fire and earthquake, human greed and human eagerness to destroy, levelled that proud building to the earth; water and earth brought down from the mountains made it a tomb. How marvelous its sudden resurrection in a volume which brings it, as it were, upon our drawing-room tables!

We have left ourselves but little space to describe the many objects of interest discovered by Mr. Wood on the site of the old city in his explorations for the Temple. Of these, perhaps none is more interesting than the finding the tomb of St. Luke, whom one tradition affirmed to have been buried at Ephesus. Enough was found of its remains to furnish a restored design of the whole, which Mr. Wood has done at page 58. It is a remarkably graceful edifice—a rotunda with a domical roof, and surrounded by sixteen detached pillars. He considers it to belong to the latter end of the third or the beginning of the fourth century, and supposes that the relics of the Evangelist had been translated from outside the city and placed in this tomb, and he was encouraged in this idea by finding a sculpture of an ox, the symbol of St. Luke, surmounted by a cross. The tomb stood in a quadrangle one hundred and fifty-three feet across, surrounded by a colonnade, and paved with white marble (p. 58). With great good feeling Mr. Wood declined to explore for any human remains.

A curious object was a stone basin found in the forum. It was fifteen feet in diameter, and raised on a pedestal. It may have held the water for sprinkling the floor of the Temple,¹ but Mr. Wood supposes it was employed in the baptism of converts in the third and fourth centuries, and he remarks that, if so, immersion could not have been practiced (p. 32), the basin being very shallow.

Of the Theatre we have already spoken briefly. The Odeum, or Music Hall,² on the southern slope of Mount Coressus, not far from the Theatre, which was on the west side, was excavated, and not only were some fine pieces of statuary recovered, and the whole plan of the stage and the proscenium made out, but several inscriptions of interest were brought away. One of them is a letter (or edict) of the Emperor Hadrian to the people of Ephesus,³ commending to them the election of one Lucius Erastus as a member of the council. The "immense number of large blocks of stone and marble which had fallen from the superstructure had blocked

¹ ἀπορραντήριον, Eur. Ion., 435.

² Athens also had its *Odeum*, built by Pericles. It was used, according to Hesychius, for the recitations of rhapsodists and for lyric contests; but we know from Aristophanes that it was occasionally used as a law-court.

³ Given in Mr. Wood's Appendix, Inscriptions from the Odeum, No. 1.

up all the entrances, covering the stage and the adjoining passages" (p. 45).

Another great building cleared out was the Stadium,¹ near the Coressian Gate on the northwest side of the city. Mr. Wood considers it to have been built in the time of Augustus. Its total length was eight hundred and fifty feet, by upwards of two hundred in width. Along both sides and the circular end were tiers of seats, of which "every fragment has been carried away." At the western end was an open columniated screen in two tiers, and the bases of the lower columns were found in their original position (p. 98).

Other buildings were found, establishing in a very interesting manner the similarity between at least two Ionic cities, Athens and Ephesus. The Prytaneum, or Town Hall (or possibly the Senate House), was identified in "the remains of a very fine stone building about two hundred and fifty feet square," in the forum near to the Great Theatre. The solid piers of masonry, of which many remained, were "particularly well built of large blocks of marble" (p. 102). The Pnyx, or meeting-place of the popular assemblies, on a swampy ground to the north of the city, had its rock-cut *bema* or platform and steps ascending to it, strongly reminding Mr. Wood of the Pnyx at Athens in the time of Pericles.²

Ancient Greek cities were, as a rule, conspicuous for their public buildings and public squares, *ἀγοραί*, but very deficient in that principal feature of modern towns, the costly and spacious houses of the inhabitants. They lived, as a rule, in open-door life, and all their interests, religious and political alike, centred in public meetings and public ceremonies. Their suburbs were adorned with costly tombs; but no vestige of a Greek house, in the ordinary sense of the word, or corresponding to the Roman *domus* or town mansion, has ever been found on a really ancient site. They were doubtless constructed almost entirely of wood on a low basement of stone or brick. Hence, Sir Charles Fellows explains, "the total absence of even the trace of the residence of the people in the ancient Greek cities, as the materials would not endure for half a century; the public buildings alone remain to point out the extent of the cities."³

We have still to speak briefly of what is really, perhaps, the most valuable and interesting part of Mr. Wood's discoveries, the Greek and Roman inscriptions, which together exceeded in number four

¹ Like the Roman circus, most cities of importance had a racing-ground for horsemanship, chariot-driving, and foot-races. There was one at Athens on the south bank of the Ilissus, for a description of which see Wordsworth's *Greece*, page 224.

² It may be added that both Athens and Ephesus had a Temple of Jupiter Olympius.

³ *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor*, p. 315. London, 1852.

hundred. Such a "find" was never made on any ancient site; and though many of these are imperfect and mutilated, and the majority of a late date, that of the Emperors Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius, still they throw great light on many obscure points in the history of those Emperors, and in the topography and political constitution of the city. Especially interesting is the occurrence in them of many of the terms in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts,¹ and a considerable list of names of persons, tribes, and local games, hitherto unrecorded. One inscription, found near the River Cäyster, some two miles to the north of Ayasalouk, dates nearly four centuries before our era, and is singularly perfect and plainly legible as far as it goes. It is a very curious document, referring chiefly to regulations respecting the interest on borrowed money. One short extract from the translation supplied by Mr. Wood, from the pen of the learned Provost of Eton, Dr. Goodford, will give our readers an idea of its nature. We seem to be reading from a page of a modern law book.

"If any, while pledging real property to one party, have raised money upon it from others, as though it were unincumbered property, by deceiving the latter lenders, then the second lenders shall be allowed, after getting quit of the original creditors according to the money-rate allowed during the common war, to keep the property; and if there be anything further due to them on the property, the creditor shall have the right of recovery from all other property of the debtor, in any way he may be able, without being liable to any penalty; and if this too be mortgaged, the right of recovery from the mortgaged property shall be the same as in the case of those who mortgage land with a bad title."²

Mr. Wood has published a selection from these inscriptions, with an English translation on each opposite page. The work of deciphering and explaining Greek inscriptions is almost a science in itself, and it will doubtless be found that some mistakes have been made in the rendering as well as some errors in the transcription. The complete editing of these must be left to future scholars. Meanwhile the author has rendered to literature a service, the memory of which will be recorded in history.

¹ Such as *γραμματεὺς, Ἀσιαρχοὶ, νεωκόρος*, etc.

² Our classical readers may possibly be curious to know that "to mortgage land with a bad title" is *μετέωρα ἐγγυᾶσθαι*.

THE BLUE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT.

The True Blue Laws of Connecticut and New Haven, and the False Blue Laws invented by the Rev. Samuel Peters, to which are added Specimens of the Laws and Judicial Proceedings of other Colonies, and some Blue Laws of England in the reign of James I. Edited by J. Hammond Trumbull. Hartford, Conn.: American Publishing Co., 1876, 12mo., pp. 360.

CONNECTICUT has long chafed under the stigma of having held among the American colonies a bad pre-eminence for the narrowness and illiberality of her early laws, which were not only subversive of all personal liberty, but marked by extreme cruelty. For more than a century this code has been known as the Blue Laws. A *History of Connecticut* by the Rev. Samuel Peters, an Episcopal clergyman, rather a satire on the colony than a serious work, full of exaggerations and absurdities, gave what purported to be the famous Blue Laws. From the year 1781, in which this work appeared in London, it has been the source from which all drew who wished to turn the shafts of their ridicule on the State.

To redeem the honor of their commonwealth, the citizens of Connecticut gave in a popular form some of the early legislation of the colonies which blended to form Connecticut. Silas Andrus, long a publisher of cheap books, sold throughout the country by peddlers when there was little local book trade, issued in 1822 a small volume entitled, "The Code of 1650, being a compilation of the Laws and Orders of the General Court of Connecticut; also the Constitution or Civil Compact entered into, and adopted by, the towns of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield in 1638-9, to which is added some extracts from the Laws and Judicial Proceedings of New Haven Colony, commonly called Blue Laws."

The Hon. R. R. Hinman, Secretary of State of Connecticut, thought it not beneath him to contribute to the same class of literature, and accordingly issued, in 1838, "The Blue Laws of New Haven Colony, usually called the Blue Laws of Connecticut, Quaker Laws of Massachusetts, Blue Laws of New York," etc. This was the New Haven Code of 1655, reprinted from the very rare London edition of 1656.

The Hon. J. Hammond Trumbull, who has, like Hinman, held the office of Secretary of State, a well-known historical student, and one of the few who have had the zeal and courage to study with thoroughness and scientific purpose the languages of our

Indian tribes, comes forward now to do battle for his State in the volume before us.

His work consists of an introduction, in which he shows the general severity of the criminal laws of England and other countries in the earlier part of the seventeenth century, and especially the cruel treatment of witches, as an element to be taken into consideration in estimating the early laws of New Haven and Connecticut. He then discusses the unpopularity under which Connecticut long suffered, and treats of Peters's work and the genuine laws of the two colonies, their various editions, and the recent use of the Peters Code by writers of the present day in England and America.

He gives in full the First Constitution of Connecticut, 1639; the Capital Laws of the same colony in 1642; the Code of 1650; various Laws and Orders of Court; the Fundamental Agreement at New Haven, 1639; the New Haven Code of 1655; Laws, etc., of New Haven Courts, 1639-1660; Peters's Blue Laws; and then, by way of contrast, laws and judicial proceedings of New York, Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, and England.

Most of the documents for a consideration of Connecticut's real position are thus before the reader in a single volume, and as that State is not likely to have her case argued by one better versed in her history than Mr. Trumbull, or of greater ability as an advocate, we may well consider this as her final plea before the great court of appeal, the good sense of the world.

The question then is: Has he entitled Connecticut to an acquittal of the charge on which she has so long been arraigned, of having surpassed the other colonies in intolerance, in a Draconian severity of laws, and in her disregard of personal rights?

Underlying all the subject are principles to be settled. In the first place, did the settlers of Connecticut and New Haven retain their rights and duties as British subjects, and were they amenable to the English laws, or were they men subject to no authority, free to form such compacts for their social order as to them might seem fit? Did the exigency in the latter case give them absolute right of life and death over all who gainsaid their enactments?

Nothing in the first constitution of Connecticut, or the laws enacted under it, nothing in the New Haven fundamental agreement, or its code and judicial action, acknowledges in the slightest degree the existence of any power or sovereignty to which they owed allegiance. The binding character of the unwritten English constitution, and of its written law, was completely ignored. Like Moreau, when he refused to pay his tax and went to jail, they seemed to say: "I simply wish to refuse all allegiance to the State, to withdraw, and stand aloof from it effectually."

Formed at a period when in the mother country revolution was

assailing the whole system of civil government, as well as the ecclesiastical fabric which, on England's revolt from the Catholic Church, the monarch and parliament had established, the colonists of the valley of the Connecticut ignored absolutely the civil and ecclesiastical government of England, and acted as if they owed no allegiance as British subjects. It may well be questioned whether they could thus free themselves from all obligations as subjects. At a later date, when the old order was re-established in England, the Connecticut colonies hastened, under the instinct of self-preservation, to recognize a paramount authority, and to seek its indorsement and its expression in a charter as the basis of their colonial government.

Though they troubled themselves not at all about any duties as British subjects, and under the charter sought to avoid discharging them, they certainly admitted their existence. Their powers to make compacts for self-government were, therefore, from the first, such only as resulted from the exigencies of the case, the non-exercise of the governmental functions in America by the recognized authority, and hence were subordinate to, and could not be exercised in violation of, the laws of England. From no principle inherent could they derive the power of life and death, and exercise it, except as temporarily replacing the lawful authority of the English law until such time as it was duly established, and as a matter of course they could never exercise it in direct opposition to the laws of England, or to punish what the laws of England enjoined.

Virginia was established with the full and complete recognition that the settlers were still British subjects bound by the English laws, to be enforced and maintained so far as their altered condition and new associations rendered it feasible.

In Maryland the case was the same, and though some now think the history of that colony something to be garbled and distorted at will, we cannot but respect the doubts and scruples of the early Catholic settlers on this very point. Under their charter every freeman attended the Assembly; but as this body acted under the British government, and would be called upon to enforce, more or less, its laws, which often militated directly against the doctrines and discipline of the Catholic Church, many of the Catholic settlers were perplexed how to act. Could they take part in legislation to enact what they could not but hold sinful? The position was new, and several cases of conscience arising from it were submitted to Catholic ecclesiastical authority to know what, under the circumstances, they could do as Catholics without sin, and what, as Englishmen loyal to their own country, they must do. It never entered into their minds, or the minds of their clergy, to hold themselves absolved from all allegiance, free to make any rules and

laws that seemed good unto them, and to enforce them even by the death penalty.

The Connecticut and Massachusetts colonies ignored and evaded the English laws and the duties of the colonists as subjects, Maryland and Virginia acknowledged them. The Massachusetts colonies acted in direct violation of the patents under which they settled, while Connecticut could excuse herself from at least that inconsistency.

No one can read the authentic documents given by Trumbull without admitting that they were designed to establish a system in utter disregard of the English law, and in many points in direct opposition to it, forbidding men to do what it was their absolute right as British subjects to do, and compelling them to do what no English law, and no necessity of their colonial condition, required.

Can any portion of a community thus isolate itself from the rest, and ignore the laws of the country, and establish a government exercising power of life and death over its members? The cases of bands of robbers and of secret societies are analogous, and it is not easy to draw a logical distinction between their position and that of the leading New England colonies.

But it may be said that the founders of these communities were highly moral men, actuated by noble principles, and that they acted for the advancement of human freedom. This indeed is the argument put forward in nearly all our current works bearing on American history, most of which emanate from the New England school; it is put forward really against the tacit charge of the illegality of their original institutions. The morality of setting aside all the laws of one's country, of arrogating exclusive sanctity and the absolute certainty of doctrine, with no proof of consecutive title to a deposit of faith, or of a special mission supernaturally attested, is very questionable. The Pharisees, standing on still stronger ground, were absolutely condemned; we find them direct opponents of truth, and while we find that our Lord converted the thief, and the harlot, and the publican, the Pharisee seemed proof alike to His doctrine, His example, and His miracles. The assumption of superior morality, were it perfectly established, would not justify their course. The noble principles that actuated them were simply self-preservation and freedom from restraint.

The claim that they acted for the advancement of human freedom, though put forward persistently, is so utterly absurd that, while repetition has made many undoubtedly think it true, thoughtful men must really laugh in their sleeves when they put forward this fine phrase to tickle the ears of the multitude.

The freedom which these men sought was freedom from all influence of the laws of their own country; freedom to make their

own will absolute law in a portion of the national domain ; freedom to exclude from it all who would not submit to a series of unauthorized rules which they chose to enforce. It was simply the freedom of a robber band, for secret societies seldom claim absolute territorial sway. The only freedom they conceived was freedom to do their own will, to defy the laws of the State in bulk, to enforce their own will on their fellow-subjects, or expel them if they refused to submit.

Every Englishman had by birthright a free right to settle in the colony and enjoy there the benefit of the English law. To say that it was freedom to deny his right to settle or to enforce upon him any other system of law is utterly absurd. Every act of a colonial body that, without absolute necessity, prevented a British subject from doing any act that he might lawfully do in England, was an invasion of his freedom. The early Massachusetts laws and those of the Connecticut colony which were based upon them, restricted the liberty of British subjects in a host of instances. How can any sensible man pretend that they established greater freedom? They made the whole system an oligarchy by restricting the right of freemen to those who were admitted members of the Church which they established. When Milford took in six settlers who were not in church fellowship, it alarmed all the towns. The preamble of a resolve made at the General Court, held at New Haven, October 23d, 1643, says explicitly, "Whereas this plantation at first with general and full consent laid their foundation that none but members of approved churches should be accounted free burgesses, nor should any else have any vote in any election, or power, or trust, in ordering of civil affairs, in which we have constantly proceeded hitherto," etc.

The General Court ordered that in future none but church members should be admitted freemen in any town; that these six should never be chosen to the office of deputy or any colonial position, nor vote at any time in the election of magistrates.

The only approved churches were those organized on the Congregational system; all others, the Church of England included, were non-approved. The Church, in each town, was a society, admission to which depended on the will of a majority of the members. No member of the Established Church could acquire the right to vote except by renouncing his own Church and applying for membership in the Congregational body, taking his chance of obtaining admission, for he had no definite right to membership. Can this in any just sense be called freedom? The claim that these colonies did aught for civil freedom is utterly untenable. The claim that they ever established or dreamed of establishing religious freedom is equally so, unless we concede that relig-

ious freedom means the right to set up peculiar theories of faith and church discipline, and compel your neighbors to accept them. Now though some people call this religious freedom, is it anything different from religious intolerance and persecution?

This Koranic enforcing of religious views on others is inherent in Protestantism, and will live with its life, die with its death. It is scarcely strange therefore that its adherents sometimes mistake its real character. From the outset of the so-called Reformation down to the Falk laws, we see it clearly marked. Nowhere was freedom given to those who chose to adhere to the old faith to retain their churches and practice their religion according to the dictates of their own conscience. To suppress Catholic worship, seize Catholic churches and institutions, break up Catholic religious orders or confraternities has always been deemed right, and even at this day every attempt of the kind finds ready sympathizers in this country. Whether this is compatible with freedom or justice they never stop to inquire; the only train of thought seems to be, that anything that will cripple the Catholic Church and advance Protestantism must be right. As this came to be a sort of axiom in regard to Catholics, it was an easy step for the New England colonies, with their established Church, to apply it practically to fellow Protestants, though logically the Quakers, acting on their own private judgment, had the same right to hang the Puritan that the Puritan had to hang Quakers.

Religious liberty in the sense of acknowledging a right in each man or body of men to worship God according to his or their church discipline, and to act up to their own standards of belief without forfeiting any of the rights enjoyed by their fellow-citizens, never was established in any New England colony. Toleration of anything but Congregationalism was declared to be "an evil egg." Roger Williams, driven from Massachusetts for his extreme opinions, and where he displayed especially his utter hatred of the Catholic religion by insisting on the removal of the cross from the English flag, founded a colony which experience had taught him to make more free than those he left; but even he denied to Catholics the right of religious freedom.

The Dutch in New York allowed the public exercise of no religion but the Calvinistic according to the Dutch form; Virginia refused to allow Catholic settlers, and enforced English laws against dissenters from the Church of England.

Not one of these colonies can claim to have established religious freedom. The honor belongs to Maryland, and at a later period to the influence of James in New York and Pennsylvania. That the principle of religious freedom should emanate from a Catholic lord proprietor, have been embodied in his charter, taken up by his

Catholic settlers, and through their influence embodied in a law in the very last moments when they were allowed to exercise the rights of freemen, has been of late a source of great chagrin to many. Feeling that the claim of religious liberty for New England is no longer tenable, they try at least to deprive Catholics of the glory. Hence the sophistries of Rev. E. D. Neill, who has been persistently harping on the subject. The matter must be taken up by some of our writers and treated from a true historic standpoint, for it has gone so far that Mr. Bancroft, in the Centennial edition of his *History of the United States*, has suppressed the tribute he had eloquently paid for nearly forty years to the Catholic colonists of Maryland, in order to throw disparagement upon them under the guidance of Neill. Cavil as they may, the idea of religious freedom in Maryland originated with Lord Baltimore, and was by his instrumentality embodied in his charter, as it was in his instructions; it was fully accepted and sustained by the Catholics while a minority, and after they became a majority in Maryland; it was the final act, we may say, of Catholic ascendancy; while religious intolerance, penal laws, and an established Church marked the advent of the Protestants to power. Another Catholic, James, Duke of York, in the laws he adopted for the colony of New York, and in the legislation there under his influence, showed a great advance on most of the other colonies in civil and religious liberty, as his fall was followed by the enactment of penal laws and the establishment of the Church of England. Under his aid his friend, William Penn, who shared his views, established in Pennsylvania a religious freedom which put to shame the pretensions of New England.

The claim of Connecticut that in her irregular action she established civil and religious liberty must fall to the ground as a mere dream, and cannot alter our judgment as to her right to ignore the allegiance due by her people to the British law.

We can now proceed to examine what the legislation of New Haven and Connecticut actually was. Peters was not the first to draw attention to it.

The strange system of law prevailing in Connecticut attracted notice in other parts, although the laws were not generally printed or diffused. As early as 1705, Colonel Heathcote, of New York, wrote: "They have abundance of odd kinds of laws to prevent dissenting from their Church." (*N. Y. Doc. Hist.*, iii., p. 14; *Doc. Hist. P. E. Church*, i., p. 9.) Smith, in the continuation of his *History of New York*, alludes to the Blue Laws as being a topic for wits, humorists, and buffoons. He adds: "The author had the curiosity to resort to them, when the Commissaries met at New Haven, for adjusting a partition line between New York and

Massachusetts in 1767; and a parchment-covered book in demi-royal paper was handed to him for the laws asked for, as the only volume in the office passing under this odd title." (*Smith's New York*, vol. ii., p. 93.)

"Most American readers," says Palfrey, "have heard of the 'Blue Laws' of New Haven, which have been precisely described as making 'one thin volume in folio,' embracing the following among other provisions: No one shall travel, cook, victuals, make beds, sweep house, cut hair, or shave, on the Sabbath day. No woman shall kiss her children on the Sabbath or Fasting day. No one shall read Common Prayer, keep Christmas or Saint days, make minced pies, dance, play cards, or play on any instrument of music, except the drum, trumpet, and jewsharp. Every male shall have his hair cut round according to a cap."¹ Mr. Trumbull on his title-page and elsewhere characterizes the whole as "The Blue Law Forgeries of Peters," yet this is scarcely accurate. Peters has not manufactured the whole out of his own imagination; he perverts and exaggerates in some cases, and probably invents in others, unless we charitably suppose him to have copied from some loose abstract of the laws given him. Peters himself does not profess to quote; he says: "The laws made by this independent dominion and denominated *Blue Laws* by the neighboring colonies, were never suffered to be printed; but the following sketch of some of them will give a tolerable idea of the spirit which pervades the whole." He does not profess to cite the acts, but to give a sketch of them, and details forty-five. For the very absurd ones cited by Palfrey we find no trace in the genuine laws given by Mr. Trumbull, although the Common Prayer would undoubtedly fall under the New Haven law against heresy (*Code of 1656*, p. 224), that against "Prophanation of the Lord's Day" with its death penalty (p. 253); and in Connecticut would be covered by the decision of 1658 (p. 158).

It may, however, be worth noting that there is a "chasm in the records of New Haven colony between April, 1644, and May, 1653, which leaves us in uncertainty," says Palfrey, "whether the Code of 1656 was the first essay of the kind," and he inclines to believe there was one in 1648 or 1649. If it were not, the colony was ruled under vague laws drawn from the Old Testament, as each magistrate chose to apply them. Prior to 1656 two persons, Goodwife Basset, at Stratford, in 1651, and Goodwife Knapp, at Fairfield, were executed as witches in the New Haven colony, the first of the terrible series of executions for witchcraft in New England.² But we should scarcely know the fact in either case, for the records

¹ Hist. New England, ii., p. 32, n.

² New Haven Records ii, p. 77.

have entirely disappeared, had not a woman of some little sense, a Mrs. Staples, examining the body of one of the victims at the grave, asked them to show her the pretended witch teats, and declared the body to have no marks that she or any other woman had not. For this she was accused by Roger Ludlow of being a witch, but being a woman of spirit she induced her husband to bring an action of slander against Ludlow. The record of this suit gives all the details known of the two witch trials, but others may have taken place and the records been similarly suppressed. In August, 1653, Elizabeth Godman was accused of being a witch, brought up again in 1655, and imprisoned. . . . Davenport preached against witches in 1653, so that doubtless a law was passed. After the code Thomas Mullener was arraigned in 1657.

The absence of some of these records has at least a very suspicious look.

The settlers claimed a divine authority for their laws: "Yet civil rulers and courts, and this General Court in particular, are the ministers of God for the good of the people."¹ This is Peters's first article. The title *Appeals* in the New Haven Code of 1656 shows that, as Peters next states, there was no appeal from the General Court or Assembly.² That the governor was amenable to the people, as he states, will scarcely be questioned. His fourth article asserts that the governor had only one vote, except a casting vote when the Assembly was equally divided. In Connecticut he seems to have had only a casting vote (p. 57). The code of the latter colony authorizes his next clause that the governor could not dismiss the Assembly of the people.

Peters asserts that "conspiracy against the dominion shall be punished by death." In the Code of 1656 we read: "If any person shall conspire and attempt any invasion, insurrection, or public rebellion against this jurisdiction, or shall endeavor to surprise or seize any plantation or town, any fortification, platform, or any great guns, provided for the defence of the jurisdiction or any plantation therein, or shall treacherously and perfidiously attempt the alteration and subversion of the frame of policy or fundamental government laid and settled for this jurisdiction, he or they shall be put to death." Numb. 16; 2 Sam. 18; 2 Sam. 20. Of Peters's next two clauses one is simply a reiteration of this. "Whoever attempts to change or overturn this dominion shall suffer death." The other, "Whoever says there is a power and jurisdiction above and over this dominion, shall suffer death and loss of property," has apparently no authority among extant laws.

"Judges shall determine controversies without a jury." This

¹ Trumbull, p. 184-85, Code of 1656.

² P. 191.

was the Connecticut rule for cases under forty shillings; and in all cases the judges had the option to call a jury of six or a jury of twelve, who required only a two-thirds vote for a verdict (p. 99).

Peters next says: "No one shall be a freeman or give a vote, unless he be converted, and a member in full communion of one of the churches allowed in this dominion." Mr. Trumbull notes: "The law only required membership of some one or other of the approved churches of New England." Palfrey (vol. ii., p. 8) goes further: "In Massachusetts and New Haven the discretion of the freemen as to the admission of new associates was limited by a standing rule of exclusion for all but such as had been received into full communion with some church." This gave by no means a fair idea of the real fact. Palfrey by the very general term "some church," would lead his readers to suppose that any Christian denomination was meant; and even Trumbull, citing the words of a law, gives the same impression to some extent. But the word "approved" was not in the sense of "generally recognized." What it meant is seen explicitly on p. 220, Ecclesiastical Provisions: "Nor shall any person being a member of any church, which shall be gathered without such notice given and approbation had, or who is not a member of some church in New England, approved by the magistracy and churches of this colony, be admitted to the freedom of this jurisdiction."

It was not, then, the churches generally approved, but approved by the magistrates. No new church could be organized but by their consent; no one coming from elsewhere could be allowed to settle or vote unless he showed membership in some New England church they approved. Should the minister of that church have taught anything not pleasing to the New Haven magistrates, these would refuse to admit a member of that church to political rights.

Hollister, in his *History of Connecticut* (i., p. 435), gives a better idea of the spirit of the whole legislation: "They looked with extreme jealousy upon the encroaching power of Popery, and many of them regarded Episcopacy as only a modified form of Catholicism. As they had been to such pains to enjoy their own opinions, they knew no other rule than the characteristic one of that age, exclusiveness, or, if that would not avail, coercion. They resolved to keep out all religious sects from their limits, or if they ventured to cross the border, to compel them to conform. They determined, too, that if it were possible, the very festivals as well as modes of worship that were associated in their minds with oppression and arbitrary power, should be suppressed, and that other public days should be substituted."

A law of the colony punished non-attendance at church by a fine (p. 220); and in Connecticut, at least, a fine in such a case

would forfeit a man's right to vote until the magistrates saw fit to restore him (p. 136). The consequence of this was to throw the management of the churches into the hands of a few, and to this few, a minority of the male inhabitants, the government of the colony was secured. Lechford, in 1640, estimated that three parts of the people of the country remained out of the church,¹ and such was the burden thus devolved upon a few that some church members, quiet men who aspired to no public office, declined to become freemen.²

The Connecticut colonies derived their laws from those of Massachusetts, whose Body of Liberties was compiled by Nathaniel Ward. What his disgusting bigotry and intolerance were, may be seen in his *Simple Cobbler of Aggawam*, and yet his code was the model for those of Connecticut.

The next clause given by Peters: "No man shall hold office who is not sound in the faith and faithful to this dominion; and whoever gives a vote to such a person shall pay a fine of £1; for a second offence he shall be disfranchised." There is no trace of such an act.

The next: "Each freeman shall swear by the blessed God to bear true allegiance to this dominion, and that Jesus is the only King." This was evidently suggested by the clause regarding the oath of fidelity in the Code of 1655, and the form of the oath given, which is simply to the colony and not to the king (p. 185). The acknowledging of royalty only in our Lord is similarly drawn from the same source: "Though they humbly acknowledge that the supreme power of making laws and repealing them belongs to God only, and that by Him this power is given to Jesus Christ as Mediator (Matt. xxviii. 19; John v. 22)."³

Peters's next clause: "No Quaker or dissenter from the established worship of the dominion shall be allowed to give a vote for the election of magistrates or any officer." This certainly states what was absolutely the fact.

"No food or lodging shall be afforded to a Quaker, Adamite, or other heretic. If any person turns Quaker he shall be banished, and not suffered to return but upon pain of death." The actual wording of the law as given by Trumbull is: "It is ordered that no Quaker, Ranter, or other heretic of that nature, be suffered to come into, nor abide in this jurisdiction, and if any such rise up among ourselves, that they be speedily suppressed and secured for the better prevention of such dangerous errors." This was the law of 1657.⁴ How far Peters's description of it varies from the actual interpretation given to it, cannot be positively determined, but on

¹ Lechford's Plain Dealing, 73.

² Mass. Records, ii., pp. 38, 208.

³ Trumbull's Blue Laws, p. 184.

⁴ Laws, etc., New Haven Colony, Trumbull, p. 295.

the 26th of May, in the year following the passage of the law, we find Humphrey Norton arraigned as a Quaker.¹ A work issued in 1660 by this persecuted sect, entitled *A Declaration of the Sad and Great Persecution and Martyrdom of the People of God called Quakers, in New England, for the Worshipping of God*, says: "Twenty-two have been banished upon pain of death; three have been martyred; three have had their right ears cut; one hath been burned on the hand with the letter H." On this Palfrey, in his *History of New England* (ii., p. 485, note), remarks: "The one case of branding in the hand mentioned in the declaration, etc., was, I suppose, that of Humphrey Norton, in New Haven Colony." As the law says nothing of branding, it shows how wide a discretion the courts used in inflicting penalties in special cases, and that in fact cases were not tried by existing laws, but by what was really law made and enforced during a trial. Connecticut had similar laws against Quakers.²

The brand H was one evidently made for heretics in general, and we can scarcely conceive that it was used only on this occasion. The opposition to Baptists in Connecticut is all the more remarkable because both in that and the New Haven colony infant baptism was rapidly dying out; the baptism of the children of church members being permissive rather than peremptory, and doubts being entertained whether the children of such as were not church members could be admitted to baptism at all. Fifty years later Munson, one of the first Church of England ministers to enter Connecticut, wrote that many were admitted to communion as members who had never been baptized, and the Episcopal clergyman claims to have baptized, in the eighteenth century, the very first white child born in the colony in the seventeenth, who had grown to hoary age untouched by the waters of regeneration.

Peters's next statement would be interesting, to Catholics at least, if it could be substantiated. "No priest shall abide in the dominion; he shall be banished, and suffer death on his return. Priests may be seized by any one without a warrant." Mr. Trumbull says there was nothing like this in the code, meaning apparently that of 1656, and refers to such a law in New York, the law of 1700, and to the Virginia anti-Catholic laws; but Plymouth had a law against priests at an early day, Massachusetts later, and when even Rhode Island made a distinction against Catholics, it would be rather surprising if neither of the Connecticut colonies ever passed a penal law against priests. But no such law has yet been traced. A Jesuit was in Connecticut in 1651, and another about twenty years later.

¹ New Haven Records, ii., p. 217, 233, 291, 363, 412.

² Connect. Records, i. 283, 303, 324.

The next alleged law as to licensed ferrymen, does not appear on the records, but has nothing really objectionable. Then follows a series of laws which draw on Peters the strongest denunciation. "No one shall run on the Sabbath day, or walk in the garden or elsewhere, except reverently to and from meeting." "No man shall travel, cook victuals, make beds, sweep house, cut hair, or shave on the Sabbath day." "No woman shall kiss her child on the Sabbath day or fasting day." "The Sabbath shall begin at sunset on Saturday." Peters cites the case of an Episcopal clergyman harassed in 1750 by petty prosecutions for violating the Sabbath, but Mr. Trumbull says stoutly: "It is needless to add that the 'Episcopal clergyman' and his trial are as apocryphal as the 'Blue Law' which he violated." Whether Episcopalian historians have found anything to support the charge, we do not know. Yet it is certain that the Sabbath was held to begin at sunset on Saturday (see *Laws and Orders*, 1647, p. 286), and that all offences against the Sabbath were strictly punished. Some village Dogberry may have carried his construction to absurd lengths, but we must consider most of what is here given by Peters as actual statute law, to be fictitious. An old Connecticut man, Daniel Barber, a soldier in the Revolution, says: "The manner of keeping Sunday in Connecticut was strict, and as rigid as the Jewish Sabbath. . . . The general family discipline was such that small children were not allowed to walk abroad in the fields or gardens, or to gather grapes or any kind of fruit, excepting such things as were necessary for the kitchen. If in case of necessity they were sent to the field, they were charged to walk softly, and make no noise. Children, of course, took but very little pleasure in being told that it was Saturday night, and that they must stop their play, and go to bed early."¹ The clauses numbered 22, making the taking of an ear of corn, theft; 23, adjudging any one guilty if accused of trespass at night, unless he cleared himself on oath, cannot be substantiated by any laws now known. The next: "When it appears that an accused has confederates, and he refuses to discover them, he may be racked," opens up a new question whether torture was ever used in Connecticut, or elsewhere in New England. Its use was not yet wholly discontinued in England, and it prevailed in New Netherlands under the Dutch. Mr. Trumbull says positively that it was never resorted to in New Haven or Connecticut. As there is no trace of any such enactment in the laws of those colonies, nor any allusion to torture in any, this statement of Mr. Trumbull has the greatest weight in inducing us to condemn Peters here of falsification.

¹ Barber, *History of my own Times*.

The succeeding acts are not important; 25 prohibits sales of land, except by leave of the selectmen; 26 authorizes the appointment of guardians for the estates of drunkards; 27 prescribes the punishment for lying. The last of these enactments is found in full in the New Haven Code of 1656.

Peters's next is: "28. No minister shall keep a school," meaning evidently a minister of the Church of England. No such law appears, but it seems probable that no one of that character would have been permitted to open a school.

Education received early attention in Connecticut. The provisions of the Connecticut code of 1650 are curious under several points of view. They show that the founders of that colony had no idea of separating religion from education.

"Forasmuch as the good education of children is of singular behoof and benefit to any commonwealth, and, whereas, many parents and masters are too indulgent and negligent of their duty in that kind, it is therefore ordered by this Court and authority thereof, that the selectmen of every town, in the several precincts and quarters where they dwell, shall have a vigilant eye over their brethren and neighbors, to see first, that none of them shall suffer so much barbarism in any of their families as not to endeavor to teach by themselves or others, their children and apprentices so much learning as may enable them perfectly to read the English tongue, and knowledge of the capital laws, upon penalty of twenty shillings for each neglect herein; also that all masters of families do once, at least, catechize their children and servants in the grounds and principles of religion; and if any be unable to do so much, that then, at the least, they procure such children and apprentices to learn some short orthodox catechism without book, that they may be able to answer the questions that shall be propounded to them out of such catechisms by their parents, or masters, or any of the selectmen, when they shall call them to a trial of what they have learned in this kind.

"And further, that all parents and masters do breed and bring up their children and apprentices in some honest lawful calling, labor, or employment, either in husbandry or some other trade profitable for themselves and the commonwealth, if they will not nor cannot train them up in learning to fit them for higher employments. And if any of the selectmen, after admonition by them given to such masters of families, shall find them still negligent of their duty in the particulars aforementioned, whereby children and servants become rude, stubborn, and unruly, the said selectmen, with the help of two magistrates, shall take such children or apprentices from them, and place them with some masters for years, boys till they come to twenty-one, and girls to eighteen years of age complete, which will more strictly look unto, and force them to submit unto government, according to the rules of this order, if by fair means and former instructions they will not be drawn unto it."¹

This enactment is the evident source from which Peters drew his "38. The selectmen, on finding children ignorant, may take them away from their parents, and put them into better hands at the expense of their parents." The last clause being entirely unauthorized.

The same Connecticut code, under the head of schools, has this curious enactment:

"It being one chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowl-

¹ First Code of Connecticut, Trumbull, pp. 78-9.

edge of the Scriptures, as in former times, keeping them in an unknown tongue, so in these latter times by persuading them from the use of tongues, so that at least the true sense and meaning of the original might be clouded with false glosses of saint-seeming deceivers, and that learning may not be buried in the grave of our forefathers in church and commonwealth, the Lord assisting our endeavors. It is therefore ordered by this Court and authority thereof, that every township within this jurisdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty householders, shall then forthwith appoint one within their town to teach all such children as shall resort to him, to write and read, whose wages shall be paid either by the parents and masters of such children, or by the inhabitants in general, by way of supply, as the major part of those who order the prudentials of the town shall appoint; provided that those who send their children be not oppressed by more than they can have them taught from other towns."¹

The colony of New Haven did not make a general law till 1657, when we find this:

"It was propounded that the Court would think of some way to further the setting up of schools, for the education of youth in each plantation, for though some do take care that way, yet some others neglect it, which the Court took into consideration, and seeing that New Haven hath provided that a schoolmaster be maintained at the town's charge, and Milford hath made provisions in a comfortable way, they desire the other towns would follow their example, and therefore did now order that in every plantation where a school is not already set up and maintained, forthwith endeavors shall be used that a schoolmaster be procured that may attend that work, and what salary shall be allowed unto such schoolmaster for his pains, one-third part shall be paid by the town in general as other rates, the good education of children being of public concernment, and the other two-thirds by them who have the benefit thereof by the teaching of their children."²

The next Blue Law given by Peters covers the establishment of a state church. "29. Every ratable person who refuses to pay his proportion to the support of the minister of the town or parish, shall be fined by the Court £2 and £4 every quarter, until he or she pay the rate to the minister." Connected with which is the very absurd one which he gives later on, and in which he embodied all the New England dislike of the Church of England: "35. No one shall read Common Prayer, keep Christmas or Saints' days, make minced pies, dance, play cards, or play on any instrument of music, except the drum, trumpet, and jews' harp."

That all other Christian bodies were prevented from organizing as churches in Connecticut except by consent of the magistrates and elders is evident (*Trumbull's Blue Laws*, p. 220), and this consent would evidently be refused to all but Congregational churches. This we know in fact. The early struggles of the Episcopalian in Connecticut furnish ample evidence on the point, and the cases all occurred after Connecticut was governed by a Royal Charter, and formally recognized the fact that it was subject to English law. Prior to the apparent protection given by that charter no Episcopalian would have dreamed of attempting to organize a church.

Early in the last century, when the Rev. Mr. Munson, from New

¹ *Ib.*, p. 128-9.

² *New Haven Colony Laws, etc.*, Trumbull, p. 295.

York, in 1707, entered the colony to meet and minister to some English emigrants who belonged to the Church of England, and also to confer, it would seem, with some of the old stock who had grown weary of the tyranny of the standing order, his visit was regarded as a dangerous step. Consultation followed as to the course to be adopted, and we soon see the result. When Munson reached Stratford on a second visit, he was met by the magistrates, who read a document to him threatening him and his companion, Colonel Heathcote, "with fine, if they proceeded to worship God or administer the Sacraments otherwise than what was agreeable to the law of this colony."¹

The act which they sought to enforce ran: "There shall be no ministry or church administration entertained or attended by the inhabitants of any town or plantation in this colony distinct and separate from and in opposition to that which is openly and publicly observed and dispensed by the approved ministers of the place." Rev. Mr. Munson remarks: "The sense and force they put upon them . . . is plainly thus to exclude the Church from their government as appears by their proceedings with me, so that hereby they deny a liberty of conscience to the Church of England, as well as to all others as are not of their opinion, which being repugnant to the laws of England is contrary to the grant of their charter."²

The real earlier laws both of Connecticut and New Haven required all to contribute to the salary of the Congregational minister of the place. "This Court . . . do order that those who are taught in the word, in the several plantations, be called together, that every man voluntarily set down what he is willing to allow to that end and use; and if any man refuse to pay a meet proportion, that then he be rated by authority in some just and equal way; and if after this any man withhold or delay due payment, the civil power to be exercised, as in other just debts."³ This was a very curious style of ordering people to do things voluntarily, and even compelling them.

In New Haven the particular court in each plantation, the deputies, constable, or other officer, for preserving peace "shall call all the inhabitants, whether planters or sojourners, before them and desire every one particularly to set down what proportion he is willing and able to allow yearly while God continues his estate, towards the maintenance of the ministry there. But if any one or more, to the discouragement and hindrance of this work, refuse or

¹ Hawkes and Perry, *Doc. Hist. P. E. Church, Connecticut*, i., p. 33 and 42. ² *Ib.*

³ *Connecticut Code*, Order Oct. 25, 1644, *Trumbull's Blue Laws*, p. 113.

delay, or set down an unmeet proportion, in any and every such case the particular court so shall rate and assess every such person, etc.”¹

This was rigidly enforced, and after members of the Church of England began to have service of their own, they were still compelled to pay their quota to the support of the Congregational minister. And no matter how ignorant or objectionable the man might be who could obtain the position of minister, all the Congregationalists in the place had to contribute to his support and attend his services. For this last point was also a matter of law. Says the New Haven Code :

“And it is further ordered, that wheresoever the ministry of the word is established within this jurisdiction, according to the order of the Gospel, every person according to the mind of God, shall duly resort and attend thereunto, upon the Lord’s days at least, and upon days of public fasting, or thanksgiving, ordered to be generally kept and observed. And if any person within this jurisdiction shall, without just and necessary cause, absent or withdraw from the same, he shall, after due means of conviction used, for every such sinful miscarriage forfeit five shillings to the plantation, to be levied as other fines.”²

This was not a dead letter. It was constantly enforced. Nearly a century after its enactment we read that Episcopalian people in 1740 were hauled to jail for refusing to attend Congregational meetings.³ Even during the Revolution, in 1778, as Rev. Daniel Barber relates, his father, while on his way to an unauthorized religious meeting held by a Sergeant Dewey, was arrested and tried for a breach of the Sabbath. The prosecution insisted “that Sergeant Dewey’s meeting was not such as the laws of Connecticut acknowledged and approved of, that is of the standing order,” and Barber was fined twenty shillings and costs.⁴

The reader may think this New England system utterly dead and gone, and that the writer, a dry-as-dust antiquarian, is merely parading a lot of old bric-a-brac, queer and quaint and curious, but let him rub his eyes and take up, instead of a musty old book, *A Yankee in Canada*, by Henry D. Thoreau, as splendid a specimen of a heathen as even New England ever produced. The book was issued by Ticknor & Fields, in 1866, and is not ancient. In a paper therein on “Civil Disobedience,” Thoreau says : “Some years ago the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman, whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. ‘Pay,’ it said, ‘or be locked up in the jail!’ I declined to pay, but unfortunately

¹ New Haven Code, 1655; ib., p. 221.

² New Haven Code, Trumbull’s Blue Laws, p. 220.

³ Hawks and Perry, Doc. Hist. P. E. C. Conn., i., p. 173.

⁴ Barber, History of my own Times, p. 10.

another man saw fit to pay it. . . . However, at the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing: 'Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined.' This I gave to the town clerk, and he has it."¹

Now, there are really men outside of lunatic asylums who will talk of the religious freedom established in New England, and deny, and cheapen, and obscure the just claim of Lord Baltimore and the Catholic settlers of Maryland and of James II. to having endeavored to establish religious equality in America, but certainly they cannot be called sane on this point.

The history of the growth of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut is to us of peculiar interest. When clergymen of the Church of England penetrated into the colony from New York they found a few Episcopalians, recently from England, anxious to have service in their own form, their children baptized, marriages performed before a clergyman instead of a magistrate; but besides these, there were many who, tired of the cast-iron tyranny of the standing order, began to think that anything their fathers had suffered from the Church of England was little compared to the thralldom in which they lived. Wherever an Episcopal congregation was gathered, some of the best old New England stock joined. Fines and prosecutions followed; clergymen visited their flocks by stealth, and rode off pursued by selectmen; but the Connecticut Episcopalians were New England men, and as stubborn as their persecutors. Then the standing order began to reason, finding force of little avail. The Episcopal clergy had no state power or social influence to support them as in England or even Virginia and New York. They had to meet the Congregationalists squarely. The consequence was that they had to fall back further and further towards Catholic ground, and they thus became extremely High Church, while in other parts, as New York, the inclination was to approach the Calvinistic bodies. After the Revolution, Connecticut was the first to seek a bishop, and Dr. Seabury was consecrated by the Episcopal bishops in Scotland, and was so full of old ideas that he actually wore a mitre, something that no other Episcopal bishop in America has ever done. He was so High Church that Bishop Provost, of New York, long refused to recognize him as a bishop. Middletown became a centre of his school, and from it came to the Church the Rev. Mr. Kewley and the Barbers, early in this century. Then Dr. Jarvis, who was like a bell and a finger-post, directing others the way he did not go, really gave an impulse here contemporane-

¹ P. 140.

ous with, but distinct from, the Tractarian movement in England, which led many highly cultivated Episcopal clergymen into the Catholic Church, among others the present Archbishop of Baltimore.

Thus strangely have the Blue Laws of Connecticut contributed to the good of the Catholic Church in this country. To a philosophic mind it is curious to note, too, how this very opposition of Episcopalian to Congregationalist preserved the latter in Christianity, while in Massachusetts, where there was no antagonistic element, the Christian idea in Congregationalism died out, and Unitarianism, Transcendentalism, and Pantheism have become the systems to which the leading men give their adhesion.

To return to the Blue Laws. Peters gives as his 31st a sumptuary law, forbidding gold, silver, or lace trimming. This was probably derived from a Connecticut law of 1641, reviving an earlier law (6 Trumbull, p. 151), and directing the constables to summon before the court any who exceeded their condition and rank in their apparel.

The next, on selling debtors, and that which follows, punishing kindling a fire in the woods with death, are exaggerations of acts actually in the codes (p. 229, etc.). The same may be said of that on cards and dice.

The 36th: "No gospel minister shall join people in marriage. The magistrates only shall join in marriage as they may do it with less scandal to Christ's Church," conveys rather the general theory than the precise words of any law. Marriage was held to be simply a contract under the control of the State, with which the Church had no concern. "They married without a minister, and buried the dead without a prayer," says Bancroft (i., p. 465). The idea of civil marriage, now so much in vogue with the infidel governments of Europe, originated on the bleak New England coast, and was first practiced there. It was in direct collision with English law, and undoubtedly all children born in New England would have been deemed illegitimate in England if the matter had been strictly construed. Several laws recognize marriage as being specially the affair of the civil magistrate. The first Connecticut Code (p. 124) says: "Every new married man shall likewise bring in a certificate of his marriage under the hand of the magistrate which married him." The New Haven Code of 1655 (p. 242) was more explicit: "No man unless he be a magistrate in this jurisdiction, or expressly allowed by the General Court, shall marry any persons, and that in a public place, if they be able to go forth, under the penalty of five pounds fine for every such marriage." Under the title of Records it also provides "that every new married man (if married within this jurisdiction) shall bring in the certificate thereof, under the hand of the magistrate or officer that married him."

It will be noticed that these laws, like the laws in France, Germany, Italy, etc., involve the absurdity of making marriage merely a contract between two parties, and yet make a magistrate *perform* a contract to which he is not a party. The Church, logical as they are absurd, recognizing in her sacrament the contract of the parties, holds that they are the ministers of the sacrament as well as parties to the contract. The magistrate can be simply a witness, and attest officially the contract entered into before him; he cannot make a contract for other people or perform or confer it. Thus these departures from the Church are equally departures from common sense.

Another of Peters's laws connected with marriage: "No man shall court a maid in person or by letter, without first obtaining consent of her parents; £5 penalty for the first offence, £10 for the second, and for the third, imprisonment during the pleasure of the Court," seems ludicrous, yet it had a foundation. The first code of Connecticut and the orders of 1643 contained a provision prohibiting "any one, male or female, not being at his or her own dispose, from making or giving entertainment to any motion or suit in way of marriage, without the knowledge and consent of those they stand in such relation to" (p. 106), while the New Haven Code imposed a fine of forty shillings on any one who should "endeavor to inveigle or draw the affections of any maid or maid-servant, whether daughter, kinswoman, or in other relation, for himself or for any other person, without the consent of father, master, guardian, governor, or of the nearest magistrate, whether it be by speech, writing, message, company-keeping, unnecessary familiarity, gifts, or in any other way." The penalty for a second offence was £4; for a third, fine, imprisonment, and corporal punishment.

Several of the other laws, as given by Peters, have some foundation, as those against fornication, adultery, that requiring married persons to live together, etc., but the last ludicrous one is a clear reference to the term roundhead: "Every male shall have his hair cut round, according to a cap," or, as he explains elsewhere, a pumpkin-shell, for which no trace of foundation can be found.

Now, reviewing Peters by the real acts, it is hardly possible to call Peters's Blue Laws forgeries, for too many of them have a real basis. They were not all the coinage of his own brains, but they lead one irresistibly to the conclusion that he never saw the genuine legislation, but derived his knowledge of them from current tradition or popular theories as to what they were. Had he read them himself and quoted merely from memory, there are some that he would not have overlooked and might have summarized

still more ludicrously. Some such abstracts of these laws may have been handed around in writing as jokes.

He would certainly have introduced the Connecticut law against "taking any tobacco publicly in the street, highways, or any barn-yard, or upon training days in any open places," or "drinking," *i. e.*, "smoking any but Connecticut tobacco" (p. 151); and a law like the former in New Haven, 1655 (p. 292), where smoking about the house or farm is also prohibited, under penalty of sixpence a pipe or the stocks. The provision preventing any young man living by himself, or living in any family except by consent of the town (pp. 149, 258), would have given him similar opportunities, and so would many other orders of the General Court, while doubtless a little research in the acts of the particular courts would have much increased his stock of quaint and odd legislation.

We have, by contrasting Peters's Blue Laws with the real enactments published by Trumbull, shown that Peters cannot be cited at all as authority; that many of his clauses are palpable inventions, and that though others are traceable to real laws, they are given so inaccurately as to be of no value. Though many writers here and in England have heretofore quoted them in good faith, this can no longer be excused. They must be thrown aside absolutely, and the *History of Connecticut*, in which they were first published, take its place with Knickerbocker's *History of New York* as a satire on the colonial condition of two neighboring commonwealths, one the work of a man of English origin ridiculing the Dutch, the other that of a Tory clergyman of the Church of England ridiculing the Whigs and Congregationalists of his own State, which had expelled him.

The character of the Connecticut and New Haven laws at their best is not such as to command our highest admiration. Ecclesiastical tyranny, the disregard of personal rights, the State intermeddling in all the concerns of life, mark them at every page.

Mr. Trumbull endeavors to mitigate the sentence which the enlightened spirit of the nineteenth century must pass on them, by arraying examples from other colonies. New Netherlands used torture, and punished murder and unnatural crimes with death, refused Lutherans, Baptists, and Quakers the public exercise of their religion, and punished Quakers severely; and New York, under English rule, passed a penal law against Catholics in 1700 and in 1707 prosecuted Presbyterian clergymen, and in Dutch and English times supported Protestant ministers and built Protestant churches by general tax; but, as we have elsewhere remarked, the only efforts made there in favor of freedom were those of the Catholic Duke of York. He shows, too, the severity of the Virginia laws, beginning with 1611, their rules for enforcing religious con-

formity and compelling attendance at church, her penal laws against Catholics, some only of which he cites, as well as against Quakers. As to Maryland, he has to admit that mutual toleration was established and maintained; and he might have noted the decision in Fitzherbert's case, where that clergyman directly claimed that "Holy Church" in the charter and acts of 1638-39 meant any duly organized Christian church, and the decision of the Court sustained his interpretation. During the whole period of Catholic influence, down to 1649, he finds nothing to cite as a counterpoise to Connecticut legislation, except the enactment against blasphemy in 1649. That subsequently to that time under Protestant rule, penal laws, State Church, supported by the taxes levied upon a large minority and in some counties a majority, who were compelled to build the churches and support the ministers of their Protestant neighbors, merely shows that this course seems to be inherent in Protestant communities. As long as Catholic influence prevailed in New York and Maryland, there was, as Mr. Trumbull really shows, a decent respect for the opinions of their fellow-men, less general severity, a broader and more Christian feeling in legislation; that this is associated in our colonial annals with Catholicity, is and ever will be our highest pride.

In many points the Connecticut laws were based on those of Massachusetts and Plymouth, and in some cases were passed at the direct request of the Commissioners of the United Colonies, in which Massachusetts had a preponderating influence.

Mr. Trumbull might easily have extended these comparative quotations, especially on the point of religious intolerance. He might have shown us the early Plymouth law against Catholic priests; have shown us Georgia founded with the express condition that no Catholic settlers were to be allowed. He might later still have shown New York in adopting her Constitution, embodying what is now appealed to as establishing religious equality by some who ascribe the honor to Mr. Jay; but had he quoted from the debates in the Convention, he would have seen Livingston and Morris fighting the battles of religious freedom, and Mr. Jay not only opposing it, but finally succeeding in putting the article in the Constitution in such a form as to exclude Catholics. And it really did. It was a Dead Sea fruit, fair enough without, but under it a naturalization law passed excluding Catholics, and a test oath was introduced which, for at least thirty years, excluded Catholics.

He might have shown North Carolina retaining similar legislation to very recent times, and one New England State, New Hampshire, still depriving the Catholic citizen of the rights his fellow-citizens enjoy.

He cites the severity of English laws in the reign of James I.;

but their cruelty from the time of Henry VIII. down to modern times would require a volume. He quotes Burn, an English legal writer, who says: "Every cruelty short of scalping was practiced on the English poor." In fact the poor in Catholic times were provided for; the overthrow of the monastic institutions really gave to court favorites estates which had been rented out at low rates, and the revenues of which had been used to give employment and aid to the poor. This change impoverished thousands, and the law then began to exterminate the poor to rid itself of the burden it had created.

But the severity in England cannot justify the severity in a new community where industry had a full field for its exercise. Nor can the action of the other colonies affect our consideration of the abstract question, especially when in other colonies, under Catholic and Quaker influence, we see something higher, and nobler, and better.

Taking the whole subject together, we cannot praise Connecticut legislation as a whole, either in view of English or Colonial law, or on its own merits. Shown at its best by Mr. Trumbull, it was narrow, exclusive, tyrannical, based on no sound views of human nature or Christianity. There was nothing in its oligarchic principle that was truly republican, nothing to mould a people for a great commonwealth. New England has become what she is, not by such laws, but in spite of them, by the assertion, to a greater or less extent of the real manhood of her people.

MR. R. W. THOMPSON ON THE PAPACY AND THE
CIVIL POWER.

The Papacy and the Civil Power. By R. W. Thompson. New York: Harper & Brothers.

IT is questionable whether the general diffusion of elementary knowledge, and rapid intercommunion of thought among mankind, effected by the inventions of printing, the motive power of steam, and the generation of the electric current can be rightly credited with all the advantages claimed for them by modern self-complacency. A deluge of information has overspread the lands, but it is very shallow, and its tendency has been rather to drown right reason than to fertilize it. The very boasting of the age is a sign of the prevailing ignorance. It is only smatterers who fancy they know everything. Ripe knowledge is almost invariably accompanied by humility, and readily acknowledges how little, after all, the merely human knowledge of even the wisest of us amounts to.

There is no avoiding this. There can never be a scientific discovery that will be able to alter the nature of things. As long as man is man, true science, ripe scholarship, and sound reasoning can only be the heritage of the few. But nowadays the illiterate multitudes are taught to claim an equal power with those privileged few to form judgments on all topics that arise. The appeal is made to them as if they constituted a competent tribunal; and, whether in religion, science, morals, or history, they are made the victims of "strong delusion to believe a lie." Now, it is the blue-glass humbug that is foisted on them. Anon, they are taught from the professional chair of a learned university that there are no such things as right and wrong, and that what are called crimes and virtues are independent of volition, and result necessarily, as effect from cause, from the formation of the brain. In the domain of morals they are taught that the control of the passions, and obedience to authority, are violations of the liberty of the individual, and that the dignity of human nature should be satisfied with nothing less than an independent, self-sufficient individual autocracy; in that of history, that the Popes were tyrants, Luther and John Knox apostles of religion, and such men as Garibaldi, of whom it is impossible to decide whether his mental or moral organization is the lower, are heroes; and in that of religion, that its highest obligation is that every one should believe and do that which is true and right in his own eyes.

The Papacy and the Civil Power is not behind the age in its pretentious emptiness. There is in it just enough show of acquaintance with books to impress the minds of such people as are likely to be its principal readers with the notion that the writer is a learned man, and more than enough malice to satisfy the most passionate hater of the Christian Vicariate.

It affords us no pleasure to have to give so uncomplimentary a description of a work written by a gentleman, who has been recently appointed to an important government office by the present occupant of the Presidential chair of the United States. It would have been more to our taste to have been able to recognize the merits of an erudite and well-reasoned work, and to have met its arguments with the consideration they would, under such circumstances, have merited; but Mr. Thompson's book is not of that class, and truth must not suffer through the desire to avoid giving pain, nor must justice be sacrificed to courtesy.

Perhaps the least prepossessing feature of Mr. Thompson's book is, not its one-sidedness alone, but its insincerity. He puts forth the most exaggerated claims to superior impartiality and fairness, on the strength of his being a Protestant.

"In the claim of impartiality and fairness" are his words, "in all such matters (the dogmas of the Catholic Church in so far as they have been employed to influence the civil power and action of governments) the advantage is on the side of the Protestant. Roman, Catholic writers are led almost universally, by the very nature of their Church organization, into intolerance and dogmatism. They are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has done or taught from the beginning is unerringly right and true. . . . Not so with the Protestant. He appeals to reason, examines history for himself, weighs both evidence and argument, and exercises his own intelligent judgment in separating right from wrong, truth from falsehood; while the papacy demands implicit and passive obedience—the entire submission of the whole man by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality."

Before going on to show how far Mr. Thompson fulfils these high pretensions, we may delay a moment or two, in order to note from the specimen culled from his preface the kind of qualifications he brings to the consideration of the important subject of which he treats.

Instead of Protestants having superior claims to impartiality and fairness because of the dogmatic certainty of the Catholic faith, most people would decide precisely the reverse. When people are in possession of truth which is absolutely certain because revealed by God, and when they are equally certain that that faith must infallibly triumph, because God has promised that it shall, surely they can better afford to be impartial and fair in the consideration of all questions connected with it, than people who are doing battle for their own private opinions, the bantlings of their own brain. All facts justify this argument. Protestants, as a rule, are far more in-

tolerant in the advocacy of their various religious whimsies, at all events, in their contradiction of Catholic truths, than Catholics in their advocacy of dogmas of truth which they know have been revealed from heaven. History and contemporary events agree in their testimony to this effect. There needs but a hint of the horrors worked at Rome by the German Lutherans under the traitor Constable Bourbon; of impoverished, bleeding, depopulated Ireland, with her three centuries of brutal Protestant persecution; of Scotland, wherein scarce a lay Catholic was left, and not a minister of the religion of the people, by a needy and base nobility, covetous of the property, of religion, and the poor, aided by the coarse and scurrilous lampooning of a degraded priest; of England, too, where for three centuries the ancient faith was not suffered to show its face. As regards the age in which we live, it is sufficient to ask:

Where is the Catholic country on the round earth in which the people of other religions have been treated as the priests, religious, and laity of the "Grand Old Church," as Mr. Thompson justly terms her, are being treated in Protestant Germany and Switzerland? Our "fair and impartial" author does not hesitate to adopt the ridiculously hypocritical pretext for these scandalous persecutions, that Catholics in those countries are rebels against the civil power. Switzerland may be passed over in silence, as unworthy of serious notice. There it was an open, violent Freemason assault on religion generally, as well as on the Catholic Church, in which all concern for legal form and observance was lain aside. But in Germany, every one knows, Mr. Thompson included, and every honest man acknowledges, that the position was expressly made for Catholics. Laws were hurriedly passed by a despotic government, under the glamor of intoxicating military successes, which it was known the conscience of Catholics would not permit them to obey, in order to force upon them an unavoidable attitude of opposition to the law. The temptation of Catholics does not lie at all in the direction of intolerance, or of partiality and unfairness in their estimate of facts and subjects connected with their Holy Faith. They have not a shadow of a doubt or of an uncertainty about the exact and precise dogmas of truth which God requires them to believe and to mould their lives upon, on peril of the loss of their souls. They know that God revealed those dogmas by His only begotten Son, present on earth in a human body as Head of the Church; and that, since His ascent into heaven and the descent of the Holy Spirit, He preserves them and will preserve them until the end of time, by him whom He made His vicar in the headship of that portion of His mystical body which is still militant on earth.

It is strange how completely at sea Protestants, and unbelievers

generally, are as to the very meaning of the word intolerance. They denounce us Catholics when we tell them that the Catholic confession is the only true Christian faith; that whatever professed Christian doctrine differs from it ever so little is false, *on that account*; that if we are to be saved by what we believe, it is impossible God should have left us in doubt as to what that belief is by which we are to be saved, and without any authority to declare infallibly what we are to believe; that Protestantism is false both in its matter and method: in its matter, because its statements are conflicting, and because they differ from those of the Church; in method, because instead of obedient subjection to authoritative teaching, which is essential to faith, it is the proud assertion of private opinion, human reason raising itself up against its divinely appointed teacher, which is the exact opposite of faith. But this is not intolerance. It is the mere assertion of our conviction that our faith is a divine revelation. It is not intolerant to assert positively that there is a God, and that whosoever says there is not is a fool. The fact is, when Protestants accuse us of intolerance on this score, they logically deny, in many cases without intending it, that the Christian faith is a divine revelation. They are in the meshes of "a strong delusion," invented by the Old Serpent to lead man to the fancy that he can cheat God out of the humility He demands as a requisite to salvation, and that he can attain heaven by the very pride which originally cost him Paradise and immortality.

It is *too great tolerance*, we repeat, which is the great snare of Catholics. The Catholic religion is the only one—and no stronger testimony to its divine origin exists,—which provokes the bitter hatred and hostility of all who reject it, and more particularly of the worst of mankind. "This is the truth, and the *only* truth—walk ye in it!" Hence those whose faith is weak, or temperament timid, or charity lukewarm, are tempted to compromise and make concessions, not unseldom to an extent perilous to religion. Indeed this very circumstance has called into existence what may be called "a party," to which the name "Liberal Catholic" has been injudiciously¹ conceded, whose perniciously tolerant principles His Holiness has several times formally condemned.

¹ This careless concession by Catholics of names to things which are the very opposite of those they rightfully designate, affords another illustration of the too tolerant temper which the certainty of their faith is apt to nourish in Catholics. To term a deed that equals, if it does not surpass, in criminality the betrayal of Christ by the arch-traitor Judas, "the Reformation;" ministers of sects calling themselves Christians, who do not even pretend to an apostolic succession, "bishops" and "priests," or the sects "churches," and so on, is, in a sense, a denial of the faith. We have heard it urged in apology, that the adoption of these euphemisms for crimes and misnomers of things does no practical harm, since all Catholics know them to be misnomers. But this does not meet the difficulty. "Words are to hide our ideas" is an irony on the

Protestantism, on the other hand, is from a similar necessity of the case, intolerant, partial, and unfair in all subjects connected with the Church, her history or doctrine. It is not denied that there have been writers who would claim the name of "Protestant," in so far as the word means "not Catholic," who have displayed a tolerant, fair, and impartial spirit in treating of the doctrines and practice of the Church; Keith, for example, or Macaulay, or Tytler, or, pre-eminently, that most engaging of historians, Ranke, who nearly equals in impartiality our own Audin. But it has been at the expense of Protestant principles. For, just in proportion as a man is a sincere and fervent Catholic, is he tolerant, fair, and impartial, and so just in proportion as he is a sincere and fervent Protestant—protester, that is, against the Catholic Church, for that is the meaning of the term—is he the reverse.

Protestantism, when the gates of the Sanctuary were first closed against it, when it was cut off from the fellowship of the faithful, by reason of the leprosy of apostasy with which it was befouled, was possessed by a quasi-religious mania. In its ravings, the infallible and indefectible Church, founded on Peter, was the harlot of the Apocalypse which deceiveth the nations. Rome—Christian Rome—was that city Babylon of whom it was written, "*Facta est habitatio dæmoniorum, et custodia omnis spiritus immundi, et custodia omnis volucris immundæ et odibilis. . . . Exite de illa populus meus; ut ne participes sitis delictorum ejus, et de plagis ejus non accipiatis. Quoniam pervenerunt peccata ejus usque ad cælum, et recordatus est Dominus iniquitatum ejus. Reddite illi sicut et ipsa reddidit vobis; et duplicate duplicia secundum opera ejus; in poculo quo miscuit, miscete illi duplum.*" Hostility to the Catholic Church is thus a

insincerity of men, not an axiom of truth. To use names which imply the very opposite of what we mean seriously, on important matters, is falsehood. If I call Judas Iscariot "a patriot" or "liberator of the human race," who is to suppose that I *mean* "an abject traitor?" If I call a great historical event "a reformation," who is to suppose that I *mean* the greatest calamity inaugurated by the greatest criminal of modern days? A priest is a man endowed with stupendous supernatural powers, whose exercise is generally necessary for the eternal salvation of the human being; a bishop is a yet more exalted member of the Christian hierarchy, because he confers those powers, and, by delegation from Christ's Vicar, the jurisdiction necessary for their exercise. By what principle of truth or common honesty can I call Protestant ministers by those titles when I know they have not a shadow of a pretence of a claim to them? Besides, it is not so certain that the judgment of the Christian multitude is not confused, nor their knowledge darkened, nor even their faith weakened by this wholesale free-and-easy concession of false titles and names of persons and things. But if it were, we have all the multitudes of Protestants to consider, whose conversion should be a consuming desire of our souls. It is impossible but that they should be misled by this adoption by Catholics of their terms. The devil is never more successful than when he presents himself as an angel of light. Surely every Catholic should shrink from helping him on with his disguise!

ratio existende of Protestantism. Upon no other principle has it any right to exist at all. If Protestants are consistent with their own principle, it is their *duty* to be intolerant of Her. The coarse lampooning and gross abusiveness of Luther were suited only to the atmosphere of the rum-shop he was in the habit of frequenting. No decent publisher in these days would allow his name to be affixed to such low and calumnious ribaldry as defiles the pages of John Knox's history of his own times. The very street *gamins* would be above employing such voluble abuse as is contained in the book of Homilies of the sect established by law in England, a series of discourses containing an authorized exposition of the doctrines of that sect for the use of its ministers. And Messrs. Harper & Bro., of New York, keep up a supply of the article in the day in which we live, slightly subdued to suit the less violent temper of the times.

Nor are partiality and unfairness, even to falsehood, in matters connected with the Church less characteristic of Protestantism than intolerance of Her. No one now doubts that in order to lend a shadow of plausibility to the Protestant theory of the Catholic Church, it was indispensable to have recourse to wholesale lying; and the so-called *reformers* lied without stint. It is only an unvarnished statement of fact to say that Protestantism was born of a lie, was cradled in lying, was brought to maturity by lying, and now, that a general diffusion of information is exposing the deception, it is rapidly disappearing. Indeed, save amongst a multitude of uninstructed old women, mostly of the feebler sex, it can scarcely be said to have any further existence *as a religion*. All the robuster minds, which insist on an intelligent conviction, excepting such as have submitted to the Church, are practically materialist, and either avowedly or tacitly disown a divine revelation.

For a striking and vivid illustration of the point we are insisting on, viz., that a temper of tolerance of people in error—not of error itself—of impartiality, and fairness, is a natural result of the dogmatic certainty of the Catholic faith (we have made no allusion to its being also the supernatural outgrowth of the charity which is its vivifying principle), let any one sufficiently acquainted with history, and especially Scotch history, if he would form a competent opinion on the subject, read first Knox's *History of the Reformation in Scotland*, and then, bearing in mind that those bishops were dignitaries of a religion which had been that of their country ever since its evangelization, and which was being violently dispossessed by a needy and traitorous nobility, whose chief agent and tool was a degraded priest, with whose character¹ and ante-

¹ It will be found amongst the publications of the Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh.

cedents the Catholic bishops were acquainted, read any one of the Episcopalian annalists of contemporary events, Leslie's, for example. The pages of the former he will find stuffed with coarsest abuse of the highest personages of the realm, more particularly of the young queen and her admirable mother, Mary of Guise; from end to end of the latter, he will not find so much as one harsh epithet addressed to the criminals who had rebelled against their fair and youthful sovereign, assassinated the ablest and the most patriotic statesman Scotland had ever known, and were endeavoring to stamp the faith of their fathers out of their land.

The line taken by Mr. Thompson in his most disappointing work has thrust upon us the necessity of treating this part of the subject at some length. With a legal adroitness to be expected rather from a pettifogging attorney than from an impartial investigator, such as in his preface he represents himself to have been, he endeavors to invalidate by anticipation any Catholic reply to his production; which an impartial criticism compels us to pronounce a bulky jumble of errors, misrepresentations, and ignorance, of the most startling description. He represents us Catholics as incompetent witnesses in our own case. He endeavors to put us altogether out of court. What are his reasons? Let us hear him:

"In the claim of impartiality and fairness in all such matters (the dogmas of the Catholic Church in so far as they have been employed to influence the civil policy and action of government), the advantage is on the side of the Protestant.¹ Roman Catholic writers are led, almost universally, by the very nature of their Church organization, into intolerance and dogmatism. They are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has done or taught from the beginning is unerringly right and true. They do not employ their individual reason or judgment to examine for themselves, but are content to accept whatsoever is announced by ecclesiastical authority. Since the recent decree of the Pope's infallibility, this authority is all centred in him. He is made incapable of error in all that he has declared, or shall hereafter declare, in the domain of faith and morals, and every member of the Church wins equal infallibility for himself only by the acceptance and promulgation of this doctrine.

"Not so with the Protestant. He appeals to reason, examines history for himself, weighs both evidence and argument, and exercises his own intelligent judgment in separating right from wrong, truth from falsehood. While the papacy demands implicit and passive obedience—the entire submission of the whole man by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality—Protestantism encourages and develops this sense by treating every individual as endowed with the faculty of reason, and as possessing the right to employ it for himself. Manifestly, he who does not do it is mere clay in the hands of the potter."

This passage may be taken as an average specimen of the acquaintance with the subject of which he treats, the consequent clearness of thought, and the cogency of argument, which dis-

¹ What advantage in these respects is on the side of Mr. Thompson we shall presently see.

tinguish this "tolerant, fair, and impartial" Protestant writer. If this be the result of his "appeal to reason," "examination of history for himself," "weighing both evidence and argument," and "exercising his own intelligent judgment in separating right from wrong, truth from falsehood," of which he so magniloquently writes, we can only say that it is impossible to overstate the advantage it would be to the writer himself, and to any he may influence, if he were "mere clay in the hands of the potter." One stumbles over a really clumsy error in nearly every line. Immediately after the statement of the proposition, we are confronted with the vulgar confusion of intolerance with dogmatism which we have already animadverted upon. Of course Catholics are dogmatic in the confession of their faith. How could that faith be a divine revelation without being dogmatic? Protestantism is not a divine revelation because it is not dogmatic. The Catholic faith is dogmatic because it *is* a divine revelation. No doubt a dogmatic divine revelation is intolerant of error, in the sense that the very statement that it is a divine revelation is at the same time a statement that whatever contradicts it is false.

But Mr. Thompson condescends to avail himself of the popular misapplication of the word. It may be he shares in it himself, for his knowledge appears to be but scant and superficial. Originally employed by Protestants as a term of reproach for the dogmatic certainty of the Catholic faith, its meaning has been gradually changed into that of forcing the Christian faith down unwilling throats, in season or out of season, *vi et armis*. But this is an offensive signification, alike unjust and untrue, and one which the Church utterly repudiates. She knows that the truth she teaches cannot be advertently rejected without the loss of the unbeliever's soul. It would, consequently, be inhuman of her not to use every means and all means that may be expedient to insure the acceptance of that truth by every living creature. But the means she employs are limited by that consideration. She does not profess any respect for the license of private opinion on subjects out of private opinion's competence; and wherever she had the power, and it should otherwise, in the interest of charity, be expedient, she would hinder by legal penalties the *teaching* of unbelief. But she would never deem it expedient, for it is opposed to her doctrine, to attempt to force the conscience of any one. She might, where she had the power and it was expedient, visit apostasy with penalties, because she would thus be helping weak and unstable souls to persevere. But she would never seek to force any one to believe. *Cui bono?* It would not be faith if it were not voluntary. Faith is a moral choice, although the gift of God; and an involuntary moral choice is not in the categories. There is here, no doubt,

certain intolerance, but it is not the intolerance which unbelievers and Mr. Thompson have in their mind when they charge it upon the Church. She is the divine teacher commissioned by God to teach men the truth by which they are to be saved, and intolerance of any hindrance to their acceptance of her teaching is the fruit of the divine charity which is her life. Unbelievers are perverse in denying this. It is a logical inference. It is true that unbelievers cannot be intolerant in this sense. Not any religion, school, or philosophy pretends to say, "This is God's revealed truth; whatsoever contradicts it is false." Intolerance of any differences of opinions on their part would consequently be the arrogance of pride and headiness of self-conceit. But unbelievers should not charge the Church with pride, because they themselves are not in possession of infallible truth.

But the utter confusion and vagueness of thought, incorrectness of expression, and ignorance of the subject on which Mr. Thompson writes, exhibited throughout the passage we have quoted, are not less remarkable than the writer's deficiency in the argumentative faculty. What does he mean by asserting that Catholics "are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has *done* or taught from the beginning is unerringly right or *true*?" There is not a Catholic in the wide world goose enough to maintain either of these propositions. Does not Mr. Thompson profess to have by him the decrees of the Vatican Council—there is nothing to hinder his having them, anyhow—and has he to be taught at this time of day that the infallibility of the Pope has nothing whatever to do with anything he may do or have done? Also that everything Popes may have taught is not necessarily infallible, but only what they may have taught under the precise limitations prescribed by the Council. Their infallibility is, as it were, an infallibility *quoad hoc*. The limitations are three-fold, unless we regard the fourth as a limitation. I. That the Roman Pontiff must speak in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians. II. It must be by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority. III. It must be a doctrine regarding faith or morals. And the fourth is, that he must define the doctrine to be held by the Universal Church.

In the use Mr. Thompson makes of this doctrine throughout his work it is impossible, without doing violence to every instinct of probability, to believe him to be in good faith. Thus much he appears to know and to admit, that the Pope's infallibility is limited to questions of faith and morals. Here, however, it is possible for him to be in good faith. Even Mr. Gladstone, a ripe scholar and hard thinker, has allowed his reasoning powers to be so dwarfed by vindictiveness as to share this ridiculous travestie of the gifts of

infallibility. That illustrious statesman,—*quam mutatus ab illo!*—he too infers from the Vatican definition of infallibility the absolute serfdom of Catholics—mind, heart, and conscience—to the Papal authority. He argues that only the “dregs or tatters of human life” can escape from the domain of faith and morals, and that, because obedience is expected of them in “the domain of all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church,” “every convert and member of the Pope’s Church places his loyalty and civil duty at the mercy of another.” Mr. Thompson, with the wonted extravagance of scantily informed persons in this hoax of 700 pages he has palmed on the literary world—for which whether we note the complete ignorance of history and of the subject he writes on it displays, its stolid repetition of stale and oftentimes refuted accusations, or its poverty of thought and senility of argument, it is little more—carries this ridiculous *non sequitur* of Mr. Gladstone out of all limits of common sense. It is the refrain of his burlesque indictment of the Church of all ages. He chants it forth at every step in monotonous iteration; and on the strength of it he labors in the teeth of facts staring him in the face, to force upon the more ignorant of his readers, with as small concern for mutual peace and brotherhood as for truth or reason, the odious conclusion, that all the Catholics of this republic, who constitute about one-fifth of the entire population, are bound by their faith, whether they like it or not, to work for the subversion of the political institutions of the country. Mr. Gladstone did not, of course, carry out his inference to such a preposterous extent as this, but he did argue quite as illogically, that the doctrine of Papal infallibility places “the loyalty and civil duty of Catholics at the mercy of another;” but even this he afterwards repudiated. The inexorable logic of Father Newman forced upon him the reluctant acknowledgment of the unreasonableness of the proposition which his unmanageable temper had led him to propound.

It is but a poor compliment to a man of the mental calibre of Mr. Gladstone to compare with him the author of the volume we are criticizing, who carries on to a yet more ridiculous extent the illogical extravagance into which a moment’s petulance had betrayed the latter. His notion of Papal infallibility is, that every time the Pope opens his mouth he is infallible. According to it, were he to forward a presentation copy of his own work to Pius IX, and his Holiness were to reply, acknowledging the receipt of the pasquinade he had done him the honor of forwarding to him, and thanking him for the amusement it had afforded him, Catholics would have to receive the letter not only as right and true, but as an infallible utterance. An alleged letter of St. Leo to the Emperor Maximus he quotes as an infallible pronouncement. “It is here

given," he says in a footnote on page 270, "that the reader may see the sentiments of the papacy, expressed by one of the greatest of the *infallible* Popes." The italics are Mr. Thompson's. And this is only one out of a whole multitude of equivalent instances.

But even this is not enough to satisfy his malevolence against the Church of Christ. Ignoring, with the jauntiest nonchalance conceivable, the decree of the Vatican Council which defines the doctrine, he writes on the monstrously absurd assumption that infallibility is ascribed by it to the very actions of the Pope. There is something so incredible in this stupendous absurdity that we feel bound to show that Mr. Thompson is really guilty of it, by quoting one or two illustrative passages out of the many scattered throughout his work. He asserts this senseless proposition roundly in the passage we have already quoted: "They (Catholics) are always ready to assume, without investigation or inquiry, that whatsoever the papacy has *done* or taught from the beginning, is *unerringly right* and true" (p. 4). The italics in this quotation are ours. In the rest of the passages we shall quote, they will be Mr. Thompson's. At page 100 he informs us that those Catholics "who, without belonging to the Order (the Society of Jesus) had been educated by it, were constrained to approve the act (of its dissolution by Clement XIV.) because it was done by an *infallible* Pope, who could not err." At page 105 he writes of the rehabilitation of that glorious apostleship of the faith of Christ. He "announced that, notwithstanding all that Clement, an *infallible* Pope, had said and done, it would henceforth (thenceforth?) be considered an act of 'audacious temerity' for any one to 'oppose' *his infallible* decree." Now it is notorious that every Catholic is at liberty to condemn the suppression of the Jesuits by Clement as an ill-judged concession to a set of self-seeking despots. Every Catholic is equally at liberty to regard it as a timely yielding to avert greater calamities, and its restoration by his successor as an act of evangelical wisdom and justice. But it needs the combined ignorance and malevolence of this unscrupulous compiler of second-hand thoughts, and second and third-hand perversions of history, to maintain that the doctrine of Papal infallibility requires Christians to believe that either of these Popes were "*infallibly right*" in what they did, or that these or any other Popes were or are infallibly right in any action whatsoever, excepting in so far as an *ex cathedra* declaration, as defined by the Vatican Council decree, may be considered an action.

At page 275, deriving, as usual, his historic lore from an unscrupulous calumniator of the Church, he alleges that Boniface II. "convened a council in the Church of St. Peter at Rome, and had a decree passed allowing him to designate his successor. Having secured this extraordinary power, in violation of the universal prac-

tice of the Church, he appointed one whom he required the bishops to recognize 'by oath and in writing.' This was, of course, infallibly done, without the possibility of error. But another council was soon after convened, and this decree was set aside, when Boniface cast his own infallible (!) bull into the flames."

We are not for the present concerned with Mr. Thompson's history. We are limiting ourselves for the moment to the notion of the doctrine of Papal infallibility he has, or affects to have, and the use he makes of it.

At page 365, after representing, still on the authority of Cormenin, the efforts of Gregory IV. to make peace between the weak son of Charlemagne, who had succeeded to the Frankish portion of his dominions, and his children, as fiendish and absolutely motiveless expedients for providing a justification for the excommunication of Louis, he writes: "Thus he succeeded in drawing away the troops from the Emperor, and after the Pope left the camp they went over to Lothaire, who made Louis prisoner, deprived him of his crown and royal robe, and made himself Emperor of the West and King of France, all of which was directed and consecrated by this base and perfidious Pope, whose conscience was not bound by either vow, pledge, or oath, however solemn. He was, nevertheless, *infallible!*"

Now this lying caricature of a holy Pope *might* have been deserved. However improbable, it is not impossible. This perversion of history might have been as true as it is false. But had it been so, can we believe Mr. Thompson to be sincere when he affects to believe that it would disprove his prerogative of infallibility? But we must not transfer Mr. Thompson's work to our pages. *Quantum sufficit.*

There are times when he writes more like a madman than a man in his sober senses. At page 115, in a passing notice of an able appeal to Americans by Father Weninger, S. J., entitled *Protestantism and Infidelity*, we find the following passages:

"From such men liberalism finds no quarter. They exhibit nothing higher or nobler than that supercilious air of imagined superiority which roots out every generous faculty of the mind, and leaves its possessor an object of mingled pity and contempt. . . . Here is a foreign priest, sheltered by our laws, who clenches his fist and shakes it in our face, daring to tell us that we will (?) 'do better' to let the car of the papacy, with Jesuit conductors, roll unresistingly over us, for if we do not we shall be punished, after the manner of Galileo, for our excesses of religious hatred."

All this raving because Father Weninger, not caring for the nonce to avail himself of the *tu quoque* arguments, had suggested to Protestant controversialists the prudence of being somewhat chary of producing the case of Galileo in proof of the alleged persecuting spirit of the Church, lest Catholics should "be forced" in their turn

"to inquire into their own excesses of religious hatred,"—a poor specimen of which we hinted at in the commencement of this article. Yet only on the preceding page he had professed the readiness of all Protestant Christians "to meet Catholic apologists" in the field of fair discussion.

But even this looks almost tame and rational by the side of the following from his criticism of the same writer, which is the last quotation illustrative of Mr. Thompson's qualifications for the work he has attempted, with which we shall amuse our readers :

"His overanxiety to assail Protestantism rendering him oblivious to the fact that his own Church, and the Order to which he belongs, *both* teach that popes and priests may sin, and yet remain the *infallible* representatives of God; and may be guilty of all the impurities of life, and yet administer *infallibly* all the Sacraments of the Church." (The italics are our own.)

So much for Mr. Thompson's intelligent appreciation of the doctrine of Papal infallibility!

In reply to the ridiculous use he makes in this last quotation, of what is really a Catholic doctrine, we would merely ask him in passing: Was the commission of the famous British Admiral Nelson null and void because he was one of the unchastest of men? Would all the ministerial acts of the late President have been invalidated if all the charges made against his moral character had been true? It would indeed be a sorry lookout for us humble Catholic laymen, who are trying hard to serve God and save our souls, if all the absolutions we suppose ourselves to have received, and all our communions, have been invalid because of the unworthiness of the human beings through whose consecrated ministration God communicated them to us. That may do for Protestantism, whose ministers have nothing to communicate but "talkee, talkee," but not for the Church whose ministers convey "the new life," the gifts of the Holy Ghost, forgiveness of sins, and the very Body and Blood of Christ to the faithful.

Mr. Thompson may object that he cannot be expected to be versed in all the subtleties of Catholic doctrine, and that he announced at the beginning of his book that he "had not undertaken to discuss mere points of religious doctrine, or to treat of the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church, except in so far as they have been employed to influence the civil policy and action of governments." Be it so; but, not to insist here on the fact that there are no subtleties in the obligatory faith of Catholics, will he inform us how he can possibly know the effect of a doctrine, of which he is so profoundly ignorant, on the civil policy and action of governments, as we have shown him to be of the doctrine of Papal infallibility?

This gentleman's argument is so vague, loose, and confused, and

at the same time, as is generally the case with such argumentation, so exceedingly ponderous, that it is not easy to give a comprehensible sketch of it. According to our lights, however, it is somewhat such as the following :

His mind would appear to be possessed with a *notion*—for it has neither the precision nor the consequence of a “belief,” or even of an “opinion”—that there are two religious phenomena which civil society has to deal with ; one, a Christian organization, which, in its present actual form, is the Roman Catholic Church, whose influential principle and animating spirit is “ultramontanism” or “Jesuitism;” the other, a school of thought, which, because its fundamental and inspiring idea is a protest against the Roman Catholic Church, has received the name of “Protestantism.” Respecting the former, he apparently adopts the nonsensical “view” of what is called the “high-church” party, in the English Episcopal sect, that the true and pure Church of Christ survived only about four centuries. Closing his eyes upon the, one would have thought, not unimportant fact of the wholesale persecution of Christians all over the world throughout almost that whole period of time, he assumes that the “early Church,” as the “branch-theory” Christians call it, or, as Mr. Thompson styles it, “that grand old Church,” was in complete harmony with the civil power. Here Mr. Thompson is as inconsistent with himself as are all writers who write from the “Protestant standpoint” (p. 3) of passion and prejudice, instead of from an unbiassed love of truth. For if the imperial and local persecutions of the first three or four centuries of the Church are no proof of the antagonism between it and the civil power during those ages, by what pretence of reason can he allege her modern persecution by German despotism as a proof of any such antagonism now? The Anglicans fix, we believe, upon the Council of Nice as the event which suspended the existence of “the early Church” until that auspicious moment when Henry VIII., in a sudden zeal for adultery, superseded the spiritual authority of Christ’s Vicar throughout his realm, and substituted for it his own paternal and patriarchal jurisdiction, recalling thus to a renewed existence that “early Church,” which had disappeared from human view for eleven centuries, in the form of the Reformed Protestant Church of England, under the headship, first of Pope Henry VIII. and afterwards of the reigning sovereigns of that kingdom.

Mr. Thompson adopts the “view” of the high-church Anglicans as to the time at *about* which “that grand old Church,” like the celebrated slave of Pythagoras, bade farewell to human ken, and began to assume the form of “Ultramontanism” or “Jesuitism;” but he considers the endowment of the Holy See with temporal Lordship by the great Christian empire as the proximate cause. From that

moment, according to him, a spirit opposed to Christianity—a spirit of ambition and worldly pride—took possession of “that grand old Church,” or as, in this connection, he calls it, “then the only visible sign of Christianity” (p. 283). Upon this subject, however, he departs somewhat from the high Anglican “view,” and is not a little cloudy in his own. For in another chapter he seems to date the claims of the Holy See to temporal power from the moment, some four centuries afterwards, when Pepin, the Frankish monarch, ordered the territory on the Italian peninsula which he had recovered from the Lombards “to be surrendered to the Pope in the name of the See of Rome” (p. 330). Whether, however, Mr. Thompson would date the disappearance of “that grand old Church” from the benefaction of Constantine or of Pepin, the next point of his argument, in so far as there is any order in an argument so inextricably confused, is that from one of these events, or both, arose those claims to ecclesiastical supremacy and temporal power, which have been successfully urged “by fraud and usurpation,” through, in round numbers, the fifteen centuries on the one hypothesis, and the ten on the other, which have since passed, until the culmination of those claims in the Syllabus and the Vatican decree of Papal infallibility, and the complete metamorphose in “Ultramontaniam” or “Jesuitry.”

Having thus proved to his own complete satisfaction, *apparently*, on the strength of a motley array of a multitude of historical scraps collected from the most rubbishy authorities, most of them anti-Catholic, and which he offers to the reader as historical testimony, that the existing faith and organization of what was once “that grand old Church,” are the product of fraud and usurpation, Mr. Thompson proceeds to the one object of his indictment, namely, to arouse a spirit of enmity and hostility against all those citizens of this republic who are members of what the *New York Herald* truly described a few weeks ago as “the largest Christian denomination on earth,” in the breasts of as many of the rest of the community as will allow themselves to be influenced by his absurd but malevolent representations. For this purpose he labors to prove that the actual Catholic Church, both in its faith and organization, is essentially, actively as well as passively, in conflict with the political constitution of these States, the inference being, that since the State cannot suffer to exist within it a power which is compassing its overthrow *delenda est Ecclesia*.

It must not be supposed that what argument there is in this work is presented in the regular and logical form we have given to it. On the contrary, it is an *olla podrida* of arguments, based for the most part on false premises, and illogical both in substance and in form. The writer tells us in his preface that “such

are his habits of thought,—possibly from professional training,—that he has taken but little for granted; but, in order to exercise an intelligent judgment as far as possible, has examined and weighed all the evidence within his reach, as he would that bearing upon any controverted point about which he can have no personal information.” This, however, is merely the exordium of a lawyer who endeavors to prepossess the jury he is addressing with a sense of the sincerity of his convictions; and the soundness and competence of his judgment, in order that they may be disposed to *take all he urges upon them for granted.*

It is, indeed, easy enough to detect the effects of his “professional training” throughout the whole of this wordy indictment of the Catholic Church. There is nothing in it at all resembling the solid learning and important weighing of evidence of an honest and able judge. We need only an ingenious *ad captandum* concoction of evidence so as to make out the strongest case against the defendant. He has pressed into his service Catholic doctrines, which, either from ignorance or design, he distorts to suit his purpose, as we have shown in the use he makes of the doctrine of Papal infallibility. From modern history he culls every incident which can be made to tell against the Catholic religion. When, as is mostly the case, facts fail him, he avails himself of inventions; and as his own knowledge of history is too limited to admit of his trusting to his own inventions, he draws *ad libitum* on the inventive resources, not of Protestant writers only, but of free-thinking and ostentatiously anti-Catholic writers, such as Michelet, About, etc. For his principal supply of this second-hand ware he seems to have depended chiefly on Cormenin, a Freemason, who, commencing life as an Imperialist under the first Napoleon, first opposed and then accepted office under every succeeding form of government. From this writer, who wrecked in his *History of the Popes* whatever reputation he had earned by his professional writings, he quotes no less than a hundred and two times, although even he, with the best will in the world to avail himself of every misstatement having even the slightest appearance of plausibility, is forced to admit at times the untrustworthiness of statements which he nevertheless quotes.

Mr. Thompson is not adroit enough to conceal the animus that inspires him, nor his own consciousness of the weakness of his cause. The most disreputable evidence of this is the disingenuous expedient he has constant recourse to, of quoting the calumnious statements against the Church and misrepresentations of history of anti-Catholic writers, and then constantly insisting that his authorities are Catholic, with such tiresome iteration as in itself to

provoke a suspicion in the reader's mind that were the fact so it would not need such constant repetition. Thus he serves Cormenin,¹ thus Dupin, who was deposed from his chair at the Sorbonne for Jansenism, who attempted a reconciliation with the English sect at the cost of the sacrament of Penance, religious vows, the Lenten Fast, the supremacy of the Holy See, and the celibacy of the clergy, he himself having broken his own religious vows in regard to the latter. Thus he serves About, whom he calls a *Gallican* Catholic, the editor of a revolutionist newspaper, and a pronounced "anti-clerical," to use an epithet now popular with anti-Catholics. Thus, too, even Michelet, if our memory does not betray us.

In the course of his labored arraignment of the Church of all the ages, a number of side issues are raised which would require a volume to refute. In fact, he traverses the whole area covered by the faith and discipline of the Church, prying here and there and everywhere, if so be he may, by all means or any means, find aught whereby to conjure up an anti-American phantom under the abused nickname of "Ultramontanism" or "Jesuitry."

To follow him over all this ground would be obviously impossible in the pages of a periodical. Neither would it be desirable, if it were practical. The bulk of his statements consists of re-served-up follies of Protestant writers of the uninstructed class, which have been disposed of times out of number. We shall therefore devote the remainder of this paper to exposing one or two more of the most startling of his doctrinal absurdities, giving a specimen of his historic lore, and sketching succinctly the actual relation, in these days, and especially in this country, of the Church to the civil power.

We must bear in mind Mr. Thompson's threefold object in his attempt to institute a distinction between "that grand old Church" and the same Church as she now exists, which he describes as "Ultramontane and Jesuitical." He appears, however, in the confusion of his thought, to be under the impression that "that grand old Church" is, after all, by no means extinct, but exists in the persons of a large number of the laity, who are overridden and tyrannized over by an "Ultramontane and Jesuit" hierarchy. In which supposition we should have to look for what survives of "that grand old Church," in the "condemned liberal Catholic party," a

¹ He incautiously lets out in a footnote at p. 367 that the disingenuity and untruthfulness of this expedient is advertent and deliberate on his part. He admits by implication that he quotes him as an authority opposed to Catholic testimony. His words are: "In the chronological table of the Popes published by *the Church*, they make Leo IV. Pope up to A.D. 855, and Benedict III. his successor. But did he die in 853, as *Cormenin* asserts, or live until 855, as the *Papists* assert?"

view quite original, and in which he will not find many adherents. He aims evidently at fostering a spirit of discontent with their rulers in the minds of such Catholics as are infected with the revolutionary principles of the age, at making it appear that his violent and ridiculous attack is not upon the Catholic Church but upon what he calls "Ultramontanism" or "Jesuitism," and at inciting a people proud of their toleration of all religious opinions to open hostility to the Church, on the pretext that such persecution would not be directed against the Church, but only against a system of "fraud and usurpation" which takes the name of the Catholic Church.

Perhaps the most foolish of all the propositions, by the help of which Mr. Thompson hopes to effect his object, is that "the papacy demands implicit and passive obedience; the entire submission of the whole man, by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality" (p. 4). Again at p. 76 we read: "Thus the personality of the believer is merged in the superior personality of the Pope." These bold assertions may be taken as average specimens of the random manner in which he discourses of serious subjects. His "professional training" may have made him more or less of a proficient in *ad captandum* appeals to the ignorance, passions, and prejudices of his fellow-creatures, but it has not improved his reasoning faculty. He either does not know, or, if he does, he ignores the elemental law of logic, that an equivocal term in either of the premises vitiates an argument. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. If the meaning of the subject of a proposition is uncertain, it means nothing; and from nothing nothing can be inferred. The word "personality" is an equivocal term with a vengeance. If his proposition had been: "The worthless personality of a Mason who has broken the secrecy by which he is bound disappears inevitably and without mercy from the offended craft," no fault could have been found with it, because the context in which the term "personality" occurs fixes its meaning. But in the proposition we are criticizing, and which the author uses for the purpose of exalting Protestantism at the expense of the Universal Faith, it has simply no meaning at all; whereas, if any definite and correct meaning be assigned to it, the proposition is as hopelessly false as any proposition can well be.

The "personality" of a man is the possession, in their maturity, of all the faculties necessary for the guidance of his actions as a responsible being. A leaf, or a tree, or a flower, or a mosquito, has not "personality." It is true, no two leaves, or trees, or flowers, or any two of the lower animals are identical; but this is individuality, not "personality."

If there be one thing which more strikingly than another char-

acterizes the teachings of the Universal Church, it is her respect for the human personality thus understood. If Mr. Thompson can supply a more clear and accurate definition, we invite him to do so by all means. Even his *bête noire*, the Society of Jesus, whose priceless and self-sacrificing services to the highest interests of mankind all over the earth, he labors to obscure in the untutored balderdash of his nonsensical denunciation, rigidly as it requires the surrender of the individual will of its members in obedience to superiors, stops short at the "personality" of the individual. Amongst the questions demanded of the candidates for the Order is the following (*Constitution of the Society of Jesus*, part 3, c. i.; *Inst. Soc.*, t. i., p. 373; *Exam.*, c. 4, § 29; *De l'Existence et De l'Institut des Jesuites*, par Le R. P. de Ravignan): "Are you determined to obey your superiors, who stand in the place of God towards you, in all things wherein *your conscience would not be wounded by sin?*"

There is not a priest in the Catholic Church, even of the most moderate theological attainments, who would not unhesitatingly counsel a penitent that the salvation of his own soul is his first concern, to the exclusion, if necessary, of every other anxiety; and that the salvation of the souls of others can only come second to it.

The truth is, all this talk of "the personality of the believer merging in the superior personality of the Pope" is sheer, unmitigated twaddle, and it is extremely difficult not to believe that Mr. Thompson knows it be so. What must we think of an educated man, a member of a learned profession, gravely maintaining so childish an argument as that the *infallible* Pope condemns some of the principles on which, according to Mr. Thompson, the American Constitution is founded; and, inasmuch, as the infallibility of the Pope is a *de fide* doctrine, all American Catholics must be disloyal citizens? Mr. Thompson ought to know, what we have already urged, that the Papal infallibility is only *de fide* within the limits assigned to it by the definition itself, which does not even lay it down that the Pope is infallible in all his utterances even within the domain of faith and morals, but only when, within that domain, he speaks as pastor and doctor of the Universal Church.¹ Mr. Thompson shows that he has no confidence in his own arguments, by admitting that the bulk of the Catholic laity are as loyal citizens as the followers of other religions. We suspect, however, that readers possessing common sense will be more impressed by the testimony of things *as they are* than by Mr. Thompson's assertions of what they ought to be consistently with his own hypothesis.

¹ The writer purposely abstains from the use of scientific or technical phraseology. He addresses merely the common sense of the ordinary reader, and endeavors to write only what all such may readily understand.

He accounts for the actual discrepancy in the following manner:

"While assigning these purposes to the Pope and his hierarchs, however, we should not fail to keep in mind the distinction between Roman Catholicism, as a system of religion, and the papacy as an all-absorbing religio-political power, founded upon human ambition. Nor should we forget that distinction which exists to a great extent, especially in the United States, between intelligent Roman Catholic *laymen* and the priesthood."

Rather, we should bear in mind that a man who makes assertions in flat contradiction of universally recognized facts deserves an epithet which politeness forbids us more plainly to specify. Here is a writer foreign to the Catholic Church, who has never drank of her spirit, who knows nothing of her inner life, nothing, or next to nothing, of her doctrine and discipline, gravely putting forth a gratuitous invention which is contradicted by facts so obvious as to admit of no denial nor explaining away. This very fabulous distinction has been alleged by the German Attila as a protest for the most brutal persecution with which the Church has been visited since the days of her baptism in blood, if we except the short demoniac outbreak which preceded the French empire, and the three hundred years' persecution of Irish Catholics by Protestant England. Yet, never in the history of the Church was there a time when the complete union of the Catholic laity with the priesthood, and of both with the Holy Father of the faithful, was more strikingly manifested. The hundreds and thousands of pilgrims, laics, priests, bishops, who flock by hundreds and thousands, day by day, at an infinite cost of time, toil, and money, to pay their loyal homage at the foot of the pontifical throne, and to pay to the pastor and doctor of the Universal Church this striking tribute of their affectionate sympathy in his brave defence of that supremacy of the Holy See, which the world calls Ultramontaniam, give the lie to the preposterous distinction attempted by Mr. Thompson.

We fear, however, that we must turn the tables on Mr. Thompson. Not only is it not contradicted by manifest facts, but it is strictly and literally true, that the doctrines of "the spirit of the age," or "modern ideas," or "the spirit of progress," or whatever the proper name be by which we are to call the prevailing political and moral heresy, do demand "the entire submission of the whole man, by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality." We will take the "craft" of Masons, for example, that powerful—for evil—organization, which, as far as present extent goes, may be considered as universal as the Church, and which is the great propaganda of modern ideas. A candidate for admission into that society is obliged to bind himself by a solemn oath that he will never reveal secrets, of the nature of which he knows nothing before the oath is taken; and he makes over his life, which is not his to give, to the un-

known chief of the society as the penalty of breaking it. More than this, his oath binds him to obedience to superiors in all that concerns the welfare of the order, so that if he should be selected to take the life of a *brother* for revealing Masonic secrets, he is compelled to obey, or forfeit his own life. If this is not "the entire submission of the whole man, by the sacrifice of all his sense of personality," we know not what is. The Society of Jesus leaves the personality of its subjects free, for they are not bound to obey in anything that is against their conscience. The obligations of a Mason may compel him to become a murderer; and no one can commit murder with a clear conscience. In good sooth, all the moral instincts and obligations which go to make up a human personality, those of a husband, father, son, brother, or friend, have to yield before the superior obligation of the welfare of the "craft." The tenderest ties of relationship will not excuse any one for refusing to carry out the behests of the society.

The political philosophy of that arrant knave and many-headed deceiver, "the spirit of the times," or as it dubs itself with grotesque complacency, "modern enlightenment," of which Masonry is the parent, demands a similar merging of the personality of *every one, believer in it or unbeliever*, in the State. Its babble about liberty of conscience and toleration of all religions is the veriest humbug imaginable. It is forward enough to tolerate, or to encourage rather, any amount of private speculation on a subject which is beyond the competence of human reason, and wherein there is *no assertion* of "personality." But let the personality assert itself, and precisely there where its living force is the most unquenchable, in the conscientious convictions of dogmatic and most certain religious belief, its most solemn obligations are required to conform to the State indifferentism, which is miscalled toleration. The education of the child by the parent, the creation, so far as rests with him, of the "personality" of his offspring, is taken out of his hands by the State, which forces him, by all the power it can exert, to be an outraged spectator of the moulding of his child to those principles of religious indifferentism which can only be professed by individuals to their eternal ruin. The rod, which an inspired writer tells us it is a neglect of parental duty to spare, is rudely snatched from his hand, and he is prevented by the intolerant and tyrannical usurpation of the State from bringing up his children in that spirit of reverence for constituted authority, without which not only cannot a man be a good Christian, but he cannot be a gentleman, nor even a civilized being.

In that most holy and tender relationship on which civilized society hinges—that union of man and wife which symbolizes the mystical union between Christ and the Church—the State even yet

more violently endeavors to submerge in itself the personality of the citizen. The sacramental, and therefore indissoluble, nature of the sacred tie, belief in which is a part of the necessary faith of a *real Christian*, it wholly ignores, nay, it makes laws to which it demands the submission of all the citizens which falsely deny it, treating marriage as a civil contract which it can make and unmake at its will. This is a power beyond any the Pope ever claimed. Christ's Vicar on earth as he is, and supreme within the domain of faith and morals, he does not pretend to encroach on the human personality.

In States where these principles of "modern enlightenment" have had full swing, so violent have been the usurpations of the "personality" of Catholic citizens in particular, that persecuting edicts have been obliged to be enacted in the vain hope of compelling its absolute surrender to the State.

When Mr. Thompson calls the preaching of the Gospel by the Church in discharge of the divine commission—"Go ye and teach all nations. . . . He that believeth and is baptized shall be *saved*, and he that doth not believe shall be *damm'd*"—demanding the merging of the personality in the Pope, he does not know what he is talking about. It is, on the contrary, an invitation to the noblest, freest, and most august assertion by the individual of his personality. "Because you have seen Me you have believed, Thomas. *Blessed* are they who have not seen, and yet have believed."

Another of Mr. Thompson's flagrant allusions, on the strength of which he hopes, if he really believes what he writes, to create a prejudice in the minds of the American people against the Church is, that it is obligatory on Catholics to believe that every other form of government but the monarchical is unlawful. He maintains this ridiculous proposition throughout his work, and with the confident assurance which almost invariably characterizes the writings of men who are not versed in the subject on which they write. The following two quotations will be sufficient to satisfy our readers that we are not ascribing to his pen follies it has not traced:

"According to the *teachings of Rome*, governments *de facto* are those which have been established by the people upon the overthrow of the kingly authority, which is considered *the only legitimate authority*. Governments *de jure* are such as are based upon the law of God, *with kings at their head*, who shall obey the Pope as the highest authority upon earth. In this view all Roman Catholic *monarchies* are governments *de jure*, and therefore legitimate, while all popular republics are governments *de facto*, and therefore illegitimate" (p. 580).

Again :

"Recognizing no other form of government *except the monarchical as consistent with the divine law*, Pope Pius IX. and his hierarchy do not hesitate to declare, in the face of the world's progress, that every other form of government is revolutionary and usurpation" (p. 585).

It is really humiliating to have to reply to such childish twaddle as this. The Church has no teaching whatsoever as to the form of secular governments. She has not even a preference for any particular form. She is profoundly indifferent whether it be an absolute monarchy, an oligarchy, or a republic. She teaches only that it is the first duty of every government to aid her in her work of saving souls. Every Catholic is completely free to advocate whatever form of government he prefers, and every good Catholic will prefer that civil polity by which this duty is most faithfully discharged.

The only civil government which has sincerely and completely obeyed this fundamental obligation of all governments in modern days has been a republic—the little republic of the Equator. The government of this country is *de facto* incapacitated from following so noble an example, in consequence of a large majority of the citizens being unbelievers. But it does the next best thing. It conscientiously preserves for the Church a fair field and no favor, which is all she can expect under existing circumstances. It does not, of set purpose, impede her in her work of saving souls, as is done in Italy, Switzerland, Germany, England, Mexico, France, and other countries, monarchical and republican. The only exception to this is the public school system, and this is not an advertent impediment thrown in her way by the State. The few infidel doctrinaires who propagate the principles on which it is founded, have succeeded in persuading the unreflecting multitude that a merely secular education is the greatest boon that can be conferred upon a citizen, and they have made the State provide one for them. The result has been a general demoralization not to be met with in any of the old European monarchies. This demoralization will continue increasing until, very probably, all in whom the moral and religious principle is not extinct will join the only Christian community with a creed and a morality, and the Church will be asked to undertake the conduct of the public schools for the salvation of the State. Then would begin to return among our youth reverence of parents, of age, and of constituted authority; chastity and modesty would begin once more to be regarded as virtues; between man and man once more fair dealing and scrupulous integrity would begin to be held in more honor than the possession of wealth, and honor and patriotism in the administration of public affairs would begin to be preferred to dishonest self-seeking and personal advancement. Already has the State shown a disposition to make the system as acceptable as possible to Catholics, and it need not be doubted that it would go farther in this direction, but for the "sectarian" efforts of such noisy and empty clamorers as Mr. Thompson and his like. The various impediments offered to the

Church by President Grant in the matter of the Indian missions and in other ways, do not diminish the force of what we have here urged. They were the proceedings of an individual only—a mere soldier—who labored to further the self-seeking and hypocritical aims of Methodism at the expense of the principles of the Constitution, of which he was the supreme executive. His unconstitutional policy, in other matters as well as this, have not been indorsed by the American people.

Before taking a farewell of this portion of Mr. Thompson's pre-tentious rhodomontade *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*, we will dispose of all his stage rant in laudation of modern "views" in the domain of political and social philosophy by one quotation from the works of one of the greatest of German linguists, scholars, and thinkers, a Protestant throughout the longer period of his life, but whose profound erudition, aided by a disposition which enabled him to co-operate with the grace of God, led him subsequently into the fold of Christ.

We will first, however, give a specimen or two, selected at random, of Mr. Thompson's stump oratory, and with which his book is interlarded from the beginning to the end.

"The two systems stand in direct antagonism with each other. The Protestant has separated the State from the Church; the papal proposes to unite them again. The Protestant has founded its civil institutions upon the *will of the people*; the papal proposes to reconstruct and found them upon the *will of the pope*. The Protestant secures religious freedom; the papal requires that every man shall give up his conscience to the keeping of ecclesiastical superiors. The Protestant develops the faculties of the mind by inciting the spirit of personal independence and manhood; the papal crushes out all this spirit by its debasing doctrine of passive obedience and submission. The Protestant has put the world upon a career of progress and prosperity; the papal desires to arrest the career, and turn it back into those old grooves which have led so many nations to wreck and desolation" (p. 53).

We have faithfully retained in this quotation Mr. Thompson's amusing distribution of capital letters. It will be seen that Protestantism—that grand system of progress backwards, three centuries old—he honors invariably with a capital letter, but the insignificant Papacy, and the servant of the servants of God himself, he equally invariably fobs off with a little p.

"It (Protestantism) saved religion by separating it from the corruptions of the papacy, and thus providing for the world a purer and better form of Christianity; it saved society by breaking the sceptres of kings and popes, and elevating the people to the point of asserting and maintaining their natural right to liberty" (p. 58).

"By their (the framers of our American institutions) training in the school of Protestantism they were imbued with the courage to defy both the authority and the machinations of those who claimed the 'divine right' to govern. Their careful study of the history of nations (?) enabled them to comprehend fully the necessities of their condition. They realized how abject mankind had become in those countries where Church and State were united (they have, however, been united in Protestant England

ever since the apostasy of Henry VIII.), and with this experience to guide them, signalized their efforts to frame a new government by dissolving this union as an unnatural and corrupting one" (pp. 67-8).

"At the times when these examples were set, the bulk of the European people were in a state of profound ignorance, and it was essential to the 'divine right' of absolutism that they should be kept so, for in their ignorance they were taught by ambitious, cunning, and corrupt priests to believe that the pope was *equal to God*. (The italics are Mr. Thompson's, as if to emphasize this clumsy falsehood.) While this delusion lasted they dared not resist a king or priest, however tyrannical, who had the pope's indorsement, for that would have been considered a violation of God's commands, and punished by excommunication and anathema. Hence these kings and princes were careful to obtain this indorsement, and the popes were equally careful to see that the light of intelligence was shut out from the popular mind, so that by a continuance of the delusion they could share between themselves the government of the whole civilized world. They must be bold and presumptuous men who ask us, as these Jesuit missionaries do, to exchange the present condition of our affairs for that they so fondly picture—to undo what the people, acting for themselves, have so nobly done in resistance to misgovernment and tyranny, and plunge in blind submission, and at a single bound, back again into mediæval times" (p. 126).

"With this distinct explanation of the politico-religious faith promulgated by the infallible popes, and sanctioned by a general council, before us, we can fully understand the Encyclical and Syllabus of Pius IX., and should be at no loss to tell what Archbishop Manning meant when he said, '*the hated Syllabus* will have its justification,' and 'would have saved society!' Its justification will be found in the complete wreck of all the Protestant and non-Catholic nations whose people are to be saved from themselves by being made the degraded and miserable subjects of the papacy. And then, when the Jesuit shout of gratified revenge shall go up from Rome, and the *débris* of shattered popular government shall be lying all around, the temporal sword will be drawn 'at the will and pleasure of the priest,' and he who shall dare to question that all this is the will of God, will be racked in every limb by the tortures of the Inquisition, or consumed by its re-kindled flames" (p. 224-5).

But enough of this doting. Let us hear what Frederick Schlegel has to say about the subject.

"In the transition from the Carlovingian to the Capetian dynasty, we should not forget that the monarchy was not strictly hereditary in any German State, but was for the most part merely elective; and it was only he who had proved himself a valiant, prudent, and powerful defender of his nation that became the man of the public choice. Royalty was then considered more in the light of an office, a charge, a peculiar calling, than of an inheritance or patrimony. The general idea of the Christian empire was a universal protectorate over all Christian nations and countries—a mighty central dominion founded on justice, while the great connecting and pervading power of the whole system was supposed to reside in the perfect unity of religious principles. When this religious unity was destroyed, the whole political edifice fell to pieces; and in the struggles of later times, the artificial relations founded on a mere mechanical balance of power on a republican equality of states, without the foundation of Christian or any other solid principles, have furnished, as experience has shown, but a very bad substitute for that old Christian brotherhood of the European states and nations, and have, in the general subversion of Christian morality, produced a sort of polite disorder and refined anarchy" (*Philosophy of Hist.*, by F. von Schlegel, Lect. xii., *ad finem*).

If it be impossible for even the most indulgent charity to excuse Mr. Thompson's perversions of Catholic teaching on the plea of ignorance, what shall be said of the gross fictions which he would palm upon the reader as history? We had hitherto thought that

John Knox's autobiography—for such in fact is his *History of the Reformation in Scotland*—to be the most lying history in existence. He has found a superior. Mr. Thompson possesses an even greater facility for misrepresenting and for inventing facts, and he is deterred by no scruples about the truth of his material, nor even by the obvious improbability of his statements to any ordinarily informed reader. He has evidently himself never been a student of history, so that all the knowledge he has is second-hand; and even for this second-hand information it is clear to us that he is indebted to the lower class of Protestant controversialists. Who but such ever heard of such historical authorities as Cermenin, on whom he chiefly draws, Dr. Cumming, Fox, Gilbert, Fry, etc.? And yet again, his quotations from these even he has evidently borrowed from some obscure book of Protestant controversy, for he constantly uses in his footnotes, absurdly enough, the learned word *apud*. Thus we have *apud* Gillet, *apud* Cumming, and so on. We do not say that he never borrowed from more respectable authorities, but it is only when he supposes they help him to make out his case, or he can make them appear to do so. It would be idle to specify any particular passages in support of our criticism; we can only imitate his learned style, and inform the reader that they are to be found *apud* Thompson *passim*. To refute them by historic evidence would require a work longer than his own, if it were worth the while. We will, however, give a few specimens of our author's historic lore.

There is one species of falsehood which crops up in almost every page of this foolish production. It is that of ascribing to the actions of saints, popes, bishops, religious orders, kings, and historic personages generally, without a shadow of a proof, and upon his own mere *ipse dixit*, as if he were merely chronicling what is universally admitted, the basest motives—motives which wholly change the significance of events. Is there a perverse and vicious monarch seeking to tyrannize over his people, it is the Pope using him as the instrument of his ambition. Does an Archbishop defend the liberties of the people against royal insolence, it is still the Pope wishing to create disaffection between the sovereign and his subjects. Pious kings who live in accordance with their faith are “imbeciles;” immoral betrayers of it are heroes and champions of liberty. If an outraged people rise in defence of their religion, they are “insurrectionists” moved by priests and monks, rebels, and what not. At the same time if an unbelieving monarch persecutes the faithful, he does so “with tears in his eyes,” or he has to deal with “ambitious and proud ecclesiastics.”

His whole account of the Society of Jesus—his *bête noire*—is prolonged and, we are compelled to say, advertent falsehood. The

Order is not exempt from error, nor are all its members saints. We must look for human infirmity there as elsewhere. But its services to religion and to the race are inestimable. Few in number, the services they have rendered to the cause of education cannot be overestimated. They devote untiring and self-sacrificing zeal to the salvation of souls, according to their motto, *ad maiorem Dei gloriam*. Wherever blood must be shed in this holy enterprise, there shall we meet with Jesuit missionaries and Jesuit martyrs. Do the world, the flesh, and the devil rise up in unholy insurrection against the Church of the living God, the Jesuits are its first and foremost victims. On the banks of the Paraguay they founded, of savages whom, at the sacrifice of many Jesuit lives, they had converted to the faith of Christ, a *freer republic* than any "modern enlightenment" ever dreamed of; where the affairs of life were conducted in mutual love, where crimes were almost unknown, and where temporal prosperity kept pace with the innocence of the citizens—a veritable Utopia. Forbidden by the constitution of the Society from accepting ecclesiastical dignities, no views of personal advantage can impair the merit of their untiring toil, mar their lofty purpose, or divert the singleness of their aim. Of such sort is the Order which a writer who professes "fairness and impartiality" describes as an organized *secret* (!) society—"the most secret society on earth" he calls it—laboring in collusion with the Pope, to bring mankind into a condition of "abject slavery." This glorious Order, founded by a converted soldier who gave up a brilliant position and all worldly hopes and goods for the love of Jesus and of his fellow-creatures, of which such men as St. Francis Xavier, St. Aloysius, St. Stanislaus, were the product, he charges with the murder of a Pope, with teaching immorality, with "subverting the morality of the Gospel, and substituting their immoral maxims for religion," with endeavoring to destroy all the "fundamental laws which form the basis of all states and governments!"

This is enough to give the reader an idea of the kind of stuff of which his historical appreciation consists. We will now, in conclusion, single out a few of the multitudes of instances of his so completely falsifying historical incidents in support of his fabulous indictment of the indefectible Church of Christ, that they become sheer inventions and fictions. Whether the inventions are his own, or he has borrowed them from some of the vulgar repertoires of anti-Catholic slander which play so important a part in keeping up the Protestant delusion among the uninstructed multitude, and of all of which *The Papacy and the Civil Power* may be regarded as an elaborate compendium, it is not for us to decide. The criminality is alike in both cases.

At p. 98 he deliberately asserts, writing of the suppression of

the Society of Jesus by Clement XIV., with as unshrinking positiveness as if it were admitted fact, that "by this act of condemnation such a degree of odium was stamped upon its character that the *people everywhere held it in execration*;" that "the expulsion of the order from France, Spain, Portugal, and Sicily,—all Roman Catholic governments,—the hesitation of Clement, his careful and deliberate investigation of the charges made against it, and the overwhelming proofs which forced him to conclusions he had manifestly endeavored to avoid, all go to show *an amount of turpitude which is without parallel elsewhere*."

At p. 100 we read: "The Jesuits, by the immoral tendency of their doctrines, and *the many enormities perpetrated by them against government, society, and individuals*, had become so unpopular throughout Europe that their suppression gave great and almost universal satisfaction." And again at p. 102: "On account of the *extreme contempt* in which they were held in all the Roman Catholic States, they were compelled to seek refuge elsewhere. *Their iniquities were so great and were so well understood that there was not a single Roman Catholic government in Europe that would tolerate them*. They found shelter only within the dominions of Frederick the Great of Prussia and Catharine of Russia."

Now Mr. Thompson might have learned from any reputable Protestant historian, that the suppression of the great Society by Clement XIV. was due exclusively to the political pressure of a family of kings who wished to deprive the people¹ of the only defence against their tyranny, the Papacy, by gathering into their own hands the spiritual as well as the temporal supremacy. It was the old struggle which the Church had maintained at intervals and in different kingdoms, ever since the time of Charlemagne, and the Jesuits, who were indifferent to themselves and cared only for "the

¹ It is worth the while to note here one of the absurdest of the many absurd inconsistencies, not only with the facts of history but with himself, into which Mr. Thompson rushes in his blind and venomous hatred of Christ's Holy Church.

The gravest of all the charges which he brings against the Jesuit Order, as it is most extravagantly absurd, and the one on which he looks to making it the most obnoxious to the American people, is that it holds as an article of faith that all civil institutions except monarchical ones are illegitimate; and that it and the Pope are engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow republican institutions throughout the world. This is the refrain of his dismal jeremiad. He recurs to it again and again throughout his work with all the bombastic iteration of stump oratory. Yet here we have him making it a proof of the iniquitous doings and principles of the Order that they had made themselves obnoxious to all the kings of Europe; whilst the only Pope of whom he treats, for whom he has no words but praise, because he suppressed the Society of Jesus, is precisely that one whose veneration for the kingly office was carried far beyond that of any Pope who ever lived, and should have made him in Mr. Thompson's eyes, had his bitter hatred of the Catholic Church allowed a spark of consistency to remain within him, a greater criminal than all the Popes put together.

greater glory of God" and the salvation of souls, saw the imminent danger and would not budge an inch. True, the peace of Christendom was threatened, but it was by the Bourbons, not the Jesuits. To charge it on them is precisely the same as the course adopted by the secret societies in the present day, who, in Catholic countries in Europe, organize mobs of rowdies to attack pilgrims on the way to their devotions or processions of the Blessed Sacrament, or other religious processions, and then accuse them of causing public disorder. The predecessor of Clement positively refused to purchase peace at the price of injustice. If Clement yielded at last to the threats and bluster of the Bourbon autocrats, it was not that he believed himself to be doing an act of sovereign injustice, but because his mind was involuntarily biassed by the coldness of feeling, to express it very mildly, which he shared with his Order towards the Jesuits, chiefly on account of differences of opinion, not, we need scarcely say, on *de fide* doctrine, but on questions of scholastic philosophy. The Society yielded to the decree of the Pontiff with uncomplaining obedience. The Bourbons have been driven *forever* from their thrones and kingdoms, with the exception of a lad of a branch of the family not entitled to the throne, who has been allowed quite lately to have the show of reigning in Spain; the Jesuits were restored after a very short interval, and enjoy at this moment greater influence and consideration than ever.

At p. 108 Mr. Thompson has the effrontery to give the following as a quotation from the "provisions of the constitution of the Society of Jesus:" "No earthly authority can involve an obligation to commit sin, mortal or venial, *unless the superior command it in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.*" The italics are Mr. Thompson's, but we also wish to direct especial attention to the words. He gives them in inverted commas as the very words of St. Ignatius, pledging thus his truth as a writer to that effect. Now the *real* words of St. Ignatius, translated literally by the celebrated Father Ravignan, are as follows:

"Dans toutes les choses auxquelles l'obéissance peut s'étendre avec charité (c'est à dire *sans péché*) soyons aussi prompts et aussi dociles que possible à la voix des supérieurs, comme si c'était la voix même de Jésus Christ notre Seigneur; car c'est à lui que nous obéissons dans la personne de ceux qui tiennent pour nous sa place. . . . Portons-nous donc avec grande promptitude, avec joie spirituelle et persévérance à tout ce qui nous sera ordonné, renonçants par une sorte d'obéissance aveugle à tout jugement contraire; et cela dans toutes les choses réglées par le supérieur, et *ou il ne se trouve point de péché.*"¹

¹ To the extent to which obedience may be rendered *with charity* (that is to say, *without sin*), be as attentive and as docile as possible to the voice of superiors, for it is Him we obey in the person of those who *stand in his stead* towards us. Let us, then, be forward to obey whatever may be enjoined upon us, with spiritual joy and perseverance, renouncing by a kind of blind obedience every conflicting opinion, and that in everything laid down by the superior, *and where there is not sin.*

The last specimens we shall quote of the inventive fertility of this writer, in so far as the Jesuits are concerned, are the following:

"The passions of the order were of course aroused to exceeding violence, even to such an excess that the pope himself, although the *infallible* (Mr. T.'s italics again, as though the meaning of an infallible Pope were a Pope who cannot do anything wrong or hold any mistaken opinions) 'Vicar of Christ' did not escape their vengeance. They published malicious libels against him, charging that he had been guilty of simony in procuring his election, and calling him by the opprobrious name of *Anti-christ*" (p. 101).

It is the practice of the Jesuits not to defend themselves against calumny. Following the example of Him whose sacred name they bear, they are "dumb" before their detractors "as a sheep before its shearers," and we challenge Mr. Thompson to bring forward a single passage from any Jesuit writer in confirmation of the above statement. Again:

"Although one of the articles of their constitution forbade the members of the Order from the acceptance of any dignity, and another recommended holy poverty as the bulwark of religion, yet there were among them twenty-four cardinals, six electors of the empire, nineteen princes, twenty-one archbishops, and one hundred and thirty-one titular archbishops, and their aggregate wealth amounted to £40,000,000 sterling, the enormous sum of \$200,000,000."

Neither Mr. Thompson nor any one else out of the Order has the means of knowing the value of the possessions of the Jesuits, and in retailing this improbable statement he must think people are easily duped, to accept it without any proof, but on his mere *ipse dixit*. But if it were true as it is fabulous, what violation of their rule of poverty would there be in it? It would not have altered their daily rule of life, nor would a cent of it have gone into the pocket of individual Jesuits. No Jesuit—and our assertions are made on the strength of personal knowledge—can call even a suit of clothes his own. It is true, as Mr. Thompson says, the rule of the Order forbids a Jesuit to accept ecclesiastical dignities; and he cannot do so unless bid by his superiors. Nor is such a command ever given except under circumstances of urgent necessity and duty. It would be very difficult to disprove Mr. Thompson's statement, nor does the burden rest on us of doing so; but, looking at its innate, absolute improbability, and at the utter disregard of truth manifested throughout his work, and in the absence of a particle of proof, we denounce his list of Jesuit dignitaries as an impudent fabrication.

It would be impossible within the limited space at our disposal to give even a mere naked list of one tithe of the extravagances and absurdities which this writer perpetrates in the name of history, and this with an unwinking complacency, untroubled with a doubt or a misgiving, for all the world as though he were infallible and speaking *ex cathedra* himself. Of the Emperor Constantine he writes (p. 250-51): "Although he convened the first Council

of Nice, dictated the most material part of his creed, and made it the measure of orthodoxy by his imperial decree, yet he deferred his own baptism and union with the Church until just before his death, in 337, when he received baptism at the hands of an Arian and heretical bishop. He was, therefore, never a Roman Catholic at all, but according to the present teachings of that Church *was always a heretic*, and not a Christian, unless a man can possess both characters at the same time." (See also pp. 286-87.)

There are nearly as many errors as words in this sentence. It is possible for a man to be a Roman Catholic in intention. A man is not necessarily a heretic for deferring his baptism, nor for being baptized by a heretic.¹ The sacrament is as valid administered by a heretic as by the Pope himself. Constantine did not *dictate* any part of the creed defined at the Nicæan Council; nor did he *make it the measure of orthodoxy*, unless supporting the definition of the Church by the secular arm is making it the measure of orthodoxy. He deferred his baptism from an overwhelming horror of the guilt of sin after baptism; to which his busy and warlike life and the glittering seductions of his exalted position exposed him, and he, improperly, no doubt, deferred his baptism in order that he might carry his baptismal robe spotless before the throne of his Redeemer, not unmingled, it may be, with a lack of courage to renounce sin. But that Constantine was not a Catholic by conviction, was never a Catholic at all, and that the immense services he rendered to the Church, and the deference he paid to her, are altogether to be ascribed to "worldly motives," and to a policy of worldly ambition, Mr. Thompson, at any rate, is not a likely person to convince us.

At p. 436 we find: "These legates called two synods, one of which met in Mercia, and was attended by King Offa in person; and the introduction of this papal code *as the law of England* was, under his influence, consented to. . . . Into what a condition of humiliating degradation, therefore, was England dragged down when the *nation* and *people* were laid at the feet of the papacy!" This of a time when the southern half of what is now England and Scotland was occupied by seven or eight different tribes of invading Saxon pirates, each with its separate king, or chief, and before there was such a place as England in existence! It is not before the year 800 that England begins to give any sign of its existence on the political horizon.

Altogether, Mr. Thompson's historical information is in the

¹ His baptism by Eusebius of Nicomedia, which Mr. Thompson adduces as a universally acknowledged historical fact, is now generally held to be apocryphal. No proof exists that he was ever baptized at all. Neither is proof forthcoming that he was never baptized.

highest degree original, and is so irreconcilably at variance with what we have hitherto innocently received as history, that either his or ours must be a myth. At pp. 436-39, he informs us that the Saxons did not drive Christianity out of Britain. The mission of St. Augustine must consequently have been a work of supererogation. That after the Saxon conquest, Saxon and Briton, pagan and Christian "mingled together in friendly association, so as to impress each other with their respective sentiments and opinions!" That "their (the Saxon) religion was pagan; yet after their conquest of England, there is no evidence that they ever interfered with that of the native Britons until after their kings yielded to the influence of Rome!" To what event he refers he does not tell us; and with a gravity which is quite comical, he makes this statement in the teeth of the fact that all that remains of the British religion and hierarchy had been driven to take refuge in Brittany and at Bangor; and that the latter were exterminated at a blow by the Mercian chief, because they prayed for a disaster to the pagan arms. And he himself speaks of these very clergy at Bangor (p. 473) as "the first *martyrs to religious liberty!*" We had always supposed that the Normans were of the Teutonic race, and had originally, together with the Saxons, issued from the neighborhood of the Baltic. Not so Mr. Thompson. To him we are indebted for the original, indeed, unique ethnological discovery that the Normans belong to the Latin race, and that the effort of their kings "to eradicate all the Saxon influences in England, as far as possible, and substitute for them those of Norman origin," arose not, as has hitherto universally been supposed, in order to supplant the Saxon dynasty and customs in the affections of the people, but "to bring the country under the influence of the principle prevailing among the people of the *Latin race* in preference to those of *Teutonic* origin!"

After this, we may bid farewell to Mr. Thompson and his history. Before finally parting with him, however, we must quote if it be only a couple of examples of deliberate and calumnious misrepresentation for which the utmost stretch of charity can find no possible excuse:

At pp. 346-7 he represents Pope Adrian I., in a bull of excommunication of the Duke of Bavaria, as declaring "that the Franks were *absolved in advance* from all crimes they might commit in the enemy's country; and that *God commanded them*, through his Vicar, to violate girls, murder women, children, and old men, to burn cities, and put all the inhabitants to the sword."

This is evidently a wicked and calumnious gloss of his favorite Freemason author, Cormenin, but Mr. Thompson gives it as the *ipsissima verba* of the Bull, asserting as much in a footnote wherein

he is again for the dozenth time guilty of the falsehood and duplicity of giving Cormenin as *Catholic authority*.

"Such a bull as this," he writes, "would seem almost incredible, if it were not found in the history of a Roman Catholic author!"

Precisely the same disgraceful fraud he perpetrated in the following alleged letter from Benedict XIII. to his legates (p. 552):

"You will immediately recruit new troops to recommence hostilities, and to wash out, in the blood of the Hussites, the opprobrium with which your name is covered. Let no consideration arrest you; spare neither money nor men. Believe that we are acting for religion, and that God has no more agreeable holocaust than the blood of his enemies! Strike with the sword, and when your arm cannot reach the guilty, employ poison, burn all the towns of Bohemia, that fire may purify this accursed land; transform the country into arid steppes, and let the dead bodies of the heretics hang from the trees in greater number than the leaves of the forest" (p. 553).

The following he gives as the very words of a letter of Martin V. to Stanislaus V., King of Poland:

"Know that the interests of the Holy See, and those of your crown, make it a duty to *exterminate the Hussites*. Remember that these impious persons dare proclaim principles of equality; they maintain that all Christians are brethren, and that God has not given to privileged men the right of ruling the nation; they hold that Christ came on earth to abolish slavery; they call the people to liberty, that is, to the annihilation of kings and priests. While there is still time, then, turn your forces against Bohemia; burn, massacre, make deserts everywhere, for nothing could be more agreeable to God, or more useful to the cause of kings than the extermination of the Hussites."

He puts into the mouth of one of the holiest of the Popes—St. Gregory VII.—*on his deathbed*, the following words. Lest it should be thought incredible that any writer of these days should be so idiotic and false as to affix his name to such a statement, we quote the sentence with which he introduces them.

"After many varying fortunes, Gregory was enabled to drive the anti-Pope Clement from the throne, but he soon sunk under the tremendous load which pressed upon him, and in the year 1085 died, *uttering these words*: 'No, my hatred is implacable. I curse the pretended Emperor, Henry, the anti-Pope Guibert, and the reprobates who sustain them. I absolve and bless the simple who believe that a Pope has power to bind and loose'" (p. 406).

We have done with Mr. Thompson and his pasquinado. We had noted a multitude of other passages illustrative of his ignorance and untruthfulness. Our space has limited us to the few we have made use of. They are, however, sufficient to satisfy any one of ordinary intelligence and honesty that Mr. Hayes's Naval Secretary has neither the knowledge nor the dispassionateness of judgment, nor the regard for truth, requisite to form any opinion worth a moment's consideration upon *The Papacy and the Civil Power* generally, or in this country specifically. He has wasted a certain amount of time and pains, only to add a fresh contribution to the reeking pile of anti-Catholic libels.

We entered on the task of criticizing this worthless production in the sincere intention of treating it with all the courtesy and consideration in our power. We were fully prepared to find any number of those blunders which are inevitable to those not illuminated by the Faith, and those we should have endeavored to meet with calm and dispassionate argument. So early, however, as at the end of the preface, we began to fear we had to do with an ordinary anti-Christian railer rather than with a scholarly and dispassionate thinker; and we had not read a quarter of the book before we were so assured of the writer's *mala fides*, as well as of the remarkable ignorance it displays of history and of the subject of which it treats, as to conclude that the work did not merit any serious notice. The author, however, informs us in his preface that it "is not designed for the instruction of the educated classes, who have the means of making like inquiries for themselves. It is intended for *the people*, who, in the main, are without these means, and who are the final arbiters upon all public questions." This should have made him more conscientious; it appears to have made him less so. And, remembering the mischief that could not but be worked amongst people unable to detect his misrepresentations, ignorance, and false reasoning, we thought that a few pages would not be wasted in exposing his untrustworthiness and the worthlessness of his work.

We had intended to close our review with a few observations of our own upon the relations of the Catholic Church and the Constitution of the United States towards one another respectively. The length to which this paper has already extended has put this out of our power. The subject is important enough to require an article of itself.

THE PAPAL POWER AND ROMAN FORGERIES.

Roman Catholicism, Old and New, from the Standpoint of the Infallibility Doctrine. By John Schulte, D.D., Ph.D., Rector of Port Burwell, Ontario, Canada. Toronto: Belford Brothers, Publishers, 1876.

IN our last article we examined and refuted the arguments of Dr. Schulte against the infallibility of the Church. And as, by his own acknowledgment, the infallibility of the Church logically implies Papal infallibility, there would be no necessity for our pursuing the subject any further. Nevertheless, to redeem a promise then made, we devote a few more pages to his book. But instead of following him through his historical inaccuracies, or rather perversions of historical truth in regard to a few Popes, whose decisions he parades as conflicting and contradictory,¹ we prefer to take up an accusation, most foul and untrue, which he brings against the whole line of Pontiffs who reigned during more than six centuries, or about one-third part of the Christian era, viz., from the beginning of the sixth down to the compilation of the *Decretum* by Gratian, about the middle of the twelfth century. This is no other than the charge of systematic forgery, forgery not only encouraged but practiced by the Roman Pontiffs, with a view to bring about a recognition of the claims of the Papacy to temporal sovereignty and universal dominion. Let us hear Dr. Schulte.

"The next great step towards universal dominion made by the Pope, was his investiture with temporal sovereignty. Indeed, we may say that he possessed no real spiritual dominion until after he became a temporal prince. The Papacy was the outgrowth of favoring circumstances. . . . Not content with giving gold and silver, they (the converted barbarians) manifested their superstitious veneration for the clergy by conferring upon bishops, churches, and monasteries feudatory rights over whole provinces, cities, castles, and fortresses. This unwonted accession of wealth and power began with their head, the Roman pontiff, who not only gladly received, but claimed it as a right, adducing proofs from Scripture, and forged documents of former territorial donations. The temporal power of the Pope had its real origin in the unjust aid which Pope Zachary afforded to Pepin in dethroning Childeric, King of France, and usurping the crown for himself. Pepin, in order to attach to himself the powerful pontiff, freed him from the yoke of the Lombards, and conferred on him sovereign rights over the

¹ These pretended disagreements or contradictions between certain Papal decisions, have been long since triumphantly exposed and refuted by Cardinal Orsi in his answer to the *Defensio Cleri Gallicani* of Pseudo-Bossuet (we can give him no other name, for though the work was originally from the pen of the great Bishop of Meaux, he began it with great reluctance, then became ashamed of it and suppressed it, and having been found amongst his posthumous papers was distorted and falsified by his Jansenist nephew, and then published in its present form, with (perhaps) the false date of Luxemburg, 1730); by Zaccaria in many of his polemical works, especially those against Febronius; by the Ballerini Brothers, Marchetti, Cardinal Gerdil, and others.

Roman dukedom. . . . Nothing contributed more to the enlargement of the papacy than the investiture of the Pope and bishops with temporal sovereignty, for the Pope had now the means of enforcing his spiritual claims" (pp. 254, 255).

"From the time that it (the papacy) acquired the first beginnings of temporal sovereignty, we have to look upon it as a political institution, and to explain almost every step in its career on political grounds. Its history exhibits the worst features of intrigue, and the most unblushing knavery, displayed chiefly in the forgery of documents to sustain its enormous pretensions" (p. 256).

"It was not to be expected that so thorough a change in the government of the Church could be made without a certain amount of opposition. The bishops of Rome were aware that their word and authority alone were not sufficient to introduce the new order of things. They knew that they must produce ancient documents by which they might justify their course, and as there were no such documents in existence, they forged them" (p. 257).

First of all, that the Pope's spiritual has any dependence upon his temporal power, is one of those assertions which, by dint of repetition, may impose on helpless ignorance or wilful bigotry, but which will not stand the test of historical investigation. It is true, indeed, of some churches, that their spiritual headship is intimately connected with temporal rule. Of the Russian, for example, where since the days of Peter the Great a Permanent Synod, at the beck of its imperial chairman, dictates dogma and discipline for subservient millions; of the Anglican, too, where articles of faith and church government have passed from the royal hands of boys and women¹ into the keeping of the lay court of Arches. It is true of all churches founded by men. But it is not true of the Catholic Church and her Head, who have received their high commission, not from man, but from Him to whom "all power is given in heaven and in earth" (Matt. xxviii. 18). The exercise of papal power is no less conspicuous and wonderful in the early centuries when the pontiffs were the subjects of Pagan or Christian emperors, than in the middle ages when they possessed a small territory, and all Europe was Catholic. It is, no doubt, a noble and cheering sight to behold the Henrys, Fredericks, and other mediæval monsters crushed, for the welfare of religion and society, by judicial sentence of the Gregories and Innocents. But the real power of the Holy See shines out perhaps more brilliantly when seen in a Victor

¹ The Edwards and Elizabeths, to say nothing of so many royal profligates, of whom we have not seen the last in George the Fourth of that name. That noblest of women and queens, Mary Tudor, was on Anglican principles the true Head of the English Church; and putting together the Anglican maxim, "The king can do no wrong," and the Lutheran article of political faith, "Cujus est regio, ejus est et religio" (whoever owns the land, owns its religion), we see no pretext of logical reason why Anglicans should complain of the fires of Smithfield. If she had done nothing more than send to the scaffold the Cranmers, Latimers, Ridleys, and one or two more of such faithless traitors and hypocrites, it would have been well; but the wholesale execution of offenders of the lower class perpetrated in her name, and in many cases without her knowledge, by her renegade courtiers, who had no religion but that of their royal master or mistress (as it chanced to be), has cast its baleful shadow over her otherwise spotless memory.

(A.D. 198), who, from his hiding-place in the catacombs, threatens the disobedient churches of Asia with excommunication; in a Celestine (A.D. 431), who sends his legates to the general council with instructions that they are to abide no discussion, but sit there as judges of the assembled fathers;¹ in a Leo (A.D. 451), who, with a stroke of his pen annuls the canons of a general council;² in an Hormisdas (A.D. 519), who demands and obtains from the Eastern churches full unreserved submission to the decrees of his predecessors against Acacius, as the only condition on which they could be freed from the ban which had lain heavily upon them for more than thirty years.³ Yet these pontiffs, while speaking out with

¹ "Auctoritatem Sedis Apostolicæ custodiri mandamus: Siquidem instructiones quæ vobis traditæ sunt hoc loquuntur, ut interesse conventui debeatis; ad disceptationem si fuerit ventum, vos de eorum sententiis JUDICARE debeatis non subire certamen." (Ep. Coelestini Papæ ad Legatos, Concilior, Collectis, tom. iv.) "We command that the authority of the Apostolic See be maintained: for this is the tenor of your instructions, that you be present at the assembly; but if any discussion arise, you are not to enter the lists as disputants, but as JUDGES of what they (the bishops) shall say." This charge of St. Celestine to his legates is a most valuable document. It was unknown to Baronius, Bellarmine, and all our early Catholic controversialists, and was published for the first time by the great Gallican antiquary, Stephen Baluzius. In his preface to the first publication of Celestine's letter, Baluzius justly says (we quote from memory, and give his meaning without vouching for the words), "Cardinal Baronius, in his *Annals*, claims that Pope Celestine I. displayed the fulness of his authority in the whole proceedings at Ephesus. What would he not have said, had this document been brought to light in his day!"

² "What the bishops have agreed to we scatter to the winds, and by authority of St. Peter we utterly annul in all its bearings." "Consensiones Episcoporum . . . in irritum mittimus, et auctoritate Beati Petri generali prorsus definitione cassamus" Ep. cvi., ad Pulcheriam Aug. Opp. S. Leonis ed. Ballerini, Venetiis, 1753, tom. 1, col. 1157. These lofty words, which even now at the distance of fourteen centuries excite our admiration, could have proceeded only from an inherent consciousness of supremé power.

³ In the eighth volume of Labbe and Cossart's *Councils*, republished by Mansi (*Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, Venice, 1759-92), may be found all the documents connected with this affair. See especially the plaintive touching letter of the Eastern churches to St. Hormisdas, pleading for mercy on the ground that they ought not to be made suffer any longer for the sin of their fathers. There is no brighter chapter in the history of Rome's supremacy, than the extinction of the Acacian schism and the reconciliation of the Eastern Church with the Holy See under St. Hormisdas. Never did the See of Peter triumph more successfully over the jealousy, stubbornness, and perfidy of the Eastern patriarchs. Even the Lutheran, Schroeckh, is compelled to admit this, though he does his best to explain it away. "Er (Hormisdas) hatte wahrscheinlich diesen elenden Sieg, DEN GRÖSSTEN WELCHEN NOCH EIN MANN VON SEINER WUERDE ERFOCHT, der furchtbaren Stimmung vieler tausend Missvergnügten von den niedrigsten Klassen und Gesinnungen aus den Zeiten des vorhergehenden Kaisers zu danken, welche die neue Regierung schonen musste" (*Christliche Kirchengeschichte*, Leipzig, 1793, vol. 18, p. 541). The triumph of the Holy See, if "the greatest yet obtained" by one of its occupants, can scarcely with decency be called a "sorry" one. "Sorry," rather, or "shabby" is, we think, the proper epithet for the Wittenberg professor's attempt to belittle the strength of Catholic public opinion at that day, which compelled the Byzantine Court and Church to bow in submission to the will of the Holy See.

such royal energy, and exacting obedience from high and low, enjoyed no temporal rule. In our own day, Pius IX. has been robbed of his States by sacrilegious violence; but the whole world can bear witness that he has thereby lost no portion of his spiritual empire. Right-minded, honest men outside of the Church look with respect and admiration upon the mysterious power of this feeble, old man, who, at home, cannot command the service of a tipstaff, and whose voice nevertheless is obeyed throughout Christendom; who to all outward appearance is more of a prisoner than a monarch, and yet counts in every class and in every clime millions of willing and faithful subjects. Wicked and evil-minded men likewise (and they abound here as well as in Europe) give their reluctant share of testimony, and confess this wonderful power by the language of hate, scorn, ridicule, and frenzied declamation with which they assail it, and by the fear, real or pretended, which makes them hold it up as a phantom to evoke hostile legislation against the Catholic Church.

The Pope's temporal rule came to him in the order of Providence as the safeguard and warrant of his independence, that he might be truly free, and might be known as such in his government of the Church. But what guarantees his freedom in the use of his power need not be confounded with the source whence that power is derived. In all civilized nations, that possess legislative assemblies, human law has provided certain rights and immunities that serve to protect members of the legislative body in the discharge of their functions. But what would be thought of the shameless sophistry that should pretend to find in these privileges and immunities the origin of their law-making power? The States of the Church were admirably adapted to the purpose for which God granted them to His earthly representative. They were just sufficient to secure his independence; not large enough to gratify or encourage his ambition, or excite the fears of other princes whom he might hold in check by earthly interests, were he a formidable potentate or a dangerous neighbor. Had the Popes been ambitious of mere temporal lordship, they might in the middle ages have added to their territory by repeated conquest and negotiation, and extended their sway over the greater part of Italy. But a higher power than themselves guided their temporal as well as their spiritual and moral action in the world's history; and if in the long and venerable line of Pontiffs, extending over eleven hundred years, from Stephen III. to Pius IX., any one of them ever entertained such mad, ambitious scheme, it was either thwarted by the wisdom of his counsellors or overruled by the direct intervention of Providence. It is no idle phrase or rhetorical fancy, but an axiom full of truth and deep meaning, that Peter yet lives and

reigns in his successors, not only guiding and strengthening their faith, but shaping and controlling their earthly fortunes. Christ, our Lord, promised that He would be with the Apostles, and consequently *they* with Him, in their successors down to the end of time. Now every Apostolical See has perished but that of Rome. The accomplishment of His promise in its full literal sense is, therefore, reserved to St. Peter alone, who, with and through Christ, yet lives and reigns in his Roman successors. The Popes, as a rule, never have had an army sufficient to defend their own States from violent aggression or domestic rebellion. Hence so many of them have been conquered, imprisoned, and exiled by Roman nobles and petty Italian tyrants, or by such formidable invaders as were the sovereigns of Germany and France. And, as if Divine Providence wished to show unmistakably the difference of the two powers, temporal and spiritual, in the Pope, and that there is between them no mutual relation of cause and effect, the Pontiffs who have given to the world the most signal and successful examples of an extraordinary use of spiritual power, were precisely those who were most helpless and unfortunate in their temporal sovereignty. Such was the case of Gregory VII., one day bringing rebellious monarchs to his feet, and the next—defeated, exiled, and dying in a strange land. Why should we again recall the case of the present Pontiff? His power is as hateful and formidable to the greatest monarchy of Europe as it is to the “gates of hell,” over which his triumph is assured by the words of Christ in St. Matthew; and yet he is but a prisoner in his own Vatican and living on the alms of the Christian world. What then can be more unfounded than the assertion of our author, that the Pope’s investiture with temporal sovereignty enlarged the Papacy, because “the Pope had now the means of enforcing his spiritual claims?” (p. 255). What earthly means has Pius IX. of compelling the confessors of the Faith, who languish in German prisons or in hopeless exile, to bid defiance for conscience sake to Prussia’s unjust, unchristian legislation, and maintain intact their religious allegiance to Rome? None, surely. But the fact is there, clear, undeniable, and staring in the face the astonished irreligious world of our day! They could have ease, honor, and temporal rewards, if they would only fall down and worship Bismarck and his State-God; but St. Peter, or Christ rather, though again “a captive in His vicar,” raises a warning voice, and they welcome chains, exile, even death if need be, rather than falter in their loyal obedience to Peter’s successor. Let the enemies of the Catholic Church explain this, if they can. It will not do to pile up such contumelious words as superstition, ignorance, bigotry, ultramontanism. From men who boast of their homage to reason, which they have lifted up to the

place of God Himself, we are justified in demanding, not unmeaning words, but a *rational* explanation.

What Dr. Schulte says of the converted barbarians, who were full of "superstitious veneration," which in their ignorant bigotry they had transferred from their Druidical to their Christian priests, may do well for untutored Anglo-American ears. His lay namesake (from whom all his historical lore is borrowed), Dr. Schulte of the "Janus," would never have dared use such language before his enlightened countrymen, the descendants of those same "barbarians," some of whom have wasted their treasures of historical erudition and comparative philology in the fond attempt to trace back the national *Kultur* to the remotest antiquity.¹

Dr. Schulte is quite mistaken, or rather tries to mislead his readers, as to the origin of the temporal power of the Pope and bishops. They were under Heaven the rescuers and savers of human society and civilization, which but for them, as all candid Protestant historians are not slow to acknowledge, would have been hopelessly engulfed in barbarism and anarchy. It was not the grasping ambition of popes and bishops that dragged the people under their yoke; it was a feeling of gratitude and a lively perception of their own real interests that induced them to welcome the sway of the clergy in preference to that of sanguinary lay lords and rapacious barons. Guizot, after recounting some singular traits of wisdom and benevolence which marked the government of Pope St. Gregory, adds the general remark: "It is easy to understand why people were at that time eager to place themselves under the dominion of the Church; lay proprietors were certainly far from showing like solicitude for the well-being of the occupants of their domains."² Nor can there be any room for wonder that the happiness of "living under the crozier" should have passed into a proverbial saying.³

¹ "Le but des Allemands, nous l'avons déjà dit, est de faire parvenir directement sur leur sol et la langue et la civilisation. En repoussant la maternité de l'Inde, ils se pré-tendent les frères immédiats des envahisseurs de l'Inde. Pendant qu'une portion de leur race descendait vers le sud, eux apportaient la civilisation aux contrées d'occident." (Les Traditions Indo-Européennes et Africaines, par Louis Jaccoliot. Paris, 1876, p. 91.) What immediately follows is quite characteristic of the French infidel who displays his patriotism by his vulgarity. "Sous prétexte de science, les gens du pays de la bière ne solevant qu'une vulgaire querelle de race." These idle prattlers of the Simon and Gambetta school make a show of abusing Beer-land, but need not be trusted on that account. In their heart of hearts these blatant mock-patriots worship Bismarck, and to-morrow would betray their country to him without shame or regret, merely because he is the prince of the anti-Catholic world.

² Cours d'Histoire Moderne, tom. iv. p. 259. The feudal system (though without the name) had already begun in Europe.

³ "Unterm Krummstab ist gut wohnen." This proverb held good even among the ecclesiastical principalities of Germany down to a late epoch, down to the days of the Hontheims, Erthals, and Dalbergs, when the sees became (under the growing influence of the age of *Kultur*) nests of Jansenism, unbelief, immorality, and oppression of the

As regards the Pope in particular, nothing could be more upright and honorable than the manner in which he became a sovereign; nor is there any European potentate whose claims can compete for justness with those of Rome's Pontiff. The willing homage of a people whom he had saved and protected made him the ruler of temporal as well as of spiritual subjects, and would have warranted his title to sovereignty, even had a Pepin or a Charlemagne never existed. It is quite a common mistake to suppose that their worldly authority originated with these two French benefactors of the Holy See. Nothing could be more false. It antedates the epoch of these monarchs by many centuries, and its traces are everywhere visible on the pages of preceding history. Though nominally subjects of the court of Byzantium, the Popes had been for ages the actual rulers of Rome and its adjacent territory; and it was only when compelled by the force of circumstances, which would admit of no other line of conduct, that they added the name of sovereignty to its real substance, which they had all along possessed. That they were conscious of their true position before the world, is evident from the fact that for centuries before Pepin or Charlemagne the Holy See (or the Court of Rome, as our Gallican and Protestant friends love to call it, and it may well be so called in this connection) exercised one of the most incontestable rights of sovereignty by maintaining habitually a resident ambassador¹

people. See Wolfgang Menzel's *Geschichte der Deutschen*, Stuttgart, 1855, vol. iv. p. 232. As a rule, the mitred princes who brought about this unhappy change were "enlightened" Catholics of the Dollinger and Schulte pattern, and most bitter enemies of the Holy See. They caused more grief to the paternal heart of Pius VI. than the French infidels of the Red Republic, who brought about his exile and death in 1799. But Divine vengeance has its appointed hour even for guilty priests and prelates, who raise their parricidal hands against the successor of St. Peter. Their "sacred" principalities were swept out of existence in 1806, by the ruthless hand of the modern Attila.

¹ The technical name of the representative of the Holy See at that day was the *Apocrisiarius* (*Ἀποκρισιάριος* a derivative of Romaic form from *ἀπόκρισις*), used constantly by Theophanes, Cedrenus, Nicetas, and other writers of Byzantine history in the sense of "ambassador." *Ἀπόκρισις*, which was originally "an answer" (*responsum*), came by degrees to signify, in the court-language of Constantinople, not only the prince's answer or rescript to memorials from petitioners, but any and every kind of message, decree, or mandate from supreme authority. Hence the bearer of these messages or mandates was called *Apocrisiarius*. "Id porro nominis inditum Legatis quod *ἀποκρίσεις* seu responsa Principum deferrent. *Responza* enim non modo rescripta Principum ad supplicantium libellos, sed etiam quævis decreta et mandata appellabant." (Du Cange, *Glossarium Mediæ et Infimæ Latinitatis*, Parisiis, 1840, tom. i. p. 316, sub. v. *Apocrisiarius*. This is Firmin Didot's splendid edition, which contains all the additions of the Benedictines, of Carpentier, Adelung, and others, and was superintended by G. A. L. Henschel.) Justinian himself (Nov. 25) attests that the name of *ἀποκρίσεις* was given to the imperial decrees by his predecessors. Unfortunately the silence (*invida taciturnitas*, if we may use the Horatian phrase) of the old Church annalists, has deprived us of the names of the Papal ambassadors at Constantinople before the days of St. Sylverius (A.D. 536), with whose reign the list now known begins. But this

at the imperial court of Constantinople, who on special occasions was replaced, as in all civilized countries in our own day, by envoys extraordinary. And this consciousness speaks out with noble indignation in the letter of St. Felix III. (A.D. 484), who rebukes the faithless emperor, Zeno, for having violated the first principles of international law (*jus gentium*) by his ill-treatment of the papal legates.¹

St. Gregory the Great (and no one can doubt his word) affirms distinctly that had he wished to do so, he could have easily exterminated the whole Lombard race.² Indeed his whole course of action towards the Lombards, whether in concluding terms of peace or making preparations for war, plainly shows that he felt his position in Italy to be that of a sovereign prince.

The aid given by Pope Zachary was neither unjust (as Dr. Schulte calls it) nor was it the real origin of the Pope's temporal power. The French prince merely proposed to the head of Christendom a case of conscience, as many, both kings and subjects, have done since that day and before it. St. Zachary answered it, as he was bound to do by his character of moral teacher of his children throughout the world; and it would be hard to discover wherein lies the injustice of his decision, unless we blindly assume as a first principle that the Pope must be always in the wrong. Had he decided, on the contrary, that a prince may actually possess royal power but must not assume the name of king, would not Dr. Schulte and Janus, from whom he draws his inspiration, have pronounced the decision not only unjust but ridiculous?

The grant of sovereignty to the Pope did not originate with Pepin. It is a very remarkable fact that in the dealings of the French monarch with Pope Stephen III., Zachary's immediate successor, we never find mention of conferring sovereignty or bestowing territory. The terms used are always those of *giving back* and *restoring* what belonged of right to the Roman Church, *justitia beati Petri*, as the quaint language of that age expressed it. And if the word *donation* ever occurs, its meaning is immediately explained

silence does not disprove their existence. Among those who held this honorable position at the court of Constantinople was St. Gregory the Great (A.D. 584), before his elevation to the Popedom. What shows in a remarkable way both the ecclesiastical and civil sovereignty of the Holy See is that these ambassadors were selected from the order of Deacons; yet in spite of this inferior rank, in all ecclesiastical assemblies, because of the See they represented, the place of honor was yielded to them by all priests and bishops, and even by the haughty patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, and Antioch.

¹ He complains that in the person of his ambassadors had been violated that "sacrosancta libertas legatorum" which is respected even by nations that have neither civilization nor religion. Ep. ad Zenonem in Mansi's Councils, tom. viii., col. 1065.

² Ep. 47.

as implying *restitution*.¹ Why, then, should the Pontiff not "claim as a right" what had been wrested from him by the violence of the Lombards and won back by the victorious arms of Pepin?

But the Pope "adduced proofs from Scripture." Proofs of what? Of his right to temporal dominion? It needs a bold face to assert this. Stephen III. in his hour of distress invokes the aid of Pepin, and, as might be expected from the chief bishop of the Christian Church, mingles occasionally with his cry for help the language of Scripture. But it is the language of exhortation, not of argument; much less of argument on behalf of his claims to temporal authority. And besides Scripture he adduces "forged documents of former territorial donations." This has been stated, likewise, by his guide and master, Janus, but without a shadow of proof. Let them produce, if they can, the passage from Stephen's letters, where he appeals to the false donation of Constantine. For this is the document Dr. Schulte refers to, though his rhetorical pen has amplified it into the plural number. And this same document, as he tells us elsewhere (p. 258), "was concocted at Rome" in order to induce Pepin to concede temporal sovereignty to the bishop of Rome." It is strange that such a ponderous weapon should have immediately lost favor with those who forged it for a purpose, to which they never applied it. Stephen III. ignores it altogether. In his letters to Pepin he appeals only to Pepin's reiterated promises, and more than once to a deed of donation (or restitution) signed by his own hand.³ But it will be said that at least Adrian I., in 774, quoted the donation of Constantine in one of his letters to Charlemagne. This is distinctly stated by Gibbon and by Janus. But they forget that Pepin's donation, which cannot be denied, had existed for some twenty years, and therefore the object of quoting the other could not possibly be to induce Charlemagne "to concede to the Pope temporal sovereignty," for this he already possessed. It is only a hasty, superficial perusal of Adrian's letter that has led to this charge

¹ See the letters of Stephen III. to Pepin and to the French Lords in Mansi's Collection, tom. xii. col., 534-555. The expressions constantly recurring are "*Sanctæ ecclesiæ restituere jubeatis*:" (Bid them restore to Holy Church); col. 547: "*Civitates et loca restituenda confirmastis*:" (You assured me of the restoration of the cities and places); col. 550: "*Justitiam B. Petri . . . per donationis paginam restituendam confirmavit bonitas vestra*:" (Your kindness assured me that what belongs of right to St. Peter, would be given back by your deed of donation), *ibid.* What is also worthy of attention, he identifies the Roman Church with the Roman State. "*B. Petro sanctæque Dei Ecclesiæ vel reipublicæ Romanorum reddere*" (To restore to Blessed Peter and the Holy Church of God or to the Roman Commonwealth), etc., *ibid.*

² This is a gratuitous assertion, unsupported by any title of evidence. The conjecture of Baronius, that it came originally from a Greek hand, is not so unlikely as it has appeared to some writers.

³ "*Donationem vestra manu firmatam*" Stephani Ep. vii., ad Pippinum, apud Mansi l. c., col. 551.

against him. He is urging Charlemagne to make good his promises, and to have certain portions of his patrimony restored which had been wrested by the Lombards from the Holy See. To this purpose he alleges in quite general terms the example of Constantine, who had "exalted and glorified the Roman Church, and given her power in these parts of Italy."¹ All this Adrian might have said with truth, even if the false donation had never existed. For it is an acknowledged fact in history that Constantine, after his conversion, bestowed upon the Roman Church many valuable estates; and these princely possessions, under the gradual growth of the feudal system, as we have seen, by natural development became so many sources of baronial rights or territorial sovereignty. So that, even pushing the meaning of the word "power"² to its utmost rigor, Hadrian was substantially correct. But it must not be forgotten that mediæval writers apply the "usus loquendi" of their day to facts and personages of former ages. Thus Dante has no difficulty in giving the name of "Baron" to St. Peter, and even to St. James, to point him out as the spiritual prince of the Spanish nation.

E la mia Donna piena di letizia
Mi disse: mira, mira; ecco il Barone,
Per cui laggiù si visita Galizia.³

Any one who will take the trouble to consult Du Cange's *Glossary of Mediæval Latin*,⁴ will readily find that the word "potestas" in the language of that day had a wide range of meaning, and denotes many things, from a king or prince (rex, princeps) down to revenues, rights, privileges (vectigalia, jura, privilegia, etc.) Again, amongst its other significations is found that of the "honor or office of a magistrate," in which sense it occurs as far back as the days of St. Augustine. Now, if Constantine (as even Gibbon acknowledges) made magistrates of all bishops by conferring on them judicial power, this must have been true in a far higher sense of the chief bishop of Christendom. Whatever its meaning, the statement of Adrian is incontestable, and to suppose it based on anything but historical truth, would be absurd. But he does not quote the example of Constantine only. He alleges "many emperors, patri-

¹ Mansi, tom. xii., col. 820.

² Potestatem in his Hesperiae partibus largiri dignatus est, l. c.

³ Paradiso, cant. xxv., 16-18. Carey, rather unhappily, spins out the saintly "Baron" into a "peer of mickle might."

My Lady, full of gladness, spake to me;
Lo! lo! behold the peer of mickle might,
That makes Galicia thronged with visitants

For the same name applied to St. Peter, see Canto xxiv., 115.

⁴ Glossar. Med. et Inf. Lat., tom. v., pp. 378-380.

cians, and God-fearing men" who had bestowed lands and possessions on the Roman See, "of which donations" (he adds) "we have the records deposited in our sacred archives of the Lateran."¹ It were but a waste of time and parchment to appeal to those donations and their record, if he had known the donation of Constantine, which covered the whole ground. And even if he had alluded (which we deny) to this false document, where is the proof that he knew it to be a forgery? How many Catholics in the middle ages devoutly believed that clumsy forgery, the fable of Pope Joan! Are we to take for granted that they believed, and gave it currency, knowing it to be false? May not men in an uncritical age honestly believe in the genuineness of some documents which will one day be exploded as spurious by the progress of historical science? Or are the Popes moral outlaws, in whose behalf no such possibility must be pleaded?

Dr. Schulte gravely tells us that the "history of the Papacy exhibits the worst features of intrigue and the most unblushing knavery, displayed chiefly in forgery" (p. 256). And that there may be no mistake as to the chief actors, he goes on to repeat the assertion in this fashion: "Forgery was not a new art to the Roman Pontiffs. They had forged documents before the ninth century and had been successful. Rome had been habituated to it by a long series of systematic fabrications extending back to the sixth century" (p. 258). Before examining the charges in detail, we submit a general remark. Against whom is this monstrous accusation by Dr. Schulte hurled? Against the holy zealous men, without whom neither he nor Janus would know any difference between the true God and Woden; the men who commissioned Augustine and Boniface, Willibrord and Kilian; the men to whom England and Northern and Central Europe are indebted for their Christianity and their civilization! Not against degenerate Cæsars in the West, or imbecile Byzantines in the East; but against a long and venerable line of princes of the Church, whose sacred character, lofty position, and the reverence in which they were held by all Christendom might, even humanly speaking, be considered a protection from temptation to commit low and degrading crimes! Many of them died in the odor of sanctity, praised and blessed by an admiring world, and their names have been inscribed in the Calendar of Saints. Such were, in the sixth and seventh centuries, Sts. Symmachus, Hormisdas, Felix IV., Agapetus, Gregory the Great (with the second and third Gregory, heirs of his name and greatness), Eugene I., Vitalian, Sergius I., Zachary, and others too numerous to mention. Some of them (as St. John I., St. Sylverius,

¹ Mansi, xii., col. 821.

St. Martin I.) made the sacrifice of liberty and life for religion, and are honored as martyrs. Nearly all of them were illustrious for zeal, learning, and the exercise of the Christian virtues, if we are to trust the accounts of their contemporaries in preference to the malignant diatribes of pamphleteers in the nineteenth century.

The only lamentable exception in this glorious catalogue of six centuries is afforded by a few Popes, intruded by force or fraud into the See of Peter during the tenth century. They were very few,¹ and historical criticism has reduced the number, proving how much reason the Church has to hail with joy, instead of fearing, as they say we must, the progress of historical or other science. Catholics, no less than Protestants, have been the innocent victims of historical deception; and not a few Popes now stand blameless before the world, who were consigned to perpetual ignominy by the saintly and learned Cardinal Baronius. He, and the rest of our early historians, who wrote before the hidden lore of mediæval annals had been drawn from its hiding-places by antiquarian research, lacked correct sources of information and were misled by the scandalous gossip of the only chronicler they had access to. And yet these few Popes, not more than half a dozen, even according to the mendacious Luitprand,² become under Dr. Schulte's magical art of multiplication the Popes who filled the Holy See for two entire

¹ Indeed, in the whole list from St. Peter to Pius IX., there are perhaps not even six who can be set down as unworthy occupants of the See. But even were there a dozen or more, what was said out of humility by St. Leo the Great would ever remain true: "What St. Peter received from Christ never fails, even in the unworthy heir of his authority."

² Luitprand was for a long time the only historical source for the Popes of the tenth century, and imposed his slanderous fables upon the credulity of Baronius and other Catholic writers. Historical science since then has rescued from the mire of his foul aspersions and restored to their due honor the names of several Pontiffs (those in particular of Sergius III. and John X.), whom he had so bespattered with filth that even the devout Baronius heaps upon their heads the most opprobrious epithets. Luitprand gave a very significant title to his history when he called it by the name of *Autapodosis* (Retribution), and intimated plainly enough that his intention in writing was to exalt his friends and put down his and their enemies. *Sentire quæ velis et quæ sentias loqui* (Think what you please and say what you think) may be the right maxim in political matters for the citizen of a free commonwealth, but we cannot allow it to be elevated into a law for the writing of history unless it be first stripped of its ambiguity. For the Luitprands and Villanis, and their modern imitators, the Guicciardinis, Mosheims, Milmans, and others, its only meaning seems this: Believe what suits you and color it to suit your readers. One of the men (Schroëckh, *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. xxii., p. 238), like young Troilus of old,

Infelix puer atque impar congressus Achilli,

has the boldness to enter the lists against Muratori in order to defend Luitprand's veracity! The Wittenberg professor is true to the great tradition of anti-Catholic history. Whatever has been said against the Pope, no matter by whom, is true; if it is not, it ought to be, and let no man dare question it.

centuries. He says that after Nicholas I. (who died A.D. 867) "a blight seems to have fallen upon the Papacy for the next two hundred years. With scarcely an exception, the Popes of *this period* were so many monsters, not men" (p. 259). But genuine history tells another tale. In all these two hundred years (A.D. 867-1067) there were but two that can be justly called bad Popes and both intruded, viz.: John XI. (931-936) and John XII. (955-964). Of the former, it may be said that his moral wickedness, or weakness rather, was more the result of *duress* than of bad will, as he was completely under the sway of his powerful relations; and his sinful compliances with breaches of church discipline were exacted from him, while he was shut up in a dungeon for the greater part of his Pontificate, by his brother Alberic, who held unjustly the temporal lordship of the Roman States. John XII. we cheerfully give up to Dr. Schulte and his lay namesake of "Janus." He was a bad Pope, the shame and disgrace of the Catholic Church; and they seem to prize him far more highly than our Clements, Gregories, Innocents, and other great Pontiffs who have astonished and edified even the unbelieving world. Let them, then, take him and make the most of him; though there is little doubt that even *his* wickedness has been exaggerated by Luitprand. The conduct of Stephen VI. (or VII., A.D. 898) need not be discussed, as it is uncertain whether he was a legitimate Pontiff or not. But, granting his legitimate election, the indignity with which he treated the corpse of his predecessor, Formosus, may have been discreditable even to the rude barbarism of that iron age; yet it was rather a cruel straining of the rigor of law, a high-handed violation of social decency, than an offence against faith or morals. The plea alleged for the act was ostensibly an honest one,—the necessity of punishing disobedience to the canons of the Church; but it was perverted, pushed to the extreme by an error of passionate judgment, which involved, however, no decision of dogma or moral law.

All the rest of these Pontiffs were men of irreproachable lives and did what they could in that barbarous age to maintain the purity of church discipline amongst clergy and laity. Some of them were canonized saints (as St. Leo IX.); others shone like brilliant lights of science and letters in those dark days (Benedict V., Gregory V., and Sylvester II.); not a few of them (to instance only the intrepid Marinus) were worthy of a place by the side of the illustrious Popes of early centuries. Yet all these worthy, venerated Pontiffs, "with scarcely an exception," are, under Dr. Schulte's pen, metamorphosed into "unblushing knaves and so many monsters, not men!" Is this, we ask, candor and fair-dealing? Would Dr. Schulte speak in this strain of the line of Mohammedan caliphs? We are sure he would not. What must even the non-Catholic reader

think of this bitter, unchristian zeal which in its eagerness for triumph, heedless of the Apostle's warning (Rom. x. ii.), will consult neither knowledge nor common honesty? Is not the "insane frenzy" with which the very mention of the Papacy inspires him, the best commentary on what he himself says elsewhere of anti-Catholic polemics?

"They (Catholics) look upon us with suspicion when we meet them in the arena of theological disputation, AND WELL THEY MAY. Do not our best Protestant controversialists seem to become inflated with bigotry and seized with an INSANE FRENZY, so soon as they enter upon the field of controversy with Roman Catholics? Is it not the settled custom to apply to the Pope and the Roman Church the MOST OPPROBRIOUS EPITHETS?" (p. 38).

Why this should be so, we leave to Dr. S. to explain, if he can, or rather if he will, for we think he knows. By his own confession this bigotry, this insane frenzy is not occasional but permanent, not the exception but the "settled custom." "Settled customs" in dress, in conversation, and in other matters of the social world, are like fashions, and may depend on whim or caprice; but in the moral world they must have a deeper origin and must be traceable to some law. If they are phenomena that are surprising in appearance, they cannot be so in reality. They must have a cause which either philosophy or religion will satisfactorily explain. What is it in our case? A casual outburst of passionate feeling springs from sudden anger; habitual reviling can only proceed from deep-rooted hatred. But whence comes this hatred? The answer to this question was given more than two thousand years ago by the common-sense of a pagan; and when we add that he was an African,¹ we say perhaps what will entitle his opinion to more respect in the minds of some. It is this: "VERITAS odium parit"² That

¹ Years ago, pent up within the narrow walls of a beleaguered city, we used to hear occasionally wonderful stories about the "intelligent contraband." He was a myth, we fear; but the true type of him may be found in Terence, who emerged from the slave into the freedman by his own merits (*ob ingenii ac formæ elegantiam*). His very name was either the kindly gift of his master, the Senator Terentius Lucanus, or the standing witness to posterity of the freedman's gratitude.

² Publius Terentius (*Afer*.) *Andria* I., i. 41. One of the Fathers of the Church says that these words of the poet came almost from divine inspiration. Speaking of "the settled custom" of the pagans and apostates of his time to revile Catholic Christianity (for there was then no other), and habitually assail it "with the most opprobrious epithets," he indignantly exclaims: "Tanti et tam pertinacis odii quam potissimum causam esse dicamus! Utrumne VERITAS odium parit, ut ait poeta quasi divino spiritu instinctus." Lactantius, *Divinar. Institut.*, lib. v., cap. 9. (For this so great, so obstinate hatred, what cause can we assign? Is it that the TRUTH begets hatred, as the poet says in words almost divinely inspired?) Tertullian, another African, says likewise of Christian Catholic truth: "Plane olim, id est semper, VERITAS odio est" (Long since, 'aye always, they have hated the truth). *Apolog.*, cap. 14.

the truth should beget hatred sounds like a paradox, but is undeniable. Truth when *subjective* (to use the terms of the school), when it has once entered and reigns in the mind, cannot produce this effect; but when it is merely *objective*, when from without it merely flashes upon and strikes a mind diseased, it obtains neither welcome nor entrance, but simply vexes and exasperates. Naturally, indeed, the soul of man loves and seeks the truth; but if morally perverted, she will disown and hate it, especially when it is of the supernatural order. So, too, the human eye, by natural instinct, loves the light and courts its presence; but when diseased, shuns it and abhors it. Who does not recall the beautiful line in which Virgil paints the dying Tyrian queen first seeking heaven's light, and then repelling it with pain and anguish:

Quæsitiv coelo lucem ingemuitque reperta.¹

How widely different is the estimate formed of the Popes of the dark ages by such illustrious Protestant writers as Voigt, Hurter,² Gfrorer, Leo, and Ranke, candid and learned men, who—while (unhappily for themselves) rejecting our doctrines as unfounded and irrational—do not consider themselves bound on that account to outrage with calumny and insult the venerable fathers and heroes of our Church, but will gladly recognize and honor virtue and worth, even when met with in the Pope of Rome. Leo,³ for example, has no hesitation in acknowledging that, if the sacredness of the marriage tie has been saved to modern Europe, she is indebted for it to the Popes—those very Popes on whose heads Dr. Schulte has rained such wholesale condemnation. Since the sanctity of marriage is the basis of the family, and since well or ill-regulated domestic polity reacts necessarily on the welfare and the very life of the State and civil government, it is evident that from Leo's acknowledgment those maligned Pontiffs were the savers of social and political civilization. It turns out, therefore, that these venerable men upon whom, in defiance of history, truth, decency, and even common gratitude, anti-Catholic bigotry pours out its venomous gall, denouncing them as "knaves and monsters, not men," deserve instead universal respect as the chief benefactors of mankind. And, limiting our comparison only to sacred things, what was the crusade of Heraclius against Chosroas to regain the Sacred Wood on which was wrought our redemption, or Godfrey's "pious arms and

¹ This apposite passage has been applied more than once to unbelievers; by none more happily than by Cardinal Polignac, who has imitated it in his elegant Latin poem entitled *Anti-Lucretius* (Paris, 1752).

² Hurter, after having published his great historical work on Innocent III., became a Catholic. Prof. Gfrorer has, we believe, followed his example.

³ *Geschichte von Italien*, vol. i., p. 258, quoted by Hefele in his *Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte*, Tübingen, 1864, vol. i., p. 232.

glorious conquest" in winning back from the Paynim the "great Sepulchre of Christ,"¹ compared to the rescue of the Christian family from Pagan or Mussulman slavery and degradation!

Ranke is not very indulgent, sometimes not even just to the Popes. Yet he is not blind altogether to their merits and greatness. Occasionally he eulogizes this or that Pope of the centuries that came immediately after the so-called Reformation, but in the following passage he bears witness in his own way to the moral grandeur of those very Popes whom Dr. Schulte stigmatizes as knaves and monsters.

"Whatever may be the opinion we form of the Popes of the earlier ages (Ranke is speaking of them with respect to Reformation times) of the Church, we must admit that they had always great interests in view: the guardianship of an oppressed religion, the conflict with paganism, the diffusion of Christianity over the nations of the North, the foundation of an independent hierarchical power. The ability to conceive, to will, and to accomplish some great object, is among the qualities which confer the greatest dignity on man; and that it was that sustained the Popes in their lofty course."²

The "forgeries" of which Dr. Schulte, blindly copying Janus, has thought fit to make special mention, are the following; the italics are his own:

"To glorify the Roman See, spurious *Acts of Roman Martyrs* began to be compiled at the beginning of the sixth century, and were produced from time to time afterwards for some centuries. For a similar purpose the story of the *Conversion and Baptism of Constantine* was invented, to make Pope Sylvester appear to have been a worker of miracles. About 514 the *Acts of the Council of Sinuessa*, the *Legend of the Pope Marcellinus*, and the *Constitution of Sylvester* were forged, to prove that no one could judge the Roman See. The *Gesta Liberii* and the *Gesta of Sixtus III.* were fabricated in defence of these Popes. The works of St. Cyprian were interpolated to suit the pretensions of the Roman bishop. The *Liber Pontificalis* was another forgery, commenced in the sixth century and continued afterwards. It was devised to prove the *Acts of Roman Martyrs*, to confirm the existing legends and emperors, and to exhibit the Popes as legislators for the whole Church. After the middle of the eighth century the famous *Donation of Constantine* was concocted at Rome, in order to induce Pepin to concede temporal sovereignty to the Bishop of Rome. Other fabrications appeared soon after-

¹ "L'armi pietose: il gran Sepolcro di Cristo: il glorioso acquisto," world-known phrases from the opening stanza of Tasso's "Gerusalemme Liberata." Some fastidious critics object to the "pious arms;" and there have not been wanting fastidious *cruscanti* who disliked the original expression (armi *pietose*). But we defy the conceited infidel world, which applauds the "*thinking* bayonets" of the brutal Corsican, to find any rule of rhetoric or consistency which forbids our associating with weapons the name that belongs of right to the gallant hearts and brave hands that wield them. That arms may be "pious" or "impious" according to their use has been ere this made known to the Napoleons, Cavours, and Bixios before a Tribunal, where deadly sin is judged not by laws of rhetoric but of eternal justice.

² Ecclesiastical and Political History of the Popes of Rome during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Translated by Sarah Austin. Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard, 1841. Vol. i., p. 46.

wards, for the purpose of persuading Charlemagne and his successors to confirm and enlarge the temporal power" (p. 258).

From the words of our author one would imagine that there was some such collection as the *Acts of the Roman Martyrs*. There is not, never was such a book. What is now known by the name of *Roman Martyrology* was so called by our converted pagan forefathers for the simple reason that their religious literature, like their religion itself, came all from Rome. There was in every church from the earliest times a book containing the record, more or less ample, of those who, in that city, or See, or province, had sealed their testimony for Christ with their blood, and were thence called *martyrs*. From it the life of each martyr used to be read during the Divine office in the church on the annual recurrence of his festival.¹ This we know from the best sources. It is attested of the Acts of St. Polycarp in the Life of St. Pionius,² and of the Acts of Sts. Perpetua and Felicitas by the great Augustine.³ Of the authenticity of these narratives there can be no doubt; for, whenever it was not absolutely impossible,⁴ the official record was obtained from the public notaries or from the Proconsular or Præsidial Acts,⁵ and incorporated in the martyr's "Passio" or account of his sufferings and death. Some of these pagan documents have come down to us in full, those, for example, of the Proconsul Galerius Maximus, under whom St. Cyprian suffered martyrdom. But Rome's *Martyrology*, as it came to be called afterwards, was naturally different from that of other countries. She was the head and centre of Christendom, and to her came continually accounts of all weighty matters which concerned the welfare or history of local churches. Amongst these could there be anything more important than the sufferings of a confessor or the death and triumph of a martyr? The Roman Church, therefore, in virtue of Catholic communion, inscribed in her annals, and honored the name and memory, not only of her own martyrs but of those sent to her from other churches. Thus we know that she

¹ His *natalis* or birthday was the name given by the faith of our pious forefathers to the day on which the martyr was released from prison and torments by death. There is a symbolic beauty in this seemingly unnatural or contradictory interchange of names, which may commend it to the admiration even of those who profess Christianity outside of the Church.

² Acta St. Pionii, in Ruinart's *Acta Martyrum Sincera et Selecta*, p. 12. St. Polycarp suffered martyrdom in the year 166; St. Pionius in 250.

³ Semi. 280. The martyrdom of these celebrated saints took place about the year 203.

⁴ Nothing else was ordinarily needed than a bribe or the connivance of some pagan official. Christian gold was freely used in those days for more than one holy purpose. From the gaoler it secured access to the dungeon of the martyr, from the executioner it purchased his remains and saved them from desecration.

⁵ Acta Proconsulis and Acta Præsidis.

gave all honor to St. Cyprian almost immediately after his martyrdom at Carthage. The Popes, from the very beginning of the Church—and the beginning of martyrdom was simultaneous—used every care to gather the history of those Christian heroes who shed their blood for the faith. And what is said in the *Liber Pontificalis* of Pseudo-Damasus, viz., that St. Clement (A.D. 100) and St. Fabian (A.D. 250) divided and subdivided the city into regions or wards, and appointed in each special notaries to collect the *Acts of the Martyrs*, must surely rest on some good basis of tradition.

Far from forging *Acts of Martyrs*, the Popes of every age have shown the utmost anxiety to keep such counterfeits from the hands of the Christian world. When Pope Gelasius, in the Roman Council of 494, says that the Roman Church, according to ancient custom, shows her special caution (*singulari cautela*) in not reading the history of the early martyrs (*Gesta primorum Martyrum*), he either means that the Roman Church, unlike the churches of Christendom, did not read them during Divine service, or he is denouncing some special compilation which bore that name. Baronius¹ inclines to the former opinion, but the reasons alleged by Gelasius seem to point in the other direction, for he says that these *Gesta* were compiled “by nameless authors, some of them by faithless and others by unlettered men; nay, some of them are reported to have come from the hands of heretics.”² It is not to be imagined that the reading of such stuff would be tolerated by any Christian Bishop, much less by the supreme guardian of Christian faith and morals. Yet, surely the Roman Church could not have been without genuine official “Acts” of such martyrs as Popes Fabian, Cornelius, Lucius, Stephen, and Xystus (who are all commemorated as martyrs by their contemporary, St. Cyprian, whose writings have never been questioned), or of Sts. Lawrence and Sebastian, Agnes and Cecilia, whose fame filled the whole Christian world, and to whom churches had been erected in Rome more than a century before Pope Gelasius was born. To mention only one

¹ In his “*Tractatio de Martyrologio Romano*,” prefixed to his annotated edition of that work, Venetiis (apud Guerilium), 1615, p. 5.

² See the *Decretum De Libris Recipiendis* with all its variant readings in Mansi’s Councils, tom. viii., p. 155. Chifflet is certain, and Mansi inclines to the belief, that this council and decree belong to the days of Pope St. Hormisdas (A.D. 514–523). This would bring it down to the very epoch of forgery, invented by Schulte and Janus. St. Hormisdas must have been “a monster” of folly as well as of iniquity to issue a decree against unauthorized legends of martyrs, while he was secretly busied in the manufacture of legends of his own, which necessarily could have only an underhand, unauthorized circulation. But the Pope, of course, is an exception to all rules; and must be at the same moment, in any and everything that he does, the silliest of fools and the keenest of knaves.

case, owing to the perpetual intercourse going on between the churches of Carthage and Rome, the latter must have been well acquainted with Pontius's Life, or "Acts" of St. Cyprian, and the Proconsular Acts that accompanied them. Did these documents all perish at one fell stroke? Baronius, we think, goes a little too far, when he supposes that all, or nearly all, of them were swept out of existence by the cruel ravages of persecution under Diocletian. Surely tradition, in some cases the testimony of eye-witnesses, the memorials preserved in the catacombs or saved in other parts of the empire, would have furnished a means of restoring or reconstructing them.¹

In any case the Decree of St. Gelasius shows how zealous was the Roman Church and its ruler to prevent the circulation of false or unworthy *Acts of Martyrs*. And more than three hundred years after Gelasius, Adrian I. wrote to Charlemagne that the Roman Church tolerates no *Acts of Martyrs* that are not by approved authors (*sine auctoribus probabilibus*).²

From the glib way in which Dr. Schulte speaks of the *Acts of Roman Martyrs*, the credulous crowd for whom he writes will naturally conclude that he is thoroughly acquainted with their compilation and contents. But the well-informed reader will judge otherwise. Whenever he is not inaccurate he owes it to his namesake, the layman, whose words parrot-like he repeats. But when he ventures to leave his guide and trust to himself, he reveals a want of ordinary information, which excites a feeling that partakes more of wonder, shame, and pity than of anger. Will it be believed that this Doctor of Philosophy and of Theology is actually unacquainted with the difference between the *Annals of Baronius* and

¹ Pope St. Damasus (A.D. 366-384), who adorned with poetical inscriptions all the chief shrines and churches of Rome, was evidently well acquainted with the history of previous Roman martyrs. When he was young, there were yet living those who had seen with their own eyes the horrors of Diocletian's persecution; and he himself gives some particulars which he had learned from the executioners of that cruel tyrant. As he tells us in one of his poems, mentioning some incidents of a martyrdom:

Percussor retulit Damaso mihi, dum puer essem.

("As the headsman told me, Damasus, while yet a child." Carm. XXIV, de SS. Marcellino et Petro in Collect. Omnium. Poetarum Pisauri, 1766, tom. v., p. 93. The sacred poetry of the Collectio Pisaurensis is most wretchedly edited. After what Sarazini and Merenda have done for the Roman edition of 1754, the text of St. Damasus yet needs an editor.) True, in his beautiful lines on St. Agnes, Damasus appeals to fame (common report or tradition, *Fama refert*); but a poet's words must not be scrutinized too narrowly. St. Jerome, who was his friend and secretary, tells us, on the other hand, that the name of St. Agnes was celebrated by the tongues and pens of all nations. In the poem of St. Damasus on this Holy Virgin Martyr may be read one of the most exquisite lines ever inspired by the Christian muse.

² In Baronius, loc. cit.

the *Roman Martyrology*, and honestly believes that they are one and the same book! Hear his own words:

"And as if this were not enough, Cardinal Baronius, the Jesuit Church historian, who received authority from the Pope¹ to re-edit the *Roman Martyrology*, manipulated the work in a truly Jesuitical manner, correcting those portions that might engender suspicions dangerous to papal absolutism and infallibility, and adding from spurious documents anything that might tend to the glorification of the papacy. In fact, THIS WORK, the *Annals of the Church*, compiled by this talented and laborious Jesuit, forms a vast repertory of spurious passages and fictions" (p. 278).

We feel quite sure that in all the colleges of Rome there can be found no schoolboy of fourteen or fifteen years, who does not know that Baronius was no Jesuit, but a disciple of St. Philip Neri, or who would be so stupid as to confound the small quarto of the *Roman Martyrology*, which he hears read daily in the dining-room,² with the large, voluminous folios of the Cardinal's *Annals of Church History* which he only looks up to with timid reverence on the shelves of the library. How came our Roman Doctor to make this disgraceful blunder? Is it possible that apostasy is not only a cloud to darken the understanding, but a relentless sponge like-wise that wipes away all traces of literary treasure from the memory? At all events, we have in Dr. Schulte an additional proof that as "murder will out," so, too, the ignorance that ventures on speech must betray itself sooner or later.

That Cardinal Baronius, far from altering and manipulating history "in a truly Jesuitical manner," was impartial and candid even to excess, we have already seen from the almost unpardonable docility with which he accepts and retails all the slanders of Luitprand against the Popes of his time. Hefele well remarks:

"Cæsar Baronius has contributed in no ordinary degree to establish the evil reputation of the tenth century. . . . The blame that he must bear is at the same time an honorable proof of his love of truth. Though a decided Ultramontane and ever ready champion of the Papal See, yet he has not only gathered up with conscientious exactness all the evil said of the Popes in his original sources, but in so doing has shown himself too credulous, choosing rather to break his cudgel over the head of many a Pope (über manchen Papst den Stab gebrochen) than to turn the sword of criticism against the authors of those slanders."³

¹ It was at the request of Cardinal Sirletus that he added notes to the new edition of the *Martyrology*, merely to elucidate some critical questions raised on the appearance of the former edition. The famous "Annals" he wrote by desire, or rather by express command, of his religious superior, St. Philip Neri, in order to vindicate the truth of Catholic history from the wicked, heretical calumnies of Flacius Illyricus and his fellow-laborers, the Centuriators (as they are called) of Magdeburg.

² In Rome, and throughout the whole Catholic world, in all seminaries it is customary to read every day during dinner a portion of the *Roman Martyrology*. In the Lutheran seminaries of Germany a like practice is, or used to be, observed. The reading-book, however, has been changed, and the *martyrology* has been replaced by that most edifying book, the *Tisch-Reden*, or *Table-Talk* of Luther.

³ Hefele; *Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte, Archäologie, und Liturgik*. Tübingen, 1864. Vol. i., p. 228.

Janus, with guarded phrase, says that these *Acts of Roman Martyrs* were forged "in the interests of Rome." Dr. Schulte, always tripping when he wanders away from his guide, says "to glorify the Roman See." Now we defy any one who has read the documents alluded to under this name to come honestly to this conclusion. Dr. Schulte, it is evident, has never seen, much less perused them. There is in them no studied reference to the majesty and power of St. Peter's successor, no mention of the privileges that were conferred on his See. They were compiled by unwise zeal merely with a view to exalt the courage and constancy of some few martyrs (who happened to live or die in Rome), by exaggerating the torments which they suffered, by adding prodigies and wonders that were not in the original account, by amplifying a few sentences of the martyr or his judge into regular speeches; in a word, by embellishing pure tradition with the meretricious aids of rhetoric and fancy. The motive of the compilers may have been praiseworthy, but it did not justify the means they used. Yet this weakness of human nature stands out conspicuous from the very first ages of the Church; and we see very soon after the Apostolic times pretended "Acts of St. Peter," "Acts of St. Paul" (to which may be added others of St. Philip, St. Thomas, etc.), the *Circuitus Petri*, the *Itinerarium Clementis*, and similar productions. What was done for the Apostles at the beginning was done subsequently for martyrs and saints. Many of these fictions (based always, which must not be forgotten, on fact) no doubt had their origin in blind, unreasoning devotion, in zeal for the honor of God's saints, which was not, however, as the Apostle would have it, "according to knowledge." This was, to give one example, the case of the priest in Asia Minor, who put in circulation a pious romance regarding the joint Apostleship of St. Paul and St. Thecla (*Acta Pauli et Theclæ*). When arraigned and deposed for the fabrication, his only plea was that he had done it out of love for St. Paul.¹

But there were others who were actuated by less worthy motives. These were heretics, who sought under cover of such forgeries to spread their errors more widely and securely amongst devout and unsuspecting readers. The Fathers of the Church, both in the East and in the West, in every age, have denounced heretics as addicted to this infamous practice. Indeed, from the first day that heresy appeared in the Church, forgery appeared by its side as its

¹ Confessum id se amore Pauli fecisse. (Tertullian de Baptismo, cap. xvii.) St. Thecla is one of the most venerated saints in all the Eastern, especially the Greek, churches. She was the protomartyr of her sex, as St. Stephen was amongst men. The Fathers of the Church, both East and West, Saints Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Zeno, Maximus, etc., have made her the subject of their praise. This shows that the counterfeit always presupposes and proves the reality.

natural sequel and ally. It began by forging Gospels; it then forged Acts of Apostles and Martyrs, Decrees of Councils, and writings of the Fathers. Nor has it changed with time or the course of ages. Even at this day it is true to its first love. To pick out one of a thousand examples, who does not remember how some thirty or forty years ago two well-known Anglicans, fellow-clergymen of Dr. Schulte, that shone amongst the brightest lights of Exeter Hall (Rev. Dr. McGee and Rev. Dr. Todd), deliberately forged and gave to the world in its pretended Latin original a Papal Brief, from Gregory XVI. to the Bishops of Great Britain and Ireland? And even though convicted, they would not confess, until the forgery had accomplished its end. This was not excess of love for God or His Saints, as was the case with the simple priest of Asia Minor, but the amiable intent of arousing Protestant wrath and hatred against their innocent Catholic fellow-subjects. Nor have we ever heard that this base conduct lessened in the slightest degree the credit and good standing of these two men with their brethren of the Anglican clergy or laity. Whence it would seem to be a fair, legitimate inference that the English Church approves and admires, or certainly does not disapprove and condemn, the crime of forgery, provided it be employed "in the interests" of the English Church and "to glorify" Anglicanism.

The story of the *Conversion and Baptism of Constantine*, which Dr. Schulte next singles out for attack, cannot be reconciled with the positive assertions of Eusebius of Cæsarea, and is therefore undoubtedly a fiction, as Catholic critics have shown long ago. But it is more edifying, more worthy of the first Christian emperor than the account of Eusebius; and this sufficiently explains its origin and the facility with which it crept into general belief. That Constantine should have put off his baptism till the hour of death, and then should have received it at the hands of an Arian bishop, seemed a blemish on the character of the great monarch who had first lifted up Christianity to the throne of the Cæsars. And it was this blemish that the compiler of the *Acta Sylvestri* sought to wipe away from the memory of Constantine. How well the story commended itself to the Christian heart is evident from the fact that it was soon adopted by the Greeks, and, in spite of their own Eusebius, has found a permanent place in their Menologium.¹ The notion that the tale was written "to make Pope Sylvester appear to have been a worker of miracles," shows little acquaintance with the Catholic belief of all centuries. And that belief springs from

¹ This is the name given by the Greek Church to the martyrology. In it St. Sylvester is commemorated on the 1st of January, not on the 31st of December, as in the Latin Church.

no capricious sentiment of human origin; it is based on the words of our Lord Himself (Jo. xiv. 12). Miracles have always been accounted an ordinary sequel, no less than a proof, of sanctity. And the sanctity of St. Sylvester has been recognized by the universal Church from the day of his death to our own time. What was, then, more natural than to adorn with miracles the legend of one whose surpassing holiness was known from tradition to all the churches? It was not Sylvester the Pope, but Sylvester the Saint to whom these miracles were attributed.¹ If the writer meant to "glorify" any one, it was Constantine rather than the Holy See.

Next we come to the Acts of the Council of Sinuessa, the Legend of Pope Marcellinus, and the Constitution of Sylvester. These are, no doubt, apocryphal; but the germ of the fable is not to be sought on Catholic soil. The Legend grew out of a Donatist calumny, which represented that holy Pontiff as yielding to torments under Diocletian, and saving his life by betraying the sacred books and sacrificing to the gods. Three other Popes, Melchiades, Marcellus, and Sylvester, all of whom are venerated as saints in the Catholic Church, were accused by the Donatists of the same abominable crime. St. Augustine² calls these calumnies simply incredible, and defies his adversary, Petilian, to offer any proof. Though St. Augustine brands the charge as one which nobody can believe, Schroeckh³ thinks there must be some truth in it, or the accusation would not have been preferred by Petilian. The great holy Doctor, Augustine, unworthy of belief in comparison with an obscure Donatist! Why not put it plainly and give us at once the enthymeme: Petilian is an enemy of the Holy See, therefore his veracity may not be questioned. Religious error may vary from one age to another, but never changes in its hatred of Rome; and fourteen hundred years form no barrier to the mutual love and sympathy of Donatist and Lutheran. How true are the words of Pope St. Agatho in his letter to the Emperor Constantinus Pogonatus, adopted by the Fathers of the Sixth Ecumenical Council and incorporated in the Acts of their Fourth Session! "*Sancti quidem Doctores venerati atque secuti sunt (Apostolicam Sedem); hæretici autem falsis criminationibus ac derogationum odiis inseculi.*" "The holy Doctors have always held it (the Apostolic See) in reverence and clung to it; while heretics have ever persecuted it with their slanderous falsehoods and hateful calumnies."⁴

¹ The Greek Menologium likewise mentions his thaumaturgic fame, calling him "a great worker of miracles" (*magnus patrator miraculorum*, as Baronius translates in *Not. ad Mart. Rom. die 31 Dec.*).

² St. Aug. de Unico Bapt. Contra. Petil. cap. xviii.

³ Kirchengeschichte, vol. v., p. 57.

⁴ Mansi's Councils, tom. xi., Col. 239.

The writer of the legend, unacquainted, it would seem, with the true history of Marcellinus, and adopting the Donatist calumny as a fact, is puzzled to account for the Pope's subsequent martyrdom and *cultus*. Knowing *a priori* that to become a saint and martyr after his fall he must have repented, in order to give all possible *celat* to his hero's repentance he invents the Council of Sinuessa,¹ where before two hundred bishops Marcellinus confesses his crime, proclaims his unworthiness to sit in the Apostolic chair, asks for judgment, and is told by the bishops that it does not belong to them to judge him who holds the chief See. "Prima sedes a nemine judicatur." Dr. Schulte, treading in the footsteps of Janus, would have us believe that the Legend and Acts were forged about 514, in order to give currency to the axiom: No one can judge the Roman See. But *cui bono*? What was the use of trying to insinuate a principle which already all openly believed and professed? Dr. Schulte was unlucky in fixing his date. For twelve or thirteen years before that time the maxim of Church law which he thinks the forger sought to introduce had been solemnly proclaimed by the united bishops of France and Italy. Amongst the latter were the bishops of the chief cities, Pavia, Milan, and Ravenna, which even then (being the residence of the monarch, as it was afterwards of the Exarchs) was beginning to set up its pretensions against Rome.

The occasion of this solemn declaration was the Council held at Rome in 502 by permission of Pope Symmachus, in order to dispel the accusations made against him by the anti-pope Laurentius. Its Acts furnish a splendid proof of the Pope's supremacy. The bishops of the provinces of Aemilia, Liguria, and the Venetian territory refused to come when summoned by Theodoric, and only consented to attend when assured by him that Symmachus had agreed to submit his case to investigation by the council. They say, in their letter to the king, that they knew well that the primacy (*principatus*) of St. Peter, the ordinance of Christ our Lord, and the voice of General Councils had given to the Roman See special power over all the churches, but they had never heard that "its occupant was subject to the judgment of his inferiors."² The *Libellus Apologeticus* of Ennodius, Bishop of Ticinum (Pavia),

¹ This is in the supposition that the legend was framed by a Catholic; but it is by no means impossible that the writer may have been the same Donatist who invented the calumny and then coined the synod in order to have the Pope's acknowledgment of having been a *traditor* (betrayer of the Sacred Books). The very expression "prima sedes" smacks of the language of Africa, the stronghold of the Donatists.

² "Nec antedictæ Sedis Antistitem minorum subjacuisse judicio." This with all the other documents and acts of the Council may be found in Mansi's Collection, tom. viii., p. 247, et seq.

which was approved by the Council and inserted in its Acts, declares that "God will have the cases of other bishops settled by human tribunals; but the judgment of this (Roman) prelate He has unquestionably reserved to Himself."¹ The bishops of Gaul were still more indignant at what they considered an outrage on the inalienable rights of the successor of St. Peter. Though they had learned that the issue of the Council was favorable to Symmachus, it did not alter their opinion. For they had not been made aware of the fact that Symmachus himself had authorized its proceedings from the beginning to the close, and thus legitimated what otherwise would have been schismatical presumption. Hence, they thought it their duty to censure the hardihood of the bishops who had ventured on such a rash, dangerous course. They commissioned St. Avitus, Bishop of Vienne, to write to Rome in their name, and protest on their behalf against the action of the council. St. Avitus says in his letter, amongst other things, "It is difficult to understand upon what plea of reasoning or of law a superior can be judged by those who are beneath him. . . . In the case of other bishops, if anything be wrong, it may be remedied; but if the Pope of Rome is to be put upon his trial, it is no longer one bishop but the Episcopal Order itself that is threatened with destruction."²

The principle that the Pope "judges all and is judged by none" did not originate with the Roman Council of 502. We find it distinctly laid down by Pope Gelasius in 495, as even Janus is forced reluctantly to admit. (He can only console himself by saying that the Pope's language is an *insult* to the Greek Church. What, then, must he think of St. Leo the Great tossing to the winds their 28th canon of Chalcedon?) It is also clearly stated as the law of the Church by Pope Boniface in 422,³ and by his predecessor, Zosimus, in 418.⁴ Did these Popes learn their lesson from the forger, yet unborn, of 514? Or was it the tradition of their See that had come down to them from St. Peter and was acknowledged by all the churches? We assert, without fear of contradiction, that there never was a time in the history of early Christianity when any one ventured to dispute this well-founded maxim of Christian jurisprudence—not

¹ *Aliorum forte hominum causas Deus voluerit per homines terminare. Sed istius (Sedis Apostolicæ) præsulem sine quæstione suo reservavit arbitrio. Ibid.*

² *Non facile datur intelligi qua vel ratione vel lege ab inferioribus eminentior judicetur In sacerdotibus ceteris potest, si quid forte nutaverit, reformari. At si Papa Urbis vocatur in dubium Episcopatus jam videbitur, non Episcopus vacillare. Ibid.*

³ *Epist. ad Rufum Thessalonicen.*

⁴ *Ep. XII. ad Aurel.* This and the preceding epistle may be found in Mansi's Collection under the head of the respective Pontiffs. One of the advantages of this edition is that it contains all that is good in the Benedictine, Constant's Collection "*Epistolæ Roman. Pontificum.*"

coined in the sixth century, but dating from the days of St. Peter, Linus, Cletus, and Clement—the Holy See judges all and is judged by none. The framer of the legend (be he Catholic or Donatist) did not invent the saying; he only transcribed it. The same observation applies to whoever wrote the *Constitutum Sylvestri*, of which Dr. Schulte knows nothing and very prudently gives only its name. Its authorship is impossible to determine or even to guess at with any chance of probability. It is not so difficult to invent facts and succeed in having them accepted as true. But it is an utter impossibility to invent principles of faith or law, entirely at variance with the prevailing system of religion or jurisprudence, and succeed in convincing its adherents that these forgeries have always formed an integral part of the system. It is only the men who habitually sneer at Catholic faith that are fond of swallowing such huge absurdities.

As regards the *Gesta Liberii*, here again the first seeds of the fable must be looked for in the prolific field of heretical forgery. That Pope Liberius prevaricated in any way, that he ever signed any formula of those that are known as *Sirmienses* (of Sirmium), much less that he fell into or sanctioned any error against faith, is historically impossible. His return to his See was the basis of all these more or less extravagant charges. But the reasons assigned for his return by the best historians,¹ viz., the hatred of the Roman people against Arianism, the hostile attitude of the clergy and laity of Rome to Felix, who had usurped the place of Liberius; the tumults and seditions caused by the presence of the intruder, which culminated in his final expulsion from the city; and finally, the prayers and entreaties of the noble matrons of Rome who interceded with the emperor—all these are sufficient to explain why Constantius reluctantly² recalled Liberius from the exile to which he had been condemned because of his unflinching orthodoxy, in which, by all accounts, he persevered to the very end of his life. These reasons make it quite unnecessary to suppose that it was any betrayal of Catholic truth, or unworthy compliance of any kind, that secured his pardon and restoration to the Roman See. When he came back the Roman clergy and people received him with every sign of joy and enthusiastic welcome,³ which, consider-

¹ Sulpicius, Severus, Sozomen, and Theodoret. Cassiodorus is often added, but he lived later, and is only the echo of the two last mentioned.

² *Licet invitus*, says Socrates. Hist. Eccl., lib. ii., cap. 37.

³ Even those of his contemporaries (amongst others, St. Jerome in his Chronicle) who were deceived by the report of his fall from orthodoxy, inconsistently add that he entered Rome in triumph. The style of the passage in which St. Jerome states the fact is to all appearance his own; and it is more reasonable to suppose that the Saint was misled by popular report than to accuse copyists of interpolation.

ing their well-known detestation of Arianism, is utterly irreconcilable with the hypothesis that his treachery to the true faith was the price of his recall from exile. But from the days of Simon Magus fraud and slander have always been the choice weapons of heresy; and none ever surpassed the Arians in skilful use of them. Ever on the alert for means, fair or foul, to serve their party interests, no sooner did they hear of the return of Liberius than they sought to turn it to account by misrepresenting its cause. They gave out that exile had broken his obstinate spirit and opened his eyes to Arian truth. They spread the rumor far and wide, from the Persian Gulf to the Pillars of Hercules. And the better to impose on the simple and good, with ingenious toil they forged and circulated letters in the name of Catholic bishops, piously bewailing or angrily denouncing the fall of Liberius. This is the origin of the apocryphal letters (called fragments) of St. Hilary, which Gallicans loved to quote and which anti-Catholic zeal has not yet given up. The wicked report reached Athanasius as he was going into banishment, and added a fresh pang to the sufferings of the noble confessor. It penetrated the deserts of Palestine and wounded the heart of the holy Doctor, St. Jerome. So that, after all, we have to thank heresy for the falsehood, which the unskilful compiler sought to remedy by additional fiction.

The *Gesta Sixti* (or *Xysti*) *III.* records the acts of a chronologically impossible council, in which that Pope was accused of crime by a certain Bassus, and acquitted. In matter and style it is a clumsy fabrication, too contemptible for notice, and one is at a loss to discover any earthly motive for the forgery. Xystus III., predecessor of St. Leo the Great, was not only a saint but one of the great Pontiffs of his age,¹ and needs no apology. Heretics who, it seems, cannot help slandering the Holy See, brought a malicious charge against him while yet alive. The Pelagians claimed him as a patron of their heterodox opinions on grace and original sin. But he proved the falsehood of the accusation so triumphantly as to elicit from the great St. Augustine a warm letter of congratulation. These heretics dishonored him in life; it was reserved for orthodox ignorance to dishonor him after death by this pretended justification.

¹ The magnificent Basilica of St. Mary Major as it now stands (all but the portico) and the beautiful mosaics which adorn the majestic nave, and are yet admired in the fifteenth century of their existence, bear witness to the munificence of Xystus; and the brief inscription which records the gift attests the modesty as well as the good taste of the Father of his people: *XYSTUS EPISCOPUS PLEBI DEI* (Xystus, Bishop to God's people). These mosaics were a true Scripture-book, representing the facts and personages of both Testaments. They had the honor of being quoted in a General Council (Nice, A.D. 787) as witness to the Roman (and therefore Catholic) belief in the lawfulness of images.

The interpolation of the works of St. Cyprian is also alleged as another of the Pope's forgeries. Let us first narrow the question down to its just limits. It is a question of one passage, and one only, in the saint's book, *De Unitate Ecclesie*. St. Cyprian's works are not unlike those of other authors, and there is no reason why they should be exempt from the fate that has overtaken so many ancient writings and even the Holy Scriptures themselves. In those days when books were preserved and multiplied, not by the speedy art of the printer, but by the patient toil of the copyist, it would often happen that in the process of repeated transcription, glosses, marginal notes, etc., would at last creep into the text and find there a permanent place. He must be a novice in Biblical criticism who does not know that the doxology ("For thine is the kingdom," etc., Matth. vi. 13) is no part of inspired Scripture, but a marginal gloss that has made its fraudulent way into the Greek and Anglican Bibles. All Protestant scholars now admit this. May not the same have been the case with St. Cyprian's book? The expressions "*Primatus Petro datur*" and "*Qui cathedram Petri deserit, etc.*," are evidently but the expansion or explanation of the saint's previous words, and therefore (if they be indeed additions, which not all will allow)¹ it is perfectly legitimate to consider them as mere glosses, that gradually by innocent error have found their way from the margin into the body of the text. The added words, if such they are, state two things which agree perfectly with this and other passages of St. Cyprian and with the sense of all antiquity. Why, then, suppose them forged and twisted into the text with evil intent?

The first of these things is, that the primacy was given to St. Peter; the second, that no one can abandon the chair of Peter without leaving the Catholic Church. It will scarcely be denied that St. Cyprian admits the primacy not only of St. Peter but of his successors, and this not only in other writings and letters of his, but in the very passages that precede and follow the gloss, if such we must call it. This even Mosheim confesses, though he takes immediate revenge on the saint by accusing him of inconsistency and contradiction. The allusion is, no doubt, to the subsequent quarrel with Pope Stephen. But who does not know that the best of men may, in an unguarded hour, say or do something inconsistent

¹ They are rejected, as a matter of course, by the Calvinist Goulart and the Anglican Fell in their editions of St. Cyprian, and omitted as doubtful by Baluzius and Maran. But they are retained in the edition of the semi-Calvinist Rigaltius, and (strange to say) are confidently quoted in the Circular Letter of the famous Gallican Convencicle held at Paris in 1682. The first public use (that we know) of the words was by Pelagius II. in his letter to the Bishops of Istria (Pelag., Ep. ii. ad Epp. Istr.) in Mansi's Collection, tom. xi.

with the principles they have ever professed and for which they would lay down their lives? The other point contained in the disputed words is, that Catholic communion and communion with the Holy See are one and the same thing. This was a standard principle acknowledged from the beginning of the Church by all; by none more frequently or more earnestly than by St. Cyprian. For example, addressing Pope St. Cornelius, he speaks of the exertions he has used "to make my fellow-bishops recognize and adhere to thee and thy communion, THAT IS, the unity of the Catholic Church."¹ And again, writing to Antonianus, he uses nearly the same phrase, "to hold communion with Cornelius, THAT IS, with the Catholic Church."² Hence it is that St. Ambrose used to say, "Wherever Peter is, *there* is the Church."³ And the same saint, in his discourse on the death of his holy brother, Satyrus, to prove how scrupulous was the deceased in matters of Catholic faith, relates how Satyrus, having arrived in the course of his journey at a certain place, and having some reason to suspect that the congregation was not strictly orthodox but infected with Arianism, in order to satisfy his conscience and discover the truth, applied the proper test. He went immediately to the bishop of the city and asked him whether he was one in doctrine and communion "with the Catholic bishops, THAT IS, with the See of Rome."⁴ And there are a thousand such examples. How, then, could the insertion in the text of a few words containing a doctrine held for centuries by the universal Church, minister in any way to the "pretensions of the Roman bishop?" And by what law of historical criticism⁵ is it allowed to put forward the bold assertion, unsupported by any proof, that the interpolation is due to Rome, to the Pope, and, as the unblushing Janus adds, to Pelagius II.? Where would have been the improbability of supposing that the copy used by Pelagius in his letter to the bishops of Istria, was one of those in which the gloss had come to be incorporated with the text? But neither probabilities nor evidence must be allowed to stand in the way when the Pope is to be maligned.

The *Liber Pontificalis* is nothing but a collection of biographical sketches of the Popes, written at different times, and which

¹ Te et tuam sedem ID EST Ecclesiæ Catholicæ unitatem. Ep. xlv. ad Cornel.

² Cum Cornelio ID EST cum Ecclesia Catholica communicare. Ep. lii. ad Antonian.

³ Ubi Petrus, *ibi* Ecclesia. Ambros. in Psalm 1., num. 30.

⁴ Utrum cum Episcopis Catholicis ID EST cum Romana sede conveniret. In Obitu Satyri Fratr., i. 47.

⁵ This is often only a specious name to veil *historical malignity*. Without going back to the book on Plutarch on Herodotus, we have a very readable treatise on the subject over a hundred years ago by the celebrated Appiano Buonafede. It is entitled *Della Malignità Istorica Libri Tre*, Bologna, 1757. It is directed against the Venetian Janus (Sarpi) and his French translator, Le Courayer.

naturally grow in length as they approach later times. It begins with St. Peter and ends with Stephen VII. (about 886), whose life is unfinished. Its authors are uncertain. The early portion is not by Damasus, to whom it was anciently attributed; nor must Anastasius Bibliothecarius be credited (as modern writers generally have done) with the lives of the Popes from the sixth to the ninth centuries. If the author of the first part really wrote in the sixth century, and made use of spurious documents, there is no reason to suppose any other explanation of it than his lack of critical knowledge. The assertion that the book was compiled or forged by a Pope of that century, as Dr. Schulte says, is simply beneath notice. That it was forged to exhibit the Popes as "legislators for the whole Church" is mere unfounded assertion, or rather reckless calumny. The writer could not have represented them in any other light; for genuine, undisputed history shows them to have been such in the Eastern and Western Churches from the very beginning. It would be a much more rational inference to conclude that the author was the Papal Sacristan or an officer of his Treasury, and that his object in writing was to show the wealth of the Roman Church in her sacred vestments, church ornaments, and landed possessions; for he seems to pay special attention to the enumeration of these objects. It is an old and true saying:

Navita de ventis, de tauris narrat arator.

Of the donation of Constantine we have said enough already. It was not all a forgery, for it rested on a strong basis of fact. It was an awkward, bungling attempt to invest with formal shape, mature life, and completeness of detail, that which had but an indistinct, embryotic existence. The donation may have been "concocted at Rome," though there is no historical ground for the assertion. But the discovery made by Janus, that it was concocted by a clerk, within the walls of the Lateran, betrays only the romancer, whose potency of genius enables him, unseen, to see and overhear all, to enter at will through closed doors, into sealed cabinets, to pry into the inmost recesses either of the human heart or of the Pope's palace. It is surely beneath the dignity of the dispassionate historian. Wherever the document may have originated, its purpose, most certainly, was not that of inducing Pepin "to concede temporal sovereignty to the Bishop of Rome," since he ALREADY possessed it. Instead of believing bad Catholic testimony, why should not Dr. Schulte listen rather to an honest Protestant witness, one who was long a brilliant light of his own Church? The late Dean of St. Paul's will teach him that Pope Gregory the Great (A.D. 590-604) was a temporal ruler, and that his sovereignty came to him neither from forgery nor other unworthy art.

"In the person of Gregory, the Bishop of Rome first became, in act and in influence, if not in avowed authority, a temporal sovereign. Nor were his acts the ambitious encroachments of ecclesiastical usurpation on the civil power. They were forced upon him by the purest motives, if not by absolute necessity. The spiritual sovereignty fell to him as abdicated by the neglect or powerlessness of its rightful owners."¹

The other "fabrications" which were to coax Charlemagne to enlarge his father's grant, are well entitled to the name, but not in the sense intended by the writer. They are simply the wicked coinage of Janus's brain, and never had an existence elsewhere. They are utterly unknown to history. They have never been quoted, mentioned, or in any way hinted at in the correspondence between Charlemagne and Adrian, or his successors, nor by any chronicler of that or a subsequent period. One should have his own hands clean if he would have us listen with patience to his railing against "forgery."

The subject of Nicholas I. and the Pseudo-Decretals is too vast to be dispatched in a few words; and, independently of Dr. Schulte or Janus, may afford matter for future discussion. They had no more to do in giving to the Holy See her supremacy and infallibility than had the conquests of Tamerlane or of Genghis Khan. We would only remark that the belief, real or pretended, that an obscure forgery of the ninth century, succeeded instantaneously in reversing all the maxims, principles, and practices of the day, in overthrowing the entire framework of Church legislation and doctrine, and replacing it by another wholly different, without outcry, without serious opposition, is belief in a miracle, or rather in an impossibility. And such belief comes with exceeding bad grace from the enlightened men who habitually reject and sneer at the best attested miracles of Church history.

¹ History of Latin Christianity including that of the Popes. By Henry Hart Milman, D.D., Dean of St. Paul's. New York, 1860. Vol. II., p. 73.

BOOK NOTICES.

1. HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By *Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg*. Translated by *George S. Morris, A.M.* With additions, by *Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D.* 2 vols., pp. 561, 487. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1876.
2. LEHREBUCH DER GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. Von *Dr. Albert Stöckl*. Mainz: Verlag von Franz Kirchheim, 1870. 1 vol., pp. 851.

The first of these works has been for some time awaiting a notice at our hands. The reception of the second reminds us of the fact, and we forthwith hasten to review them both together. Dr. Ueberweg's book is quite a popular manual among students and professors of philosophy. To the latter it is indispensable, on account of the exhaustive bibliography attached to each author's name. The best and most trustworthy editions of philosophical works are pointed out. The author seems to have spared no pains to render the work a standard reference-book. In the part treating of Scholasticism he seeks to be fair-minded. Indeed, as a rule, he attempts to give a plain, impartial skeleton of the various systems and doctrines he meets, without interpolating any opinion of his own. If he has remarks to make, as when commenting upon the paralogisms of Spinoza, he makes them in footnotes, so as not to interfere with the outline he places before the reader in the text. The main question here is, How far is that outline a faithful transcript of the system it traces? In order to answer this question satisfactorily, we must test the philosophic temper of the author.

Dr. Ueberweg has a clear, acute, philosophic mind. His definition of philosophy shows that he possesses a correct conception of it; and, it may be added, that this is the first essential for a historian of philosophy. "Philosophy," he says, "is the science of principles." This definition goes nearer to grasping the essence of philosophy than any other the reviewer is acquainted with. Dr. Stöckl squares his definition with his subject-matter. He regards it as an effort of the mind to raise itself to the last analysis of things, considered in their causes; or, to use his own words, it is "the effort to penetrate, by way of discursive thinking, to the highest and last causes of all being—*das Streben, auf dem Wege des discursiven Denkens zu den höchsten und letzten Gründen alles Seienden durchzudringen*" (p. 1). We always prefer a definition taken objectively. There is more truth in it; for it aims rather at giving us the essence of a thing than the mere subjective impression. This definition of Dr. Stöckl tells us of a struggle of the intellect, and an effort to rise higher than surface impressions. But that is not philosophy. For this reason we give preference to Dr. Ueberweg's definition. As the crucial test of a philosopher is in his definitions, let us try another in each of the books under review.

Dr. Ueberweg defines history from a subjective and an objective standpoint. "History, in the objective sense," he says, "is the process by which nature and spirit are developed" (p. 5). We do not think that this is history at all. It may be the organic law of humanity or society, and as such it may form the subject-matter of history, but it is not history. History is a record. Therefore what the author gives as the subjective sense is the only definition of history. "History, in the subjective sense," he says, "is the investigation and statement of this objective development." Dr. Stöckl, in defining the history of

philosophy makes the same objective and subjective distinction (*Lehrbuch*, p. 3). We regard the practice as a pernicious one. It does not clear up one's ideas; it only tends to mystify. Regarding anything subjectively and objectively is only looking at two aspects of it. But it has many more aspects besides. Every different standpoint will give a new aspect. Studying a thing under its various aspects may help us to understand it partially, and to describe it partially, but it will not give us the comprehension of the thing as a whole. For that we must look at it as it simply is.

Another defect we notice in Dr. Ueberweg as a historian, is a lack of versatility of mind. He seems unable to put himself in the place of the philosopher whose system he lays before us. He describes from outside. In this respect he is surpassed by Dr. Stöckl. The latter is, for this reason, not so dry, and writes with a freshness that attracts. On some authors, as Jacob Böhme, for instance, he is much fuller and more accurate. Indeed, he understands the whole subject of mysticism much better than does Ueberweg. And in the whole history of philosophy there is none more difficult. The terminology is strange, and the use of words is peculiar. Thus, in the analysis of Böhme's system Stöckl gives his conception of God in Böhme's own terminology. Therein we read that God is an everlasting Nothing—*er ist ein ewiges Nichts* (p. 567). On the face of it this reads like pure atheism, a total denial of God. But nothing was farther from the conception of Böhme. The Catholic Tauler did not so understand the expression, nor did blessed Henry Suso, and no doubt both of them frequently made use of the expression long before Böhme was born. The expression is descriptive of that mystical state of the soul when it has, in contemplation, ceased to have sensible images of any kind before its mind's eye, and feels itself plunged into a vague indeterminateness, an abyss of calm, that no word can better express than Nothing. Then the soul feels it is holding mystic communion with God. Therefore seeking this state was commonly called seeking the Nothing. We learn that a clergyman, who is himself a philosopher of merit, is about to translate this volume of Stöckl's. We would call his attention to this part of the book, and suggest the propriety and necessity of adding explanatory notes. Besides, Stöckl himself is here to be followed with caution.

And what has here been said of the difficulty of apprehending the mediæval mystics applies with equal force to the ancient pagan philosophers. Here, too, Ueberweg shows his want of versatility. He carries with him everywhere his scale of German transcendentalism, and weighs in it Heraclitus and Pythagoras with the same weight with which he tests Kant or Hegel. He imagines them exercised over the same issues which occupied his own life, while in all probability such ideas never entered their minds. For this reason it seems to us that he places a forced interpretation on several passages in these ancient writers. The leaders of philosophic schools, in Greece especially, took pleasure in making the major part of their teachings esoteric, and for this purpose they veiled them in cabalistic terms. Think you the "fire" of Heraclitus was a literal fire? Neither are we sure of the real import of the teachings of Parmenides or Pythagoras. These are preliminary questions that every historian of philosophy ought to study. In neither of the works before us do they seem to have been taken into consideration to any determinate extent, and in Ueberweg less than in Stöckl.

To Dr. Ueberweg's work are added two appendices. One is by Noah Porter, on English and American philosophy. It is a fresh and agreeable sketch, but it lacks the accuracy of Ueberweg. We do not think

the author appreciates and does justice to the late Doctor Brownson and his philosophy. The influence of *Brownson's Review* upon American, and especially New England, thought, has not been fully recognized as it should have been. And, for a gentleman of Noah Porter's standing, it is somewhat surprising to see him use that vulgar shibboleth, "Romish." However, the sketch of Italian philosophy by Signor Botta is still more objectionable. We learn from the appendix that the Signor was a "Professor of Philosophy in the Royal Colleges of the University of Turin." Perhaps the fact of his having been a professor in more than one college at the same time accounts for his unphilosophic habits of thought. He seems to have a certain acquaintance with the language and methods of some schools of philosophy, but he has neither depth nor acuteness. The traditionalism of Padre Ventura he calls scholasticism. He undertakes to give the principles of the *Civiltà Cattolica*, and he sums them up in supposed propositions drawn from the Syllabus of 1864, without reference to their bearings and connections. We submit to the Signor that the condemning of errors is one thing, and the establishing of principles another and a far different thing. This last is what is within the legitimate sphere of the history of philosophy. We must say that Signor Botta has marred an otherwise useful book. We cannot recommend it to our Catholic colleges. It is to be hoped that the *Lehrbuch* of Stöckl will soon appear in an English dress. It is more convenient, if not more erudite, than Ueberweg's.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. By *Herbert Spencer*. Vol. I., pp. 704. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877.

This volume is intended by its author to form part of a system of synthetic philosophy. This is soaring into the highest regions of philosophy. None but superior geniuses attempt the work of synthetic philosophy. Gioberti had an intellect adequate to the task; so had Pierre Leroux; so had Hegel; but these men abused their talent, and their philosophies remain so many wrecks floating upon the sea of thought. Has Herbert Spencer also a genius adequate to the task? We think not. Littré has said that Herbert Spencer was no metaphysician, and we agree with him. He has tact for natural science; he has a certain amount of power of classification; he has great control over language, and facility in inventing terminology, but he lacks philosophic acuteness. Synthetic philosophy requires a principle binding together into a united whole all the various parts. This is what Herbert Spencer has nowhere in his philosophy. He makes all things subordinate to the theory of evolution; but a theory is one thing, a principle is something far different. His early training in the school of Comte gave him the advantage of a new starting-point; it placed many things before him in a novel light. He improved the occasion, and made divergencies enough from his master to draw upon himself the abuse of the Positivists, and to come to be considered the founder of a new school in philosophy. The broadest difference between himself and Comte lies in the fact that whilst the latter merges the individual in humanity, the former merges both individual and humanity in the Cosmos. In details, he reproduces many of the Positivist doctrines, among others that treated of in the volume under review.

In fact, Herbert Spencer in this and his other volumes on the same subject, is only filling up the outline sketched in a masterly manner by Comte. It is Leibnitz who said: *Le présent est gros de l'avenir*. This principle is true enough, and on its misapprehension did Comte build

up his system of sociology. He conceived all results of a political or social movement as necessarily happening, which is far from being the case; whereas he ought not to have gone further than the dictum of Montesquieu, that the same causes acting under the same circumstances ought to produce the same results. In consequence, the doctrine of free-will is, in his opinion, and Herbert Spencer coincides with him, a fictitious belief, based upon one's ignorance of the laws of sociology. For this reason he classifies the new science with the natural sciences. "Now," says he, "that the human mind has established celestial physics, terrestrial physics, whether mechanical or chemical organic physics, whether vegetable or animal, it remains for it to terminate the system of the sciences of observation, by establishing social physics" (*Philosophie Positive*, I., p. 22). Accordingly, he divides it into social statics, or the laws of social coexistence, and social dynamics, or "that continuous succession seen in the whole of humanity—*cette succession continuë, envisagée dans l'ensemble de l'humanité*" (ibid., t. 4, p. 263). And Herbert Spencer takes the same materialistic view of social science. He has a special treatise on social statics. But in the present volume he shifts his basis of discussion from physics to physiology. Such a mode of reasoning is only analogy. Now, it is a problem that seems never to have entered the brain of either Mr. Spencer or M. Comte, how far, if at all, analogy can be made the basis of any science.

Can the *aná-logos* ever take the place of the *lógos*? And if not, does not all the reasoning of both Mr. Herbert Spencer and his master topple to the ground? Not that there may not be constructed a science of sociology. But we fear neither Positivist nor Cosmist can give it an adequate expression. They begin at the wrong end. They defy history and tradition and the noblest instincts of human nature.

Principles of Sociology is occupied with subjects of moment and interest. The first 400 pages are devoted to the explanation of the "Primitive Man," physically, emotionally, and intellectually considered. Therein are we served up an account of how we came to think we have such a thing as a soul, and what led us to believe in a future life and in a Supreme Being. We must confess we found the dish rather insipid, not on account of the matter presented, but rather because of the cooking. There is too much hash for our stomach. True, Mr. Spencer felt that the whole was rather difficult to swallow, so he added some condiment in the shape of an insult to the intelligence of Catholics, by making their belief in the Real Presence a criterion of incongruity of reason (p. 185). Here is a taste of the intellectual food Mr. Spencer prepares for his readers. It is an attempt to account for the origin of worship. Of course, you imagine the author dealing with man's sense of the mysteriousness of nature and the hidden powers that control its energies. But that is an antiquated hypothesis. Herbert Spencer has a span-new one. It is a genuine ghost story. "The awe of the ghost," he says, "makes sacred the sheltering-place of the tomb, and this grows into the temple; while the tomb itself becomes the altar. From provisions placed for the dead, now habitually and now at fixed intervals, arise religious oblations, ordinary and extraordinary—daily and at festivals. Immolations and mutilations at the grave pass into sacrifices and offerings of blood at the altar of a deity. Abstinence from food for the benefit of the ghost develops into fasting as a pious practice; and journeys to the grave with gifts become pilgrimages to the shrine. Praises of the dead and prayers to them grow into religious praises and prayers. And so every religious rite is derived from a funeral rite." (P. 446.) Now is not this a sweet tidbit of evolutionism? Well, grant Mr. Spen-

cer his premises, and you will be compelled to take it all down, and absurdities still greater. If man has developed from the lower forms of life—if the most degraded conditions of savage life are the primitive states of society—if language is a human invention, and law and order the result of experience, slow and gradual—and Church and religion institutions of fictitious value—then—. *If!* This is the last word to which an analysis of Mr. Spencer's position reduces him. His whole system hangs upon that word *if*. And the misfortune is, he has disciples who upon that same word—frail, slender, untrustworthy though it be—hang their eternal destiny. For this reason, *Principles of Sociology* is a pernicious book. It furnishes scoffers at religion with many new and telling points.

Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte both belie history when they represent the savage as the type of primitive man. He is representative rather of the old age of society. It is an historical fact that no nation by its own individual efforts ever raised itself out of the savage state into civilization; that is the work of education. It is also an historical fact that no language, be its imperfections what they may, ever changed its essential grammatical structure for that of another, no matter how rich in idiom and expression. And when we study the beginnings of Oriental history, we look in vain for a barbaric period. "Egyptian civilization," says Mariette Bey, "manifests itself to us fully developed from the earliest ages, and succeeding ones, however numerous, taught it little more." (*Aperçu de l'Histoire d'Égypte*.) Renan expresses the same opinion. And speaking of China, Ferguson says: "At the earliest period at which Chinese history opens upon us, we find the same amount of civilization maintaining itself utterly unprogressively to the present day." (*History of Architecture*, I., p. 83.) We assure the reader that there is not a single fact in the *Principles of Sociology* that cannot be explained, not by supposing, but by remembering, the fact that the savage life is the old age of society, and its degraded and inane state is like that into which old persons fall when they are said to enter on their second childhood.

INTRODUCTIO IN SACRAM SCRIPTURAM ad usum Scholarum Pont. Seminarii Romani et Collegii Urbani, auctore *Ubaldo Ubaldi*, Presbytero Romano, SS. Literarum Prof. Vol. I., Introductio Critica, Pars Prima. Romæ: ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, 1877. Large octavo.

This is a volume extorted from him, as the author assures us, by the importunity of disciples and friends. And if ever importunity might be called tolerable, and more than that, praiseworthy, it was surely so in this case. Many of our clergy who had never seen Dr. Ubaldi before, learned to know and admire him during his short visit to our shores some two years ago in the company of the Papal Ablegate, Monseigneur Roncetti. If they will only read this book, in which he gives out the treasures accumulated during years of study, they will know him better and admire him still more. It is a work of singular excellence, and with the learned world will confirm and add to the high reputation which he has long enjoyed as professor.

Dr. Ubaldi (p. 9) refuses, and justly, in our opinion, to follow the practice of German Biblical scholars, who restrict to *Biblical Criticism* alone the name of "Introduction to Sacred Scripture." As the name indicates, it should include everything that *introduces* or leads the way to the study and understanding of Scripture. Why appropriate to a part what belongs rightfully to the whole? Hence Dr. Ubaldi aptly

divides the Introduction into three parts. The first, Biblical Criticism, which establishes the value and authority of the Scriptures so as to make of them a trustworthy source or witness to which the theologian can confidently appeal when he wishes to prove religious truth or refute human error that rebels against it. The second is Hermeneutics, which lays down the law of interpretation, viz., the only true method by which it can be lawful to explain and understand the Sacred Text; for it is evident that a code which contains the New Law, viz., the Faith which the Christian world has to believe and the Ordinances which it must obey, requires some fixed standard of interpretation, and must not be dependent on a capricious system, or rather want of all system, as is now the case with non-Catholics generally, whether so-called believers or professed unbelievers. The third part is known as Biblical Archæology, and comprises those aids which are derived from the manners, customs, geography, etc., of the Jews and their neighbors; in a word, from what are called Jewish Antiquities. This part Dr. Ubaldi proposes to omit, considering that the student may find it sufficiently well treated by Glaire in his Introduction, and in a special volume by Ackermann, who revised and corrected the rationalizing tendencies of Jahn. This we regret, as many travellers from the time when Glaire and Ackermann wrote, down to the late English Archæological Commission, have thrown fresh light on many subjects, and have made some discoveries of interest, if not of importance, in the topography of Jerusalem and other places in the Holy Land.

Besides (and this remark we respectfully recommend to Dr. Ubaldi's attention, should he ever reconsider his plan and decide to give his pupils the elements of Biblical Archæology, either as a part of the introduction or in a volume apart), would it not be well to include in this third part, or in an appendix to it, some account, however brief, of those discoveries made by Egyptian and Assyrian scholars which confirm the truth of the Scripture narrative? It may be said that a commentary would be a more appropriate place in which to mention, under their respective passages, those things which have been illustrated or vindicated by the researches of Egyptology and Assyriology. True: but such a commentary does not now exist, nor is it likely to be written soon. And when it does appear, it is not likely that among the few who may purchase it will be found any seminarian. The same may be said of the learned works in which these researches are unfolded; they are generally academic essays or society records, inaccessible to students and to most of our clergymen. We only venture the suggestion on the ground that our students ought to have *some* knowledge of these things; and, if they do not get it at this point of the course, they are not likely to get it afterwards. And, after all, the very name of Biblical Archæology seems to favor its introduction at this period of Bible study. A brief summary (thrown into an appendix, if you will) is all that can be expected, and will be sufficient to give them what they need to know on a subject of much importance. If they feel interested in the study, as will be the case with some, they will pursue it afterwards with the aid of the best sources.

Professor Ubaldi subdivides his first or "critical" part of the Introduction into three sections, the first of which discusses the human or *historical* authority of the sacred books, the second their divine or *canonical* authority. The third is called the *critica verbalis* or verbal criticism of the text, and examines the amount of authority that attaches to the smallest portions, and even to the very words themselves of the sacred text. With this volume the author concludes the first section, so that

we may expect from him not only a second but perhaps a third volume. We sincerely hope that no fear of being considered diffuse or prolix will prevent him from giving us a full and complete introduction. Our theological students need such a classbook, and Dr Ubaldi is just the writer to provide it. If too large for small seminaries or a limited course, it can be abridged, and the author hints in the Preface that he may some day, if necessary, reduce the present work into a compendary form. But for our colleges and large seminaries, and for the clergy who have leisure to study, a book is needed which will exhibit and refute the latest objections made in the name and under the pretext of science against the book of God's Revelation. These enemies of Holy Scripture are coming forward daily with new weapons, new modes of attack, and we have only to fight them on their own ground and with the weapons of their own choosing.

Dr. Ubaldi has done this well; and we need only refer to his chapters on the Mosaical account of the creation and of man's origin. He ably refutes the geological systems invented by irreligion to throw doubt or discredit on the statements of the inspired historian. He is thoroughly acquainted with all that is objected from the ages of stone, brass, and iron, the lacustrine dwellings, etc., and disposes of them in a satisfactory way. We might add his treatment of the so-called fragmentary hypothesis, and how he confutes it not only on intrinsic grounds, but by insisting on the important point that while pompously prating about Jehovistic and Elohistie fragments, no two rationalists scarcely can agree in fixing the authorship of this or that fragment.

This is one of the best and at the same time most tangible arguments against these men of false science, and ought to be pressed against them not only in this but in all other matters, in which their impiety lifts up its blasphemous mouth against God and His teaching.

Dr. Ubaldi's style, it may be added, is clear and lucid, and even elegant, as far as is compatible with the didactic form which he is compelled to use.

LIVES OF THE SAINTS, compiled from authentic sources; with a Practical Instruction on the Life of each Saint, for every day in the year. By F. X. Weninger, D.D., S. J. Vol. II. New York: P. O'Shea, Publisher, 1876. Royal oct., pp. 837.

We have already in a previous number called attention to the first volume of this most useful work. There can be no better book to put in the hands not only of Catholics but of those also who are outside of the Church. Many (more, indeed, than is generally supposed) are in this sad condition *vicio parentum*, by fault of their progenitors rather than their own. They have no blind hatred of the truth, and if they have prejudices contracted from a narrow education, are willing to discard them when better informed. For such "men of good will" there is no better book than the *Lives of the Saints*. Controversy has in it almost of its very nature something that tends to embitter and exasperate; to throw a man on the defensive, especially where the case is weak, puts him upon his mettle, and too often encourages pride and obstinacy. But the argument of example, appealing gently and silently through the pages of a book, succeeds far better not only in convincing but, what is more important, in persuading. It finds its way to the heart, and with God's grace often proves irresistible. The reader discovers by imperceptible but sure degrees where holiness, that unerring mark of the true church, is to be found. In other churches there is much talk about holy life, and its maxims are laid down, for the better class in books,

for those of the vulgar sort through the pulpit and the religious newspaper in a jargon that is not unfrequently revolting to good taste as well as to true piety. But how many go beyond the theory or its jargon? The mediocrity of outward goodness, the godliness which shows itself that it "may be seen of men," is the highest summit to which they seem able to aspire. Humility, the foundation of all Christian virtue, is as unknown to their speech as to their practice, in its Christian acceptance. The word has for them the same idea that *ταπεινότης* and *humilitas* had for the haughty Roman and the corrupt Greek of heathen times, "want of spirit, cowardice, abjectness of soul," and nothing more. Love of the cross is essential to sanctity, for sanctity consists in following Christ, and the way in which he walked was the way of suffering and self-abnegation. He tells us that they alone are perfect who resemble their Master; and to the young man who sought a higher holiness than the bare observance of the Ten Commandments he made answer, "If thou wilt be perfect . . . come, follow me" (Luke vi. 40; Matt. xix. 21). Where are the footsteps of those who tread the pathway of the cross, to be found outside of the Church? Where are we to look amongst non-Catholics for the tests of self-denial proposed in the New Testament, the fasts and vigils, the penances, the voluntary austerities preached and practiced by St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 27; 2 Cor. xi. 27)? It would be well if they were merely unknown; but, what is worse, they are denounced and derided as relics of ignorance and superstition.

On the other hand all these features of holiness that love to take up the cross and follow Christ, are easily recognized in the Catholic Church and the innumerable saints that adorn her calendar. And even those who are strangers to her belief, who with no unworthy disposition read the glorious lives of the martyrs, confessors, virgins, and other saints, must soon come to admire them. Admiration will beget affection; and if God's grace is not thwarted, if it is allowed to have its way, the result cannot be long doubtful. They will begin to sigh for and crave, and will end by obtaining fellowship with those great saints through the communion of that Church which alone could be the mother of such patterns of holiness.

This, it may not be denied, is only an indirect use of books like the one before us, and not the one primarily intended by the compilers. Nevertheless we have dwelt on it, because we fear it is too much neglected and much good thereby lost. To one who manifests a wish to inquire into our doctrines and practices, a Catholic friend or neighbor will usually hand a copy of Milner, Wiseman, Manning, or other controversial writer, and think that enough has been done by placing their powerful arguments in the hands of the inquirer. But very often it is not enough. Argument may convince, but example attracts. While the intellect is beginning to yield assent, the heart likewise must be wrought upon and moved. Milner and Wiseman must be supplemented by *Lives of the Saints* and other devout reading.

Of course the principal use of such books, and the main object of their authors is to make Catholics acquainted, as they should be, but unfortunately are not, with the lives and actions of those great and holy men who have shed their lustre on the Church of Ages. We are all anxious and insist that our children should know everything connected with the lives of our Revolutionary heroes. And in fact, when called up and questioned, they can give plentiful and minute details of what was done by the Washingtons, and Franklins, the Waynes, Putnams, and Allens, the Sumters, and Marions of Revolutionary fame. But how much do they know of the holy martyrs, Laurence and Vincent, of

the apostles of the North, Augustine and Boniface, of the great modern restorer of church discipline, St. Charles Borromeo? Such ignorance is a shameful reproach to them, but more to the adult generation. If other churches had any of our saints, they would carefully impress their glorious deeds upon the tender mind of every Sunday-school child. At best, they have only a few counterfeits; yet they make the most of them. We have the genuine coin, and yet far from prizing it as we should and giving it circulation, we allow it to lie unheeded or buried in the earth. How can the Catholic duly honor and imitate saints, of whose existence in general he has a vague idea, but knows none of them in particular? Yet it was for this that God has given us the saints.

F. Weninger did not intend to write a critical history of the saints. Hence, he has no difficulty in using occasionally those legends which the pious fancy of our forefathers used to interweave with the strictly historical account of some early and mediæval saints. The publishers promise an additional volume of saints recently canonized or beatified, by the same author.

ELEMENTS OF ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, compiled with reference to the Syllabus, the Constitution "Apostolicæ Sedis" of Pope Pius IX., the Council of the Vatican, and the latest Decisions of the Roman Congregations. Adapted especially to the discipline of the Church in the United States. By *Rev. S. B. Smith, D.D.*, formerly Professor of Canon Law. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1877. 8vo., pp. 261.

This book of Dr. Smith is intended as the first of two volumes which will constitute a treatise on canon law, adapted to the needs of theological students in this country, where, as many say, and some really think, there is no canon law. Nothing could be more unreasonable than this assertion, and the author plainly shows it. We have the whole common law, and as much of statute law as our circumstances will allow. Dr. S. gives proof of much reading and a careful study of the subjects which he discusses. He does not shrink occasionally from freedom of speech, but there is nothing in the tone or temper of his remarks, as far as we have read, that any one could reasonably object to. If the author intended it for a textbook for seminaries, why did he not write it in Latin? The habit now coming into vogue of writing theological textbooks in the vernacular is not to be commended for many reasons. Besides, it is a breach of time-honored discipline, and one novelty is too often the mother of many others. As it is, the author has to fall back often on Latin, and fills his pages with it, so as to prove a stumbling-block to some readers.

BESIDE THE WESTERN SEA: A collection of Poems. By *Marie* (Harriet M. Skidmore). With an introduction by the *Most Rev. J. S. Alemany, D.D.*, Archbishop of San Francisco. New York: P. O'Shea, publisher, 1877. 8vo., pp. 534.

No one can open Marie's book and read a page or less without feeling the better of it, for it is true poetry. Oh that all those who are weary and heartsore with the perusal of the false, maudlin lays that first charm, then pervert, and finally sicken with disgust the children of the world, would take up this book and read it! As soon as they opened its pages they would find themselves in a new world. Its sweet and holy strain would attune their hearts to something higher and better than they ever knew before.

How few Catholics were aware that we possessed such a poet as Marie until the publication of her volumes! She has creative fancy, lofty thought, harmonious numbers, happy choice of words—everything that makes the poet. And she has another unfailing test of true poetry. The

simplest and most ordinary things become under her pen things of grandeur and dignity, and what causes this is not stilted metaphor, nor grandiloquent phrase, but the quiet magic of one or two words. If she have a defect at all, which we will not admit, it may be this: the splendor of her poetic atmosphere is perpetual, and the rich vesture in which she decks her fancies is gemmed with almost regal profusion.

The very first poem which our eye fell upon in opening the book at random gave us a high idea of Marie's power. It was "The Precious Blood" (p. 203), and when we saw the light, lilting metre in which such a lofty theme was to be sung, we feared that its solemnity would be impaired, perhaps lowered to the point of desecration. Let any one read it, and see how unjust was our fear. We should like to give a specimen of her style, but know not how to discriminate in our selection, so we choose the first piece that comes to hand. She is speaking of Christ's Spouse, the Church, and the poem borrows its title from its last line:

THE BRIDE THAT NEVER GROWETH OLD.

Not hers the life that waxeth old,
Its face and form of earthly mould.
Not hers the beauty carved from clay,
That bears the brand of dark decay.
She dwells in youth's immortal prime,
Nor dreads the ruthless hand of time,
For never can its touch erase
The radiance of her royal face,
Nor spot nor wrinkle e'er may blight
Her cheek of bloom and brow of light.
Her life-spring flows from source divine,
Her form is truth's eternal shrine:
No clinging trace of earthly clod
May mar the beauteous bride of God!
E'en when the primal curse began
To work its woe on fallen man,
She came, in types yet veiled and dim,
To trace the heavenward way for him.
She dwelt in Israel's lonely tent,
In long Egyptian banishment;
On crimson sea, o'er desert drear,
She cheered his path of gloom and fear, etc.—P. 153.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF DISTINGUISHED MARYLANDERS. By *Esmeralda Boyle*, author of "Thistle-Down," "Felice," etc. Baltimore: Kelly, Piet & Co., 1877. 8vo., pp. 374.

A good readable book in pleasant style, and containing two hitherto unpublished letters of General Washington. The fair authoress does not pretend to give a collection of all the worthies of Maryland, but only a selection from each class, civil and political, literary, military, etc. The period extends from the foundation of the colony to our own times, and includes those who distinguished themselves in the earliest period as well as some noble souls who gallantly threw themselves into the death-struggle of our own day.

DE DEO CREANTE. Prælectiones Scholastico-Dogmaticæ quas in Collegio SS. Cordis Jesu ad Woodstock maxima studiorum Domo Soc. Jesu in Fœd. Americæ Sept. Statibus habebat A.D. MDCCCLXXVI.—VII. *Camillus Mazella*, S. J., in eod. Coll. Studior, Præfectus et Theologiæ Dogmat. Professor. Woodstock, Marylandiæ: Ex-Officina Typographica Collegii, 1877. 8vo., pp. 935.

We regret that the late hour at which we received these *Prælectiones* prevents us from noticing them as we should wish in this number. We

can only recommend it to the clergy as an excellent treatise. From a note on the flyleaf we see that it can be procured from Rev. F. M. McDonough (treasurer), Woodstock College, Howard County, Md.

SHAKSPEARE, FROM AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW. By *George Wilkes*. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877. 8vo. pp. 471.

This work abounds in just and acute critical remarks on Shakspeare. Had the author taken pains to inform himself thoroughly upon Catholic doctrine and Catholic usages, and had he rid himself of his prejudices against the Church, he would have written a better and a more useful book. The book seems to have arisen from the absurd controversy concerning the authorship of the Shakspearian plays. The author takes issue against those who hold that Lord Bacon wrote them, and lays stress upon proving two points: first, that Shakspeare was a Catholic, and secondly, that he was not a people's man. For these two reasons he argues that Shakspeare is not a proper universal manual for American democracy and American Protestantism. He certainly proves that all Shakspeare's better instincts and sympathies were Catholic. Alas, for Shakspeare! Now that it is a proved fact that he is a Catholic, is it not time for a certain individual who writes anti-Catholic articles for a certain anti-Catholic *weekly*, to begin to vilify him? And, in the meantime, Mr. Wilkes might find leisure to prove that King James's Bible was translated with some inaccuracies from a Catholic Bible; we think it would help to settle the question of the use of the Bible in the public schools. Afterwards, he might show how the Book of Common Prayer is, the greater part of it, a translation of the Catholic Mass-Book, with some few changes to suit the fashions of the day. Then, he, or somebody else, could show how far Milton is indebted to the Catholic Cedmon, the Catholic Avitus, and, the Catholic Audreini, for the excellencies in his *Paradise Lost*. A new book might then be made from all these, composed of what is exclusively Protestant in them. It would be a very small and a very uninteresting book. In good truth it is too late for Mr. Wilkes, or anybody else, to begin to quarrel with an author because he is a Catholic. For the last decade of centuries we have been living upon Catholic thought, and whatever is worth preserving in the most decidedly Protestant writers has its roots in Catholicity. It were far more graceful to accept the situation.

ITALIAN MASS, for two voices. Arranged and published by *Edwin F. McGonigle*. Philadelphia: J. M. Armstrong, Musical Typographer, Philadelphia, 1877. 4to., pp. 32.

This Mass, for which in its new form of arrangement we are indebted to the patient labor of Prof. McGonigle, possesses two qualities that are its highest praise. In the first place it has a charming simplicity; and next its harmonies, however sweet, never fall short of that grave, solemn character which befits all that is to be sung, or said, or done during the celebration of the Sacred Mysteries. As it is for two voices only and can be easily learned, it is admirably suited to chapels, country churches, and small choirs, that from want of numbers, or of skilful training, or of sufficient opportunity to practice, cannot attempt pieces of more elaborate composition. In saying this, however, we are merely recommending the Mass as easy and simple, not derogating from its merits. On the contrary, it is certain that if this Mass were properly sung in the grandest of our cathedrals by a large number of the best-trained singers, it would fill with delight the ears of the assembled thousands, and

awaken deep religious feeling in their hearts, provided always that they be Christians in some degree and not mere fashionable worldlings or *dilettanti* who despise all music that can afford to dispense with screaming and trilling, with the *gorgheggio*, the *tosse di capra*, and other fanciful points of difficult execution. Such persons are, for the most part, as ignorant of music as they are innocent of devotion.

The present Mass was intended, no doubt, by the composer to be sung, not by a few, but by many male baritone voices. It is *then* that its holy harmonies obtain their due expression and come out in all their intrinsic beauty. Whoever listens to it performed under these conditions, is almost tempted to believe that the solemn majestic tones of many organs have been, as it were by sudden magic, transformed into so many intelligent, articulate voices, to utter the praises of the Most High in a way not altogether unworthy of His Divine majesty. And he who has thus heard it once will never care to hear again what is called fashionable sacred music in the House of God.

SUMMA SUMMÆ, scilicet Summæ Theologicæ Divi Thomæ Aquinatis Analytico-Synthetica Synopsis. In usum scholarum clericalium ad mentem Divi Thomæ in questionibus occurrentibus, præsertim philosophicis, certius citiusque aperiendam, necnon ipsius Summæ et gratiorem et utiliorem reddendam confect ac edidit T. J. O'Mahony, in Sac. Theol. et Jur. Canon, Doctor, etc. Dublinii: apud M. H. Gill et Filium, 1877. 8vo., pp. 108.

St. Thomas is the great model of theologians, and his works an immense treasure-house, whence endless stores may be drawn by patient study. Indeed, it is not too much to say, that one becomes more and more of a theologian in proportion as he learns to appreciate what has been written by that great Doctor. Foremost among his works is the *Summa*, which soon after its appearance became, and remained for ages (what Peter Lombard's *Sentences* had been before), the textbook of all the schools, to be elucidated but never replaced by the teacher's commentary. The study of the holy Doctor's works, after having declined during the last two centuries, has begun to revive in our day; and the many editions published of late, not only of the *Summa*, but also of other works by the old divines, go far to show that the scholastic form of theology is fast recovering the favor it once enjoyed, and which seemed to have passed away forever.

The work of Doctor O'Mahony is a proof that this revival of scholastic fervor and of the study of St. Thomas, has spread from the schools of the Continent of Europe to those of Great Britain and Ireland. The "synopsis" (of which this is only a first instalment) must be of the greatest advantage to every student of St. Thomas, for it is a complete guide to the Saint's doctrine, not alphabetical, nor in the language of the compiler, but by order of matter, and everywhere in the very words of the angelic Doctor himself. It is a work which required great skill and no little labor, and those who carefully use it will soon learn how much they owe to the patient zeal of the learned professor.

THE LIFE OF CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS. By Rev. Arthur George Knight, S. J. The Catholic Publication Society. New York, 1877.

Father Knight has done a meritorious work in putting forth this volume. The real character of Columbus has been greatly misunderstood. Justice has been scarcely done him as a navigator and discoverer, and that, too, tardily; but his character as a pure, virtuous man, a sagacious, prudent, and firm administrator, a consistent, devout, heroic Christian,

have never, before the publication of this book, been properly placed before the English reader.

Father Knight has successfully vindicated the character of Columbus in all these respects. He shows clearly that Columbus was far more than a bold, adventurous, and skilful mariner, and a diligent and successful student of geography and kindred physical sciences; he proves that he was no mean theologian, that he possessed eminent ability as a legislator and administrator, and was, both by nature and by grace, well fitted to be a leader and ruler of men, and, what is of more consequence, a Christian of devout and saintly life.

Father Knight brings to view what is ignored in all other English biographies of Columbus we are acquainted with, that an ever-present and pervading sense of a divine mission filled his mind; that it was the all-powerful motive of all he did, led him to persevere despite repeated discouragements and disappointments, and sustained him under a weight of false accusations, ingratitude, ill treatment, and calumnies, that otherwise would have crushed him.

The work is written in pleasing style; the statements on controverted points are supported by references and documentary evidence or other sufficient proof, so that it is not only an interesting but a valuable contribution to the history of the discovery of the New World.

FORTHCOMING WORK BY FATHER THEBAUD, S. J.—We are glad to learn that *The Church and the Gentile World at the First Promulgation of the Gospel*, by Father Thebaud, will soon be published. It will be a most interesting book, and will bring out or put in clearer light some facts in the history of Christianity and the Church which have been unknown or overlooked till our day. See a fuller account on advertising sheet.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WE have received from the estimable author of *Monotheism* the following letter, in which he unfolds the plan and purpose of his book, and invites all fair, intelligent judges to read, weigh, and decide upon it accordingly.

VERY REVEREND SIR: In page 654 of your *Review* (number for October, 1876) there occurs the following passage:

“We cannot escape from the necessity of being painfully aware of the generally lamentable inadequacy of the attempt on the Christian side to point out to an honest inquirer the hand of God visibly guiding the nations during the long checkered reign of this ‘Gentilism,’ the latter years of which were marked by so deplorable an alienation of the nations from the truths of the original Revelation. Father Thebaud speaks of his own work as being of *so vast and exalted a nature as to inspire with fear the heart of any one who should make the bold attempt.*”

This passage was followed by the promise, in some future number of the *Review*, of a contribution towards this very work, which is really a part of the debt that Christian science and learning owe to the great multitudes of people who, through the prevailing vast spread of popular knowledge, are now able to pick up smatterings of information on nearly every imaginable subject, that they may at least not be left to grope about in their own helplessness without the aid of some kindly hand stretched out to lead them out of their errors.

. . . In the meantime, however, the general duty above described as the

debt which Christian science and learning owe to the vast multitude has made a little step in advance, the value of which awaits the verdict that I hope in a reasonable course of time will be pronounced upon it. The step in question is the publication in a separate volume, of an argument by which it is shown what a large amount of strictly historical evidence has survived the lapse of time; which requires that the early history of the city of Rome, as commonly understood and taught, should undergo a most important rectification, according to which this one chosen city of the world, which is before the eyes of all the nations of the earth at the present moment as the centre of Christian unity for all the people of the earth, was by no means the idolatrous city from its first origin which it is commonly represented as being.

This much being explained, the following seven headings contain an outline of the course pursued in the investigation:

I. That except Rome had received the knowledge of Monotheism from the Hebrew people, the continuity of the Divine rule of government as regards the preceding imperial powers would be broken off in a manner for which no sufficient reason appears.

II. That ample evidence exists to prove not only the possibility of Rome thus obtaining the knowledge of Monotheism, but the necessity the city was under of making Monotheism the foundation of the political state.

III. That the Christian testimony beginning with St. Paul, is clear and precise, that Rome in the beginning did possess the knowledge of Monotheism, and that she acquired it from the Hebrew people.

IV. That the literature of the Augustan age was under an insuperable necessity to conceal the truth of the early Monotheism of the city.

V. That in spite of this necessity the classic literature contains a superabundance of evidence confirmatory of the Christian testimony.

VI. That on the application of two most searching tests, each issues in the clearest result, thus proving that the political state of Rome was originally founded on the Monotheism of the Hebrew people.

VII. That otherwise it would be found a simple impossibility to reconcile the known characteristics of the rise and growth of the Roman sovereignty over the world with the Christian belief in the Divine rule and government over the events of history.

The above is necessarily a very imperfect outline of the contents of the volume, but, imperfect as it may be, it still, I hope, contains sufficient evidence that I have not raised the question in any other than a very serious way, and that it quite entitles me to say to all who have leisure time to study and examine the question, Gentlemen, what is your verdict? Is the city of Rome guilty of the sin of idolatry from her first origin, or is she not guilty?

. . . . I may, I hope, count upon your kind co-operation in making known to the readers of the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* the existence of the volume containing the above-mentioned evidence respecting the city of Rome, and in conveying to them my very respectful invitation to the effect how much I desire that they should take a foremost part in giving the American verdict on the question which it has been given to me, at least to put into the way of being in due time laid before the judgment of all the various nations of the world, all of whom we may not fail to observe have an equal right to a voice in the verdict to be given.

I remain, Very Reverend Sir,

Your very faithful servant,

HENRY FORMBY.

PERIODICAL

70735

THIS BOOK MAY NOT BE
TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

DOES NOT CIRCULATE

